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ABSTRACT
The democratisation process experienced by third wave countries demonstrates the 
complexity of the relationship between democracy and human rights. The 
incompleteness of the legal state reveals some interconnectedness between 
democratisation and human rights protection, which this research explores in order to 
understand how countries starting democratisation in similar political and civil rights 
conditions ended up with different civil citizenships and control of the security 
apparatus in their new democracies.
In debate with Modernisation theory, this research argues the importance of political 
factors and a legal state for the expansion of civil citizenship. As much as socio­
economic indicators and the development of a welfare state impact human rights, the 
possibility of their violation is embedded in the laws and practices inherited from 
non-democratic regimes and political dynamics that reproduce them. At the same 
time, in a debate with Transition theories, this work emphasises the potential impact 
of regional factors in the democratisation process and the relevance of reintroducing 
geopolitical elements to the discussion.
The regional dimension presents different categories of influence. In order to identify 
regional factors related to the democratic aspects discussed here, this research focuses 
on regional mechanisms for promoting human rights and the rule of law, as well as on 
the regional cooperation or assistance related to law enforcement areas, most 
specifically to the police institution.
Through a comparative analysis of the police in Ecuador and Poland, this research 
discusses: (1) the relationship between the agents of the security apparatus and 
ordinary citizens; (2) the domestic and regional institutional network that regulates 
and controls the lawlessness of their activities; and (3) regional environments that 
promote changes or constrain attempts toward their democratisation.
In summary, this research aims to verify whether or not the regional dimension has 
impacted the democratic salience of the rule of law and human rights in the 
democratisation process.
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Introduction
Given the wave of enthusiasm for widespread processes of democratisation in 
different continents around the world, it is necessary to face the continuous and new 
challenges imposed by those processes. In Latin America, the hope in the 1980s was 
that the end of dictatorships would also imply the end of the abuse of power. 
However, if this was partially true for the political opposition in ensuing 
governments, it was not true for most of the population.
The democratisation process experienced by third wave countries1 demonstrates the 
complexity of the relationship between democracy and human rights. A great deal of 
confusion exists over the relationship between human rights protection and 
democracy. Although strongly interconnected, they are not the same. The degree of 
closeness between them depends very much on the concept of democracy implied as 
well as on the instruments available for its promotion. For this reason, democracy and 
human rights must be analytically decoupled.
Recognising that human rights protection and democracy are not the same does not 
mean that democratic regimes can neglect human rights issues, or that they should 
follow Samuel Huntington’s advice of not prosecuting human rights abusers2. Deeper 
reconciliation in a society and a consolidated democracy require dealing with the 
crimes committed by authoritarian regimes, giving formal apologies to victims and 
their families and punishing those responsible for the crimes in accordance with 
democratic laws. The justice system may become more efficient in dealing with those 
crimes after a period of democratic experience; however, the possibility that this 
efficiency will produce a democratic and human rights-oriented culture requires a 
place for these issues in the political agenda. The same examples used by Huntington3
1 The first wave of democratisation was between 1828 and 1926, the second one was between 1943 
and 1963, and the third wave started in 1974 with Portugal (Huntington 1991 p. 16).
2 Guidelines for Democratisers 4: “(1) If transformation or transplacement occurred, do not attempt to 
prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights violations. The political costs of such an effort will 
outweigh any moral gains” (Huntington 1991 p. 231).
3 In Southern Cone countries there have been many attempts to deal with the past. Since the Presidency 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state has recognised its responsibility in past crimes and 
has created a Commission to review those cases and indemnify victims or their families. Argentina and 
Chile are also reviewing their laws of general amnesty. For the first time, early in 2006 the Supreme 
Court of Chile admitted complaints related to human rights violations against the former Dictator
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in his argument demonstrate the necessity to deal with the past in order to protect the 
present and to strengthen the future of democracy. Reconciliation with the truth and 
with justice is a necessary epilogue for every authoritarian past, and it is an important 
part of the continuum of the democratic process.
At the same time, the protection of human rights from state violence cannot be 
limited to the violations that have already been committed. It is the legal framework 
that creates the core of human rights protection. Without guarantees or “the right to 
have rights,” to use Hannah Arendt’s expression, it is not possible to effectuate any 
protection vis-a-vis the state. As Koszeg (in K&d&r 2001 p. 5) observes:
“The possibility of such rights violations is embedded in the law, which gives 
rough and general indications to law enforcement agencies, especially the 
police, concerning the extent of human rights and limits on the use of force; it 
is embedded in the internal structure of these organisations, in a police force 
that functions like a military machine, by following orders unquestioningly; it 
is embedded in inherited practices, in a philosophy openly expressed -  or 
sometimes sworn in secret.”
Addressing past crimes and strengthening a liberal and democratic rule of law are 
both necessaiy for building democracy.
Due to the approach defined here, this research does not address past crimes issues, it 
focuses in particular on a “probl&natique of democracy” that O’Donnell (1999 p. 
325) has identified as critical for any democracy; that is, the legal state specifically 
regarding the effective extension of civil citizenship and accountability under the rule 
of law. The incompleteness of this legal state implies some interconnectedness 
between democratisation and human rights protection that this research aims to 
explore in order to understand how countries that began to democratise under similar 
conditions, mostly with regard to political and civil rights, ended up with different 
types of control over the state’s repressive apparatus in their new democracies.
General Augusto Pinochet. In Uruguay, the government of Tabari Vasquez, inaugurated in 2005, also 
started to investigate past crimes.
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Full human rights protection requires deep reforms for countries moving away from 
an authoritarian past. Not only must the government democratise, but the state must 
also, a fact very often obliterated by the dominant discussion on the political system. 
Based on this assumption, this research elaborates on the legal state and the reforms 
to democratise it. In order to develop the discussion about the democratisation of the 
legal state, this research looks at the relationship between the state and its population 
specifically through the analysis of the police, its principles and functioning in new 
democracies. The discussion about the police will attempt to build a bridge between 
formal human rights and their protection in practice.
Protecting human rights in their most basic aspect and controlling the state’s 
repressive apparatus are an old challenge in a new context; new not only in their 
domestic aspects of new democracies but also in their regional and international 
environment of a more dynamic and tight interrelations. For this reason, this research 
focuses on one aspect seldom explored about democratisation processes: their 
regional dimension. It looks comparatively at the impact that the regional political 
environment may have in the protection of human rights, more precisely at the 
control of the police institution in order to protect not only the political opposition but 
also all vulnerable groups in society. This research elaborates on the argument that 
there is a close connection between human rights protection and regional initiatives, 
and also between the regional environment and the priorities established in the 
democratisation process. Domestic concerns about the legal person have more and 
more connection to its regional construction.
Composing Democracy: Time and Chord
A discussion within the framework of a democratisation process requires clarifying 
some aspects of this process and of specific sets of institutions. Without missing the 
integral vision of this process, it is relevant to identify separately the different 
interrelated questions in debate.
The first question concerns the concept of democratisation implicit in this research. 
This process is usually divided into three stages: liberalisation, democratic transition,
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and democratic consolidation. Liberalisation is identified as the moment when there 
may be some changes in policy and the introduction of some legal safeguards for 
individuals, such as habeas corpus (Linz and Stepan 1996 p. 3), but since it starts 
under a non-democratic regime and is characterised by the mere toleration of 
opposition, the main changes are in the sense of softening the regime. During 
liberalisation there may also be an increasing concern about international public 
opinion; however, the relationship with international human rights regimes, when it is 
not totally ignored, is still openly conflictive. As this research focuses on the 
contradictions present in an already democratic context, it will skip the discussion of 
the liberalising phase.
Democratic transition may still embrace liberalisation, but it implies a further 
transition, which means that the opposition is not only tolerated but is able to compete 
for the control of government. Open contestation and free association are permitted 
and competitive elections introduced. At the international level, the attitude toward 
human rights regimes starts to change as states desire to be well accepted in the 
international community and have more access to financial funds. Most changes in 
this period are related to political and, to some extent, civil rights.
Democratic consolidation, in turn, is considered as the process that leads democracy 
to become the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996), when “democracy 
acquires deep and widespread legitimacy among all major elite groups and the 
citizenry at large” (Diamond and Plattner 1996 pp. xxviii-xxix) and it is sustained in 
its behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions. Democratic consolidation, 
following Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996 p. 6), presents three dimensions. The 
first one, behavioural, implies the absence of threat and acceptance of alternative 
proposals for democracy from any group in the country. The second dimension, 
attitudinal, means that democracy has strong support from public opinion. The third 
one, constitutional, indicates that all forces in the country are subjected and 
habituated to law. Put in a different way, democratic procedures and institutions are 
responsible for resolving any conflict in society.
Some authors emphasise specific elements during this process, such as strong 
political parties for political stabilisation and legitimate representation (Sartori 1976;
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Pridham and Lewis 1995) or the advantage of parliamentarism to avoid critical 
conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of government (Linz 1990; 
Linz and Valenzuela 1994a and 1994b; Horowitz 1990). Others highlight the 
necessity of a democratic political culture for a real commitment to democracy (Dahl 
1971), focus on socio-economic conditions (Lipset 1980; Przeworski 1995), or stress 
the importance of accountability to provide space for the opposition and 
underprivileged groups in society to dialogue and negotiate (Mendez, O’Donnell and 
Pinheiro 1999).
It is difficult to determine precisely when a democratic regime becomes consolidated; 
depending on the emphasis received by certain elements, the concept of democratic 
consolidation may be very controversial. In fact, it is intrinsically related to the 
concept of democracy assumed4. The utility of the term “democratic consolidation”, 
for instance, is questioned by O’Donnell (in Diamond et al. 1997) when applied to the 
new democracies since he identifies them with polyarchies; that is, basically 
synonymous with political institutionalisation5. According to Dahl (1971 pp. 3-8), a 
polyarchy is based on three opportunities: (1) to formulate preferences, (2) to signify 
preferences, and (3) to have preferences weighted equally in the conduct of 
government. The struggle for democracy, in this case, is grounded in political 
freedoms6. The challenge for new democracies or polyarchical regimes is to 
incorporate a liberal component, which means solving the paradox pointed out by 
Zakaria (2004 pp. 101-102) of conciliating democracy that is about the accumulation 
and use of power with constitutional liberalism that is about the limitation of power. 
Introducing accountability and strengthening civil rights become more difficult for
4 Collier and Levitsky (1996) describe five different types of democracy: the electoralist; procedural 
minimum; expanded procedural minimum; established industrial democracy; maximalist definition.
5 A formal democracy as opposed to substantive democracy, in Agnes Heller’s terms, or a low 
intensity democracy in opposition to high intensity democracy in Boaventura Souza Santos’ 
expression. O’Donnell also uses a similar term “low intensity citizenship” for new polyarchies where 
individuals are citizens in terms of their political rights, but not their civil rights due to violations of the 
law at a social level (Mendez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro 1999 p. 320).
6 Therefore, polyarchies require the following institutions for their consolidation: (1) freedom to form 
and join organisations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) 
right of political leaders to compete for support and for votes, (6) alternative sources of information, 
(7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preferences. O'Donnell adds three other requirements: (8) elected officials (and 
some appointed persons, such as high court judges) should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end 
of their constitutionally mandated terms; (9) elected officials should not be subject to severe 
constraints, vetoes, or exclusion from certain policy domains by other, non-elected actors, especially 
the armed forces; and (10) there should be an uncontested territoiy that clearly defines the voting 
population (O’Donnell 1998 pp. 34-51).
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these new regimes, since they have followed a reverse historical sequence in relation 
to the expansion of subjective rights in comparison to the most developed 
democracies, where civil citizenship preceded political citizenship (Mendez, 
O’Donnell and Pinheiro 1999 p. 324).
Rather than engaging in the discussion about the definition of democracy and its 
consolidation, this research starts from three interrelated assumptions about 
democracy and democratisation. First, polyarchy, despite its initial contradiction with 
constitutional liberalism, offers a necessaiy and valuable ground for the struggle to 
foster a liberal democracy. Second, as a corollary deriving from the previous 
statement, this research approaches democracy as more than a political regime; in 
O’Donnell’s words (in Mendez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro 1999 p. 321) it should also 
refer to a “particular mode of relationship between state and citizens, and among 
citizens themselves, under a kind of rule of law that, in addition to political 
citizenship, upholds civil citizenship and a full network of accountability”. It leads us 
to a third assumption in this research: that democracy is a long-term and open-ended 
outcome. In this sense, this research assumes a moderately “constructivist approach” 
as presented by Whitehead (2002 p. 3), by understanding that “democracy is not just 
a feasible equilibrium but is a socially desirable and imaginary future”.
Comparative Politics Approach: Introducing Two (Sub) Regions
Among the third wave of democratising experiences in member states of consolidated 
regional human rights regimes,7 Latin America and Eastern Europe bring interesting
o
issues for the discussion I propose here. Specifically, the Andean Region (AR) and 
East Central Europe (ECE)9 permit cross-regional comparisons that, despite the
7 Apart from the European System for the Protection of Human Rights and the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, there is also the African System of Human and People’s Rights. The African “Banjul” 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights was adopted in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. In other 
regions there are only some instruments for human rights protection, but not structured mechanisms 
with human rights courts.
8 AR countries are identified as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. They are all part of 
the Andean Community of Nations (CAN in its Spanish initials), created in 1969, with the exception of 
Venezuela that withdrew from the community in May 2006.
9 ECE countries or the so-called Visegrad Four are constituted by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland. This term comes from the meeting held in Visegrad, Hungary in February 1991 
by the prime-minister of Hungary and the presidents of Poland and what at that time was still
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oversimplification this perspective implies, do illustrate the link between the 
theoretical discussion and the empirical evidence. The AR and ECE sub-regions 
make a clear and interesting case to exemplify the arguments I pursue in this research.
Due to the complexity of variables involved in this research, I have limited the scope 
for specific comparison to the cases of Ecuador and Poland. In the AR, Colombia and 
Venezuela do not qualify for the research since they belong to the second 
democratisation wave (1943-1962). Peru elected its first civilian president in 1980 but 
experienced a recent reverse period in its democratisation process with Fujimori's 
military-backed self-coup in 1992. And Bolivia, with its first civilian president 
elected in 1982, presents stronger ethnic tensions and a higher level of poverty 
compared to Ecuador. Among ECE countries, Slovakia and the Czech Republic make 
a special case since they emerged from a country-split process. Hungary could make 
a possible case for comparison, but it shares fewer social, political, and cultural 
similarities with Ecuador than Poland does.
In both sub-regions, Ecuador and Poland were the first countries to initiate transition. 
Ecuador started the democratisation process with the new Constitution and the 
election of a civilian president, Jaime Roldds, in 1979. In Poland the roundtable 
discussions between the Party-State regime and the opposition ended Communist rule 
in 1989, and in 1990 Lech Walesa, the leader of the Solidarity movement, was elected 
president. Both countries, as will be further developed, started their transition through 
a negotiated process between the authoritarian forces and the new democratic ones. 
The difference in time for the beginning of transition in both sub-regions does not 
interfere in the analysis. The decade that separates the Ecuadorian and the Polish 
initiating process, and especially the end of the bipolar world, make the conditions I 
propose to discuss and the importance of the regional dimension more visible; 
furthermore, they make the analytical decoupling between democracy and human 
rights more necessary.
Czechoslovakia to discuss mutual cooperation. In October of the same year, these countries signed a 
cooperation agreement in Krakow, Poland, and in December 1992 they created the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
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In terms of human rights violations, both countries presented a moderate repression 
when compared with other non-democratic regimes. If we look at the survey 
conducted by the Freedom House to measure political and civil rights, both countries 
initiated transition with a similar situation (see Annex, Table 1). In 1979, Ecuador 
was considered a free country with a score of two for political rights and four for civil 
rights, while Poland in 1989 was considered only partly free and scored four for 
political rights and three for civil rights. However, from their respective second years 
of democratic elected government, both were considered free and scored the same, 
two for both political and civil rights.
Although Ecuador and Poland have different historical developments, both countries 
share a past formation based on Western values. In Poland, the European liberal 
values were well established, as much as in other parts of the West (Whitehead 1996 
p. 359). Both are also deeply religious countries with a strong and prominent 
representation of the Catholic Church.
Additionally, Ecuador and Poland present regional strategic positions. Ecuador has 
borders with Colombia, a country emerged in an internal conflict for decades, and it 
constitutes part of the “Pacific corridor” used for drug trafficking and migration, two 
security issues in the hyper-realist perception of the U.S., the regional hegemonic 
power. Poland represents a significant border with the East and a virtual “wall” 
against organised crime, terrorism, and also migration in the perception of European 
countries. Ecuador and Poland also have a history of territorial dispute. The dispute 
between Poland and Germany was resolved in 1990 with an agreement between both 
parties accepting the Oder-Niesse line as their definitive frontier. The dispute 
between Ecuador and Peru was only resolved in 1998 with the Peace Agreement 
signed between the two countries. Conversely, both countries have been very 
sensitive to external influence.
In terms of initial conditions for democratisation, geopolitical concerns, and 
neighbourhood turbulence, both countries lend themselves to the comparison 
developed here. By limiting the scope of my comparison to the context of the Andean 
and East Central European sub-regions, I assume the risk of omitting different sub- 
regions in the Americas and Europe that also have made a great effort at
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democratisation. I acknowledge the potential contribution of those other sub-regions 
to my research. Although European institutions have had an important role in 
Southern European countries since their political liberalisation process, the AR and 
ECE make more interesting sub-regional environment cases due to the external 
sensitivity both regions presented already during the Cold War. The same criteria are 
valid for Southern Cone countries, where regional influence is less visible in 
countries the size of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina. The Balkan states10 and 
Central America, in turn, present a recent experience of internal armed conflict. The 
AR, as already mentioned, also experienced war after democratisation had started, but 
the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru did not involve the civilian population. 
Yet, with the intention of working with specific sub-regional environments, I also 
omit the isolated cases of Turkey and Mexico.
Notations for Democratic Expansion in Ecuador and Poland
The possibility for democratic expansion involves different interactive and 
complementaiy elements that permit one to compare the reality of the countries this 
research examines. Those elements can be recognised in their main areas of action, 
which Linz and Stepan (1996 pp. 7-15) identify as five arenas: (1) a lively civil 
society, (2) a relatively autonomous political society, (3) an economic society, (4) a 
usable state, and (5) the rule of law.
Civil society is the arena where individuals, groups and movements from all social 
strata articulate values, create solidarities, and advance their interests (Linz and 
Stepan in Diamond et al. 1997 p. 17). A lively civil society requires two basic 
institutions: freedom of expression and freedom of association. This arena was 
paramount in order to mobilise the opposition to non-democratic regimes in both 
regions. A civil society enables people to generate political debate and alternative 
policy proposals, as well as to organise institutions and to monitor the government 
and the state. Concerning human rights, civil society, through manifold organisations, 
is greatly responsible for generating policies in this field, promoting changes, and
10 Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and the Former Yugoslavia.
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activating mechanisms of protection. The question this arena poses to us is why civil 
society in Ecuador, in comparison to Poland, has not been able to create a civic 
culture that can push for the strengthening of legal institutions and for the expansion 
of civil rights. Still following Freedom House’s scores for political and civil rights 
(see Annex Table 1), in the first four years of democratically elected governments, 
both countries were judged equally free, and both were deemed to have a fertile 
terrain for the formation and development of civil society groups.
The trade unions in Ecuador, led by FUT (Frente Unitario de Trabajadores11), played 
an important role in the opposition to the militaiy dictatorship during the 1970s, and 
in the protests against the outcomes of economic policies during the debt crisis that 
dominated Latin America in the beginning of the 1980s. The Catholic Church has 
kept a relevant place in Ecuadorian society, but its activities have been mainly local 
rather than national. The same can be argued about student movements. By the end of 
the 1980s, new social actors with new demands emerged or were strengthened, such 
as human rights organisations, women’s groups and environmental groups, 
neighbourhood organisations, and the strongest one, the indigenous movement with 
its claim for a plurinational state. The indigenous movement has been primarily 
articulated in CONAIE (Confederation de Nacionalidades Indigenas)12, created in 
1986. However, the collective rights of indigenous people and of black communities 
were recognised for the first time only in the 1998 Constitution, and the plurinational 
character of society remains to be built.
In Poland, the two main forces in society during transition were the Catholic Church 
and the Solidarity movement. The Polish Catholic Church, unlike the Hungarian, was 
not accused of collaborating with the Nazi occupation, and it never publicly 
compromised with the Communist regime, although it did accommodate it
11 FUT joined three of the five Ecuadorian national labour unions: CEDOCUT (Confederation 
Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Unitarias de Trabajadores), CTE (Confederation de Trabajadores del 
Ecuador) and CEOSL (Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales). The other two are: UGTE 
(Union General de Trabajadores del Ecuador) and CEDOC (Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones 
Clasistas). With the exception o f the UGTE and the CEDOCUT that were organised, but not 
necessarily legally recognised, in 1982 and 1976 respectively, the others were already organised before 
the 1970s. CEDOC, the oldest one was organised in 1938 (Vdzquez and Saltos 2004).
12 There are other older indigenous organisations, such as FEI (Federacion Ecuatoriana de Indios, 
important during the 1950s and 1960s), FENOCIN {Federacion Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas, Indigenas y  Negras, important during the 1970s), and FEINE {Federacion Ecuatoriana 
de Indigenas Evangelicos), organised in the 1980s by the Evangelical churches.
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(Prazmowska 2004 p. 205). The Church was able to keep its moral authority during 
the non-democratic regime, and saw its support increased with the election in 1978 of 
the Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy. When the transition started, the 
Church enjoyed a paramount position in society and played a direct role in 
negotiations between the government and the opposition. At the same time, Poland 
entered the 1980s with economic difficulties that encouraged workers to form free 
trade unions, soon named Solidarity. The movement, the largest and most disciplined 
ever seen in Europe, challenged the regime’s control over society and reasserted the 
Catholic Church as a moral reference and national symbol (Millard in White et al. 
2003 p. 24). The declaration of martial law in December 1981 allowed the 
government to declare Solidarity illegal and to imprison many of its members. In 
1986, all prisoners detained under martial law were given amnesty, and in 1988, 
when new strikes broke out during an economic crisis largely caused by the growing 
foreign debt, the regime had to turn to Solidarity’s leaders to stop protests and try to 
negotiate some support for economic reforms (Prazmowska 2004 p. 210; Millard in 
White et al. 2003 p. 24). In 1989, the Solidarity trade union was restored to legality 
with the leadership of Lech Walesa, and it fully participated in the Round Table Talks 
that set up the process of democratisation.
Wrongly presented as the opposite of civil society is the political society arena. In 
both sub-regions, democratisation was stressed by a discourse that emphasised "civil 
society versus state." Nevertheless, the political arena is also vital for democratic life. 
It is the space where the competition for legitimate control over public power and 
over the state apparatus takes place (Linz and Stepan in Lariy Diamond et al. 1997 p. 
17). The institutional design of a political society may present a complex variation 
among democracies, from its form of government to its type of party and electoral 
system. Discussion abounds about what might be the most appropriate arrangement 
for institutional routinisation aiming to regulate the conflicts inherent in any 
democratic polity.
Ecuador and Poland are not classic contrasting cases. Poland has adopted a semi- 
presidential system, at least until the promulgation of its 1997 Constitution that 
strengthened the parliamentary character of the system; Ecuador, until the reforms 
introduced by its 1998 Constitution, had a presidential system with parliamentary
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elements, such as the possibility of parliamentary motions against ministers of the 
government cabinet. Both countries, in the beginning of their respective 
democratisation processes, presented low leadership control over parties, a personal 
type of vote, high volatility of the party system, and opposition in the legislature 
leading to, in different degrees, deadlocks in the government. However, despite all 
the problems and imperfections in its system, Poland was able to advance rapidly in 
the democratisation process, as the external legitimacy given by its accession to the 
EU in 2004 suggests. However, in Ecuador, political instability and flaws in its 
democratic rules have increased in recent years, as illustrated by the downfall of three 
out of the four most recently elected presidents: Abdal£ Bucaram (1996-1997), Jamil 
Mahuad (1998-2000), and Lucio Gutierrez (2003-2005). In the beginning of the 
process the perception of democratisation in both countries would point to other 
directions. Ecuador seemed to have a more stable polyarchical system with fewer 
problematic polities, and Poland presented a difficult institutional building process.
The third arena is the economic society, responsible for the mediation between state 
and market through a set of accepted norms, institutions, and regulations, which must 
be socio-politically established in order to make democracy fundamentally concerned 
with citizens rather than with consumers. In Ecuador, the previous regimes had left a 
legacy favouring consolidation in this arena. Ecuador had already stimulated private 
accumulation, encouraged certain forms of competitiveness, and created fiscal 
institutions to strengthen an institutionalised market. From the perspective of 
individual autonomy, at a first glance it would seem that Poland had as many, if not 
more, serious problems to overcome than Ecuador, since all the sources of status and 
wealth were concentrated in the state. In addition to the task of consolidating an 
economic society, the dual transition in Poland presented the paradox of struggling 
for civil rights while, at the same time, introducing new social relations that are 
inherently unequal in their ownership structure. During the process of dismantling the 
communist regimes, citizenship rights were identified with ownership rights 
(Whitehead 2001 p. 358). Yet, in both countries, the process of democratisation was 
filled with tension from pressures for the application of neoliberal economic reforms.
The concept of a usable state represents the fourth arena and refers to the state’s 
capacity to accomplish at least the minimal functions implicit in the Weberian
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definition of a state; a usable state must be able to exercise a monopoly over the use 
of force in its territory, protect the rights of its citizens, and deliver the basic services 
they demand. For that, the state requires a functioning apparatus with rational-legal- 
bureaucratic norms. Economic crisis and anti-statist reforms tend to increase this 
deficiency. In Ecuador, the economic crisis over debt and adjustment reforms which 
mainly favoured the interests of dominant groups in society have aggravated 
problems regarding the disconnected and less-than-accessible welfare state and have 
weakened civil citizenship. In Poland, the deficiency was mainly due to the 
juxtaposition of party and state; when the party was delegitimised, it affected the 
whole state apparatus indistinguishably, including the consolidated welfare state. Out 
of different circumstances, both countries faced problems in relation to their delivery 
of services. However, although it is true that their capacity to deliver social services is 
not comparable due to the heritage of their previous regime types, this is not true for 
issues specifically related to the control of their repressive state apparatus and the 
protection of civil rights, which can be better discussed in the following democratic 
arena.
Finally, the rule of law is the arena related to the existence of a legal system. A set of 
rules must be created and must be properly enacted, that is, publicly promulgated by 
independent and impartial authorities. It must be predictable and equally applied to all 
people and institutions. It is the central arena for the constitutionalism dimension of 
democratic consolidation, meaning that the state apparatus and government are also 
subjected to the law, their power and competence have clear limits, and they are 
accountable for their actions. The rule of law arena permits the strengthening and 
expansion of civil citizenship by limiting and constitutionally regulating the 
government and the state, both of which, as O’Donnell stresses, “exist for, and on 
behalf of, individuals who are carriers of subjective rights enacted and backed by the 
same legal system that the state and the government must obey and from which they 
derive their authority” (O’Donnell et al. 2004 p. 28).
The strengthening of the rule of law requires the existence of an independent 
judiciary, a police under direct civilian control, and a legal culture which reflects 
equality under the law and its pre-eminence in civil and criminal matters (Linz and 
Stepan 1996 p. 308). It is important to emphasise the democratic and liberal nature of
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the rule of law in order to empower people to exercise control over their governments 
and over agents of the state’s repressive apparatus (Prib&n 2002). The law empty of 
democratic and liberal principles may be a mere instrument of dominance. The rule of 
law does not necessarily mean democratic rule, just as democratic rule does not offer 
an automatic guarantee of human rights. Highly bureaucratic authoritarian states tend 
to have a proliferation of laws and codes as an instrument to exercise power over their 
citizens. A famous expression attributed to the Brazilian populist-dictator Getulio 
Vargas (1934-1945) illustrates this logic: “For my friends, everything; for my 
enemies, the law.” Thus, the concept of the “rule of law” applied here is not restricted 
to the idea of formal rules and procedures, since it is not the same to talk about “rule 
by law,” that is, acting accordingly to the law, and the “rule of law,” understood as 
the “legally based rule of a democratic state,” in O’Donnell’s words (Mendez et al. 
1999 p. 318). Yet, according to O’Donnell, the “rule of law” entails: (1) guarantees of 
polyarchy; (2) civil rights for the whole population; and (3) networks of responsibility 
and accountability which ensure that all agents, public or private, are subjected to 
legally established control of the lawfulness of their acts.
It is the development and articulation of all five of these arenas that pushes for further 
democratisation. However, this research focuses on the last arena, due to the specific 
elements of comparison it affords. The rule of law arena permits us to focus the 
discussion on the “triangle of tension” between society, its laws, and its repressive 
apparatus (Lindholt et al. 2003 p. 6). By delimiting our analysis to the legal state, we 
avoid entering into a discussion of comparisons between countries that, despite many 
similarities, also present strong differences in relation to the welfare state. The 
comparison proposed here involves the relationship between agents of the state’s 
repressive apparatus and ordinary citizens, and specifically concentrates on the third 
entailment of the rule of law pointed out by O’Donnell, that is: the institutional 
networks that regulate and control the lawlessness of their activities.
Transition Theory and the Prior Regime Type
In the literature that emerged from regime changes in Southern Europe and Latin 
America, there is a consensus that the prior regime is one of the determinants of the
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transition path and the consolidation tasks, and it is also valid in discussing Eastern 
European cases (Linz and Stepan 1996 pp. 53-65). In this sense, the possibility of 
comparison between the democratisation processes in Ecuador and Poland would be 
frustrated if we strictly contrasted communist regimes, as a monolithic bloc of 
regimes, and military capitalist regimes without analysing variations that they present 
in the exercise of power. The pace and degree of Stalinisation in Poland differed from 
other Party-State countries with regard to: (1) the amount of terror applied and the 
political violence, which predominated during the takeover and consolidation of 
power period (1944-47) rather than during the subsequent Stalinisation process 
(1948-54); (2) the significant capacity retained by the elite for defending its survival; 
(3) the incomplete collectivisation of agriculture; and (4) the restricted animosity 
between the regime and the Catholic Church, limited to the trial of only a few 
members (Sanford 2002 p. 25).
Additionally, as with some post-totalitarian regimes, such as Hungary, Poland had 
already faced a certain liberalisation process when the transition began. This 
approximated them to the military bureaucratic regime type in certain aspects on 
which this research focuses. Already in 1956, as Sanford (2002 p. 29) observes:
T]here was a long drawn out redefinition of the ‘Dictatorship of the 
Pro“[letariaf and the constitutional-philosophical framework for the exercise 
of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR, Polish Zjednoczona Portia 
Robotnicza) hegemony. The Stalinist formulation, that People’s Democracy 
was an inferior variant developing towards the Soviet model, was replaced by 
Gomulka’s national domestic flexibility -  although he supported ideological 
homogeneity, albeit of a looser type, within the Soviet bloc.”
Before the democratisation process started in Poland, the “decolonisation process” 
from the Soviet Union had already begun; Poland experienced changes that increased 
religious tolerance, enhanced the role of Parliament, and most significant, increased a 
concern for national over class struggle. After the declaration of martial law in 
December 1981, the Soviet Union authorised the army and not the Communist Party 
to assume control of Poland (Prazmowska 2004 p. 208). Whether it was due to a 
perception that the party was weak or due to fear of a backlash with the party action is
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difficult to say, but the point is that the Jaruzelski regime (1981-1989) strengthened 
the role of the military in the political life of the country.
In addition to the strong military character of both authoritarian regimes, Ecuador and 
Poland present transitions involving negotiation and pacts. In 1977, the Ecuadorian 
military leaders announced their desire to leave power, but before they left, a new 
Constitution was approved by a referendum in 1978. In Poland, the roundtable 
negotiations between the communist government and the Solidarity movement 
resulted in a pact for a peaceful transition signed by both parties in 1989, and the 
reform of the legal order began within the existing constitutional framework. In 1992, 
the existing Constitution, dubbed “the Empty Constitution” suffered some reforms 
that led it to be called the “Little Constitution”; it was finally replaced by a new 
Constitution only in 1997. Both countries kept the constitution of the former regime 
for many years after initiating the democratisation process.
Regarding political rights, as already observed, there is not much difference between 
AR and ECE countries in the beginning of their respective democratisation processes. 
Following the Schumpeterian tradition, which stresses the free competition for votes 
among political parties as a defining feature of democracy, the countries of both 
regions could be considered political democracies after the transfer of power from the 
non-democratic governments to transitional ones and fit within the same category of 
likelihood for a democratic outcome.
Thus, in relation to the expansion of political and civil rights, the previous regime 
type per se does not preclude the comparison proposed and, in this case, does not 
explain differences in dealing with the reconciliation of civilian control over the 
military and police and the definition of their role in society.
Modernisation Theory and the Prerogative of Socio-economic Indicators
Modernisation theory has demonstrated, with much diversity in methodological and 
conceptual measures, the strong relationship between socio-economic development 
and democracy (Diamond and Plattner 1992; Huntington 1968; Lipset 1980, 1994;
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Przeworski 1995). The developmental indicators most commonly tested in 
association with democracy are wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and education. 
The higher those indices are, Lipset argues, the more democratic the country is or the 
greater a chance it has to become so. The main argument is that wealth increases 
social equality by diffusing power and education, and socio-economic development 
diminishes radicalism and determines the form of class struggle by permitting “those 
in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and 
gradualist views of politics” (Lipset 1980 p. 45). The issue of whether there is a 
causal relationship between democracy and socio-economic indicators, and in which 
direction it might go, has generated much controversy. The only consensus in the 
literature about democracy and development is that higher levels of socio-economic 
development generate a higher probability of democratic stability or durability 
(Diamond and Plattner 1992; Przeworski 1995; Leftwich 1993, 1996; Sen 1995). 
Socio-economic development facilitates democratisation but it is not entirely 
determinative of it, at least in the short and medium term.
In the beginning of the democratisation process, Poland for instance had an 
exceptional economic performance; in the period of 1991-1995, its average annual 
GDP growth was 2.3%. However, Hungary presented a negative growth of 2.2% 
(World Bank 2002). In the same period, Hungary had an annual average inflation rate 
of 25% for consumer prices, while Poland reached a problematic three figure-rate, 
192% for consumer prices (World Bank 2002). With these indicators it is difficult to 
find a causal relationship between the economic performance of the two countries and 
their democratic performance in the region. A look at Ecuador and Bolivia’s 
indicators will also reveal more intra-regional differences than cross-regional ones. In 
their first years of democratisation, Ecuador (1979-84) presented an average annual 
GDP growth of 2.7%, while Bolivia (1982-87) had a negative growth of 1.6%. The 
Southern European democratisation experience also illustrates the difficult causal 
relationship between socio-economic performance and democracy. When 
democratisation started in Portugal in 1974, 23% of its population was illiterate, 
higher than the illiteracy rate of Ecuador in 1979, it was 18.7%. Other indicators 
show no better development in Portugal; for example, its GDP growth was only 
1. 1%.
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The human development index (HDI), formulated by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), has been adopted to emphasise socio­
development rather than economic performance as having a strong correlation with a 
regime’s level of democratisation. The HDI, combining three basic dimensions of 
human development - a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of 
living -  readdresses Lipset’s thesis in the terms suggested by Diamond (Diamond and 
Plattner 1992 pp. 108-109), that the statement of “the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” should be slightly reformulated as 
“the more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will 
favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country.” The HDI (see 
Annex Table 2) shows a significant difference between Poland and Ecuador. 
However, if we analyse the socio-economic indicators for Ecuador, there are slight 
improvements that do not correspond to the development of political and civil rights; 
during the same period, those rights have deteriorated in the country (see Annex 
Table 1).
By questioning the causal relationship between socio-economic indicators and 
political and civil rights, I am not denying the positive correlation they have or 
arguing against the indivisibility of human rights, as it was reasserted at the Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. However, there are complementary 
factors to socio-economic conditions that explain the human rights reality in many 
countries and are also fundamental for its improvement. In addition to socio­
economic indicators - affluence, growth with moderate inflation, declining inequality
- Przeworski and other authors have suggested three more conditions for democratic
11endurance: democracy , parliamentary institutions, and a favourable international 
climate (Larry Diamond et al. 1997). To those conditions, if we want to discuss the 
possibility of further democratisation, it is necessary to add or emphasise the legal 
state and its role in the extension of civil rights, and the specific regional environment 
surrounding those processes.
13 This apparently tautological argument of democracy as a condition for democracy is presented by 
the authors to counter the idea that dictatorship favours development in poor countries. In this vein, 
observing 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, they argue, there is no evidence that developed 
dictatorships are more likely to become democracies than poor democracies (Przeworski and Limongi 
1995).
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Here we also have to argue with another line of the modernisation theory that defines 
“civic culture” as a precondition for democratisation (Almond and Vera 1963 and 
1980). There is no question that civic culture favours a democratic outcome, but it 
cannot be assumed as a precondition for it, or we risk resembling Tocqueville when 
he reveals all his aristocratic nostalgia with his idea that freedom is not something 
that can be taught but is something that one simply has or does not have (Tocqueville 
1955). Furthermore, civic culture is not a static institution one country has or does not 
have; it would be difficult to explain the “reverse waves” of democratisation based on 
this. In Latin America, after World War II, most countries had already reached an 
intermediate level of development (O’Donnell 1973); they had exhausted the stage of 
import substitution and already had a larger urban population when the second wave 
of authoritarianism took over. It is necessary to look at other domestic factors playing 
with the logic of the Cold War and its regional politics to understand the authoritarian 
coalition reconvened under military bureaucratic-authoritarianism (Collier 1979). 
Modernisation theory can neither explain why countries under dictatorships are able 
to improve their social and economic indicators nor why countries with low civic 
culture are able to democratise. Yet, if we take into consideration experience with 
democracy after World War II, Poland had almost no experience, while Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru, presented at least 10 years of political democracy (Huntington 1991 
p. 271).
I do not intend to ignore the importance of socio-economic and cultural aspects, but 
to call attention to other variables, the legal state and regional politics that also have 
an important impact on democracy and democratisation. There are problems, as Linz 
and Stepan remind us (Diamond et al. 1997 p. 31), specifically related to “the 
functioning of the state (...) that allow us to speak of the quality of democracy 
separately from the quality of society.” This differentiation between the quality of 
society and the quality of democracy is important in understanding the complexity of 
the democratisation process and all of its elements.
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Regional Dimension
Another consensus in the transition literature that has emerged from the regime 
change experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America is that the choice of 
institutions and policies in the democratisation process is predominantly a domestic 
affair (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). The emphasis of transition and 
modernisation theories on domestic factors has neglected the analysis of the 
interaction between democratisation and external factors. The debate on 
democratisation in Eastern Europe, however, has reasserted the role and significance 
of the international dimension. Even if the influence of the international context is 
mediated - and normally it is - through national actors and processes to varying 
degrees, any regime change is affected by the international political context. This is 
not to say that international factors are the “prime movers,” but to recognise that 
contemporary regimes are increasingly more affected by them. The problem, as 
pointed out by Schmitter (in Whitehead 2001 p. 28) is that the international context is 
a difficult variable to pinpoint.
From the recent debate on democratisation, two assumptions have been stated. First, 
the effects of the international dimension will be greater and more lasting during a 
stage of further democratisation than during the initial transition to democracy. As 
this process advances, new international arrangements will be formed and developed 
in reaction to this effort and will gain more legitimacy on both levels, nationally and 
internationally. Secondly, the international dimension that can influence 
democratisation is regional. The regional context, or international sub-context, is 
more favourable for the construction of the “structure of opportunities” (Schmitter in 
Whitehead 2001 p. 40). The regional context presents the most effective channel for 
external actors to influence domestic politics, not only due to cultural and 
geographical affinity, but mostly because of contemporary patterns of regional 
interdependence. The development of multilateral initiatives through regional 
mechanisms and the formation at regional levels of free-trade areas, common 
markets, and economic blocs promote the elaboration of regional strategies by all 
types of interest groups.
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In order to deal with the regional factors impinging on democratisation, this research 
uses the analytical framework elaborated by Whitehead (2001 pp. 3-25), who defines 
three, sometimes overlapping, explanations for the international dimension of 
democratisation. The first explanation model, “contagion”, is defined as a 
parsimonious interpretation based on the idea of a neutral process of transmission that 
“might induce countries bordering on democracies to replicate the political 
institutions of their neighbours” (Whitehead 2001 p. 6). Without taking into 
consideration actors and channels of transmission, this category presents a limited 
capacity to explain democratisation; it endeavours to explain when and where 
democratisation starts, but not the content of the process. Particularly in the cases of 
AR and ECE countries, the domino effect is not very helpful to explain even the 
initial process in Ecuador and Poland, since the two countries compared were the first 
in their respective sub-regions to initiate the democratisation process. Additionally, 
by ignoring the development process in each wave of democratisation, this 
explanation model does not recognise the international or regional constraints on 
further democratisation.
The second model, the “control” explanation, rests on “the policy of a third power.”14 
This approach takes into consideration the role played by external actors, their 
interests, and their instruments and strategies of action. This model permits us to 
understand the development of the democratisation process, its speed, direction, and 
limits (Whitehead 2001 pp. 8-15). The control approach used here is related to the 
indirect systems of support and influence, through allocation of aid, cooperation, 
specific policies, and political statements, that a third power may use to encourage, 
restrain or redirect democratisation. Based on a realist approach to international 
relations, it raises questions about the content and objectives of certain cooperation or 
assistance policies. Not all regional influences or cooperation strategies are equally 
effective or positive. They may work in a positive or in a restrictive way to affect the 
quality of democracy. After the end of the Cold War, more complex and conflicting 
interests started to orient international and regional assistance. On the one hand, the 
West became the main source of external influence; on the other hand, the West no 
longer had a realpolitik motive for promoting democracy (Whitehead 2001 p. 383).
14 Since this research discusses democratisation after its liberalisation phase, the strategy of “powers in 
decline” is not of interest.
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The third explanation model, the “consent” approach, looks at the interaction between 
external and internal actors in an attempt to reassess the international dimension 
(Whitehead 2001 pp. 15-16). Bringing the international dimension into debate should 
not mean that the entire responsibility for democratisation is attributed to 
international factors. This interaction may take different forms15, contributing or 
impeding the generation of consent. Of particular interest is the existence or not of 
“international structures of consent,” in the case of this research, “regional structures 
of consent” that permit a democratisation process by convergence16. These structures 
may create “democratic conditionality” that makes domestic actors incorporate 
regional factors into their logic of action. The logic of action by the involved actors is 
based not only on the imposition of third countries or on the increasing and more 
complex interdependence, but also on the interests and strategies of internal actors. A 
positive regional dynamic of interaction also depends on the existence or not of 
institutions or actors facilitating democratisation, something Whitehead (2001 pp. 
265-273) calls “bridging institutions” or “bridging actors.” External bridging 
institutions may influence democratisation whether or not there are adequate internal 
bridging institutions and actors. They can form a network with internal actors and 
institutions, pushing democratisation and creating and strengthening the structures of 
consent.
To the analytical framework articulated by Whitehead, Schmitter adds conditionality 
as a fourth approach. Conditionality has emerged as a new element in the 
international dimension of the democratisation process. The novelty of conditionality 
in the last decades is that it is not restricted to economic and monetary matters but it 
also addresses “political objectives” (Schmitter in Whitehead 2001 p. 42). However, I
15 The four aspects Whitehead (2001 pp. 17-22) distinguishes are: (1) “the territorial limits to 
successive democratisation and their consequences for established alliance systems”; (2) “the main 
international structures tending to generate consent for such regime changes”; (3) “the ways in which 
authentic national democratic actors may be constituted from relatively diffuse transnational 
groupings”; and (4) “the role of international demonstration effects”.
16 Among the paths to democracy in which the international dimension is dominant and democracy is 
promoted by an external actor, Whitehead identifies, at least, five possibilities in his works: (1) 
democratisation-through-defeat (e.g., Japan, West Germany); (2) democratisation-through-invasion 
(e.g., Panama); (3) democratisation-through-incorporation (e.g., Puerto Rico); (4) democratisation- 
through-decolonisation (e.g., the former British colonies in the Caribbean); (5) democratisation- 
through-intimidation (e.g., Nicaragua); and (5) democratisation-through-convergence (e.g., Portugal, 
Spain, Greece, Hungary, Poland) (Whitehead 2001 pp. 64-83,265).
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understand conditionality more as an instrument used in the dynamic of either control 
or consent, rather than as a specific analytical approach. Conditionality as applied 
here is the definition of political obligations and certain priorities as a prerequisite for 
obtaining diverse sorts of advantages, from most-favoured-nation treatment or access 
to aid programmes to membership in specific organisations. Conditionality may have 
a positive impact on the democratisation process; however, depending on the 
conditioner’s policies, the establishment of certain priorities and the manipulation of 
incentives may generate contradictory effects.
At the regional level, democratisation processes are inserted not only in the dynamic 
of sharing democratic and human rights values, but also in the dynamic of state 
security and economic interests. The complexity of interests involved may be 
contradictory to the promotion of further democratisation, as Whitehead (2001 pp. 
410-411) has observed in the context of contemporary Europe and the Americas, 
“regional convergence or integration constitutes the main bearer of international 
influence in support of democracy”; however, “not all regional cooperation strategies 
are equally democracy-friendly” and “the means used to construct a regional 
community will affect its subsequent quality and durability”.
During the democratisation process it was expected that the relationship with regional 
human rights regimes would start to consolidate in what should be a strong 
democratic and cooperative fashion. Overcoming traditional concepts of sovereignty, 
states would work together with regional human rights organisations to protect and 
promote human rights, which would imply an effort to reform their domestic 
institutions vis-a-vis international and regional standards. In other words, through the 
legality provided by human rights regimes, a common political space would be 
established and potentially become a force for social integration (Prib&n 2002 p. 4). 
However, in many countries democratisation was not automatically nor equally 
translated into this relationship. The existence of “democratic conditionalities” may 
explain why democratic and human rights values were incorporated more quickly in 
certain countries and were protected by a network of national and regional watchdog 
mechanisms. Issues related to the rule of law arena, such as democratic 
accountability, rights protection, and law enforcement, demand more time and more 
international support and cooperation, while issues located in the political arena are
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usually “settled through domestic decision-making over a limited period of time” 
(Whitehead 2001 p. 445).
Thus, the regional dimension of democratisation presents a varied range of analytical 
approaches. For the purposes of this research, the consent and, to a lesser extent, the 
control explanations are applied. Both explanatory models incorporate the 
geopolitical element in the discussion about democratisation processes and provide 
insights about the speed, extent, and direction of those processes.
In order to pin down the regional factors, I disaggregate the channels of external 
influence by focusing on the regional mechanisms to promote human rights and 
democracy, and more specifically, on the regional cooperation or assistance related to 
law enforcement areas, in particular to the police. This research identifies the 
interacting stakeholders and institutions at the regional level, and the political 
dynamic they impose upon the democratisation process through these channels of 
influence. An increasing number of actors play an important role, if we understand 
these channels within more diffuse regional social processes; however, this research 
concentrates on state-to-state or state-to-multilateral organisations interactions.
This research aims to verify whether or not the regional dimension has influenced the 
content of democratisation in Ecuador and Poland. Two main questions will be 
developed: the first regards the democratic salience or the centrality of the rule of law 
in the democratisation process, and the second refers to the regional influence and 
leverage of this dimension. In order to pursue this discussion, this research analyses 
comparatively the police institutions of countries located in different regions, Ecuador 
and Poland.
Structure of the Research
The aim of this research is to discuss the impact of the regional dimension in the 
strengthening of the rule of law and human rights in new democracies. My hypothesis 
is that, in the democratic framework, a veiy domestic issue, such as the reform of the 
police institution, can be significantly pushed or opposed by regional actors and the
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regional institutional network responsible for promoting human rights and the rule of 
law. Police reform is usually understood exclusively as a response to domestic 
political and social demands; however, as other elements of democratisation, police 
institutions can suffer a significant impact from regional political issues with 
important consequences for the capacity of the state to promote further 
democratisation and human rights protection.
The first two chapters of this work present the political context of each region; 
Chapter One describes the European institutional environment and Chapter Two 
describes the Inter-American context. The objective of these two chapters is to 
discuss the existence or not of a “regional structure of consent” that facilitates a 
democratisation process by convergence, and the elements it presents for the 
strengthening of the legal state.
Chapter Three specifically focuses on the assistance directed at the police institution 
in each region. It explores the different approaches and interests behind the main 
existing programmes and their relationship with the institutional framework of each 
region.
After presenting this broader picture of the subject matter, Chapter Four discusses the 
issue of policing democracy. From the discussion about the role and functions of the 
police in democratic regimes, this chapter develops a further discussion about the 
political obstacles for reforming the police during the democratisation process. The 
police reform debated here do not concern the technical issues involved in police 
work, but its political aspects and its role within the state apparatus.
The following two chapters are dedicated to the case studies of this research; Chapter 
Five addresses the police reform in Poland, and Chapter Six addresses the absence of 
police reform in Ecuador. For both cases I analyse the police institutions through four 
issues: (1) the continuity from non-democratic regimes, (2) the existence of external 
control mechanisms, (3) the respect for human rights, and (4) the interaction with 
regional politics.
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Finally, the conclusive chapter discusses the findings in the analysis of the Polish and 
Ecuadorian police institutions in the light of the hypothesis and questions debated 
through the development of this work.
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PART I
Chapter 1 - The European Context 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main European processes responsible for 
promoting and supervising human rights and the democratic rule of law in the region. 
Special attention is given to the European System for Protection of Human Rights 
(henceforth the European system or EHRS) in order to highlight its specificity in 
comparison with its American counterpart discussed in the following chapter. 
Understanding these systems is the starting point for the theoretical and comparative 
study that seeks to analyse the regional human rights regimes and their relations with 
the new democratic states.
In order to do so, three levels of analysis are required. The first is the historical 
analysis. Tracing the history of the European system makes it possible to identify its 
foundation and examine its development. Questions to be discussed include the kind 
of system that was created and the kind of system that is desired to address new 
demands in the human rights field. The second level of analysis is institutional. The 
investigation of its internal functioning makes it possible to examine how human 
rights protection has been institutionalised in the region and, thus, to recognise 
internal constraints imposed on the system. Finally, the third level of analysis 
required is political. Stressing the idea that regional human rights systems should be 
understood as a process rather than a rigid system, it is fundamentally important to 
identify the political actors involved and the dynamic established by them in the use 
of different regional mechanisms for human rights protection.
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The Origins of the European Human Rights Regime
The initiative to create a European system for protection of human rights started with 
the move to unify Europe. With the lessons from the punitive approach after the First 
World War, embodied in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the predominant assumption 
was that the best way to ensure peace in Europe was through regional integration and 
the institutionalisation of common values. By the same token, the political scenario 
which arose from the Second World War also stressed the Western European states’ 
desire and sense of urgency to bring the non-Communist countries of Europe together 
within a common ideological framework; what would be possible only through a 
form of regional inter-state association. Thus, building European unity and 
embodying a system of liberal values were not only a response to the atrocities that 
Europe had witnessed during the war, but also a regional response to Communism.17
The Council of Europe
Following the favourable climate of the post-war period, in 1948, the International 
Committee of the Movements for European Unity organised a conference that 
became to be known as the “Congress of Europe”. This congress took place in The 
Hague on 7 May 1948, and was attended by delegates from sixteen states as well as 
observers from the United States and Canada.
As it was constituted by groups of different persuasions, great divergences were 
revealed regarding the type of unity desired, and soon two groups became 
distinguishable. The first was a group comprised of France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg; states unconditionally supporting a Europe-wide federation, which was
17 The idea of European unity to combat external and internal threats was not a product of the 20th 
century. Already in the Middle Ages it was possible to verify the emergency of a European identity 
evolving from Christianity and developing in the face of external threats to its territory, and since 
Renaissance the idea of peace through unity had been discussed and would be further developed by 
thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) and the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) (McCormick 1999 pp. 31-43). However, for 
the purpose and feasibility of this research, the discussion only focuses on the emergence of the 
European regional arrangements after the Second World War, when the ideas o f human rights resumed 
an international dimension and explicitly merged to the idea of European unity.
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a very ambitious idea at that time. The second group was constituted by the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries; states favouring a form of inter­
governmental cooperation.
After long negotiations in Brussels, on 27 and 28 January 1949, the five Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs of the Brussels Treaty countries - Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom - reached a compromise for the creation of the 
Council of Europe. On 5 May 1949, in London, the Council was finally founded with 
the signing of its statute by Ten European States - Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom accompanied by Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway and Sweden. At that time, the only possible outcome was the creation of a 
Council consisting of an executive body - the Committee of Ministers comprised of 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all member states or their deputies - and a purely 
consultative assembly appointed by the national governments - the Consultative 
Assembly18.
In contrast to the initial expectations, the Council of Europe has never become more 
than a “loose inter-governmental organisation” (McCormick 1999 p. 66). In 
accordance with the compromise reached, its statute made no mention of drawing up 
a constitution or any other move to achieve the economic and political union called 
for by The Hague delegates. Consequently, separate bodies were established later to 
address questions emerging on the political and economic spheres. In this context, on 
9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, approached all the 
Council of Europe countries with a proposal for a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which would be provided with specific political and budgetary 
means. The first motivation for creating the ECSC was mainly the concern of 
situating the heavy industries of the Ruhr, which had supported Germany’s military 
power in two wars, within an inter-governmental structure constituted by West 
Germany and its former adversaries. Thus, the six countries most attached to the ideal 
of integration - Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal 
Republic of Germany - signed the very first Community treaty on 18 April 1951, the
18The Assembly was soon reviewed and, in 1951, became the first European parliamentary organ 
comprising representatives of the national Parliaments of the member states, and providing a 
deliberative forum for the Council of Europe’s work. In 1974 it would name itself the Parliamentary 
Assembly.
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Treaty of Paris. From this date forward, the regional integration process started 
paving a new way, institutionally different from the Council of Europe.
The Development of the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe became only one of the starting points for the idea of 
European integration. Although it has not been pivotal in this process, it has retained 
a relevant role in the European scenario, and the European Human Rights System 
operates under its auspices. The Council of Europe presents two distinguished phases 
of development and expansion. The first corresponds to the building of its organs. 
From the year of its creation through the 1970s, the organisation gradually developed 
its structure and its major institutions, including the human rights system. In this 
period, it also expanded its membership. The new members were, in order of 
accession: Greece (1949), Iceland (1950), Turkey (1950), Germany (1950), Austria 
(1956), Cyprus (1961), Switzerland (1963), Malta (1965), Portugal (1976), Spain 
(1977), and Liechtenstein (1978). Until the 1980s, the Council of Europe remained a 
Western European institution.
The predominant stability in Europe, with few exceptions, demanded a fairly modest 
political role in this phase. The first major political crisis that engaged the Council of 
Europe broke out in 1967, when the Greek colonels overthrew the legally elected 
government and installed an authoritarian regime. Obviously, this was a serious 
contravention of the Council’s statute and the democratic principles defended by the 
organisation. As a result, on 12 December 1969, just a few hours before a decision 
that would have expelled Greece from the Council of Europe, the military regime 
anticipated action by denouncing the European Convention on Human Rights and 
withdrawing from the Council. Greece would resume its membership on 28 
November 1974 after the fall of the military dictatorship and the holding of free 
elections.
Another political crisis experienced by the organisation occurred in 1974. The 
Cypriot crisis arose when the Turkish military intervention partitioned the island and
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the reticent efforts for a solution by the Council of Europe, alongside those of the 
United Nations' Secretary General, failed. A new issue involving Turkey occurred in 
1981 when, in response to a military coup d’etat, the Parliamentary Assembly decided 
to withdraw the right to a seat by the Turkish parliamentary delegation, which did not 
resume its place until 1984, after free elections were held.
These crises, even if exceptional, are privileged moments for the analysis of the 
Council of Europe's role on the European political and institutional scene, and equally 
important for the analysis of the development of its mechanisms to protect and 
promote human rights and the rule of law. In this specific situation, the human rights 
mechanism of the Council of Europe was activated by other member states, and 
demonstrated the regional support for democracy. For the same reasons, Portugal and 
Spain would not join the Council of Europe until initiating their democratisation 
process. Portugal acceded to the Council on 22 September 1976, two years after the 
“Revolugao dos Cravos” of 1974, the peaceful revolution that brought to an end to 48 
years of Salazarist dictatorship. In its turn, the death of General Franco in 1975 put an 
end to 36 years of dictatorship in Spain and led to its accession on 24 November 
1977.
The second phase of the development of the Council of Europe was inaugurated with 
the trend emerging in Eastern and Central Europe. This phase of development is 
characterised by the enlargement of the Council, which has reinforced the ideal of a 
Pan-Europeanism and given another dimension to the European identity. In this 
context, the Council of Europe resumed its paramount role as the only organisation 
capable of encompassing all the countries of Europe once they had adopted 
democratic rules19.
In January of 1985, the convocation by the Committee of Ministers for an 
extraordinary session to discuss specifically East-West relations was already laying 
the groundwork for rapprochement with the ECE countries; thus, when the 
perestroika occurred in the Soviet bloc countries, the Council of Europe became 
pivotal in political relations with them. It rapidly became the Council's role and
19 Council of Europe's Secretary General on 23 November 1989.
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purpose to support and to assure that the political, economic and social reforms 
underway would be irreversible. A series of several exchanges was inaugurated, 
including visits of the Secretary General and the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly to the Soviet bloc countries, as well as visits of their respective delegations 
to the Council’s organs in Strasbourg. As a result, in 1989 the Parliamentary 
Assembly instituted a special guest status for the national assemblies of states willing 
to apply the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (Helsinki 1975) and the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights (the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). This status was immediately granted to the 
assemblies of Hungary, Poland, the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, 
opening the way to full accession of the ECE countries.
The end of the Cold War and the democratisation process that took place in Eastern 
and Central Europe permitted the accession of new members. Finland, whose 
neutrality during the Cold War had previously been seen as incompatible with the 
Council’s membership, joined it in 1989, and followed in subsequent years, in 
chronological order by: Hungary (1990), Poland (1991), Bulgaria (1992), Estonia 
(1993), Lithuania (1993), Slovenia (1993), the Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia 
(1993), Romania (1993), Latvia (1995), Andorra (1994), Albania (1995), Moldova 
(1995), Ukraine (1995), the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (1995), 
Croatia (1996), the Russian Federation (1996), Georgia (1999), Armenia (2001), 
Azerbaijan (2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002), Serbia (2003), Monaco (2005), 
and Montenegro (2006).
At this time, it has 47 members20. The conditions for the admission of a state to the 
Council of Europe are stated in the Article Three of its statute: the state “must accept 
the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdic­
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and 
effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council”. An applicant state must satisfy
20Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, 
Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia’, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
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the requirements of the Council’s Committee of Ministers demonstrating that its legal 
order is in conformity with this article. The opinion of the Parliamentaiy Assembly is 
sought and the Assembly in turn appoints an expert group to advise it. The opinion of 
the experts is based upon an on-site visit. In 1994, an expert report on the situation in 
Russia concluded that these requirements were not met (Benhardt et al. 1994), 
delaying its accession until 1996, and Belarus' special guest status has been 
suspended due to its lack of respect for human rights and democratic principles.
The European Convention
The predominant ideas and fears of the aftermath of the Second World War reflected 
on the Council of Europe’s Statute presented relevant assumptions for human rights. 
In its first chapter, it states two principles: “(a) the aim of the Council of Europe is to 
achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and 
realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage, and facilitating 
their economic and social progress.” And, “(b) this aim shall be pursued through the 
organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by 
agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and 
administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”. These principles underline three relevant assumptions. 
First, the protection of the individual is not an exclusive prerogative of the state. 
Secondly, it recognises that individuals may need protection against their own state. 
Thirdly, the values of democracy and the realisation of human rights are a common 
concern and consequently require a common action, that is, a collective guarantee. 
The first two assumptions will not be directly discussed here since it is not the aim of 
this research to discuss the foundation of human rights nor to examine its process of 
internationalisation. This research concentrates on the questions related to the third 
assumption, which involves a discussion about the regional political dynamic 
responsible for human rights protection.
Human rights and democracy, in fact, formed the main subject of the first session of 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, in August 1949. The Assembly
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decided to charge its Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions to study the 
matter of a collective guarantee of human rights. One month later, the Assembly 
adopted the Committee’s report, in which ten rights were identified as subject to a 
collective guarantee, and the establishment of a Commission and a Court of human 
rights were proposed. In November of the same year, the Committee of Ministers 
decided to appoint a Committee of Government Experts to prepare a draft text based 
on the first report. The draft came few months later; however, numerous political 
problems remained unsolved and another committee had to be appointed. The 
Committee of Senior Officials also failed to decide on many points, and the fmal 
decision was left again to the Committee of Ministers.
Despite the prompt initiatives to write a draft, it was not possible to come to an 
agreement on all its parts and, on 7 August 1950, the Committee of Ministers 
approved a revised draft. The result was a more conservative text than the original 
proposal on a number of questions, such as the system of individual applications and 
the jurisdiction of the Court established by the Convention; both were made optional 
at that time. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth the European Convention) was, thus, signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950, and entered into force on 3 September 1953, finally 
inaugurating what is called the European Human Rights System. For the very first 
time, the abstract human rights ideals were transformed in a concrete legal 
framework.
Although the disappointment created by the discrepancy between the states’ discourse 
and initial proposals, and the setbacks in its negotiations, the European Convention 
was an important achievement and has had a paramount significance for the 
protection of human rights at the international level. It was the first comprehensive 
treaty in the world in this field and the first to establish international human rights 
complaints procedures. Besides its pioneering aspects, over time, it has demonstrated 
productiveness and effectiveness, and generated the most extensive jurisprudence on 
this subject.
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Rights
The rights set out in the European Convention are derived essentially from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and accordingly to its preamble, it 
was framed “to take the first steps for collective enforcement of certain rights stated 
in the Universal Declaration”. The early versions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were also used as a model for the definition of 
rights21.
Although economic and social rights were reflected in the post-Second World War 
French, German and Italian constitutions, the writers of the Convention decided to 
adopt a less controversial text. As it would have been veiy difficult to reach an 
agreement about economic, social and cultural rights, the European Convention 
protects predominantly civil and political rights.
Whether the text adopted was a matter of priority or strategy, it does not obscure the 
fact that there was an implicit concept of democracy; it reflected the belief that it was 
first necessary to guarantee political democracy and then to coordinate the economies 
of the European states for the generalisation of social democracy. In the predominant 
political and ideological context during the elaboration of the Convention, there was a 
clear intention by the Western European countries to differentiate what they called 
“genuine democracy” in the Statute of the Council of Europe from the “people’s 
democracy” that was promoted by the Communist states (Steiner and Alston 1996 pp. 
572-580). Some of the economic and social rights, property rights and right to 
education for instance, were subsequently addressed in Articles One and Two of the 
First Protocol to the Convention, but their full recognition would come only with the 
European Social Charter of 1961, which came into force in 1965. This text is seen as 
the counterpart of the European Convention of Human Rights in the social sphere; 
however, it does not have the same effective machinery. The European Social Charter
2]The Covenant was only adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and, in the meantime, suffered 
a number of changes. The most significant are related to the articles about derogation and limitation of 
freedoms of expression, association and religion, and the inclusion of rights absent in the Convention.
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only establishes a system of monitoring and reporting on states’ obligations and the 
progress achieved22.
A serious silence in the Convention is also found in relation to some individual rights. 
The Convention does not guarantee the right of a person in detention to be treated 
with humanity and dignity as stated in Article 10 of the ICCPR. Article Three of the 
Convention, which states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”, has been criticised for its lack of legal meaning 
due to the generality of its text. For this reason, in 1987, the Council of Europe 
adopted the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which came into force in 1989. Although this 
Convention is concerned especially with prevention, it is far more innovative and 
intrusive in its approach to supervision than the UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment adopted in 1984. 
Unless there are exceptional circumstances, each member state is required to permit 
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)23 to visit places of detention 
within the state’s jurisdiction (Article Two). Most visits are routine and scheduled
22The European Social Charter was signed in Rome on 18 October 1961 and came into force on 26 
February 1965. The Charter has gradually developed a common body of social rights. It consists of 
four parts. The first part sets out 19 social rights and principles. The second part contains the legal 
obligations and specific measures designed to ensure the effective exercise o f these rights, which are 
not binding per se. The third reflects the principle of progressive implementation tailored to suit the 
circumstances of individual states. Each contracting party must agree to be bound by at least five of 
seven rights, which are considered to be o f central importance, and accept at least five of the other 
rights. The fourth part provides for a supervision system based on the submission of periodic reports 
by contracting parties.
In the past, the reports were examined by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Independent Experts 
(CIE), whose assessments of compliance and non-compliance were then reviewed by the 
Parliamentary Assembly and a Governmental Committee (also established under Council auspices). 
On the basis of all these views, the Committee o f Ministers could, by a two-thirds majority vote, make 
specific recommendations to the state concerned. In addition to being cumbersome and time- 
consuming, this system vested excessive power in the hands o f the representatives o f governments who 
were reluctant to take forceful action even when both the CIE and the Assembly considered it to be 
warranted. It was only in 1991 that an Amending Protocol introduced major reforms in the report 
system by giving the CIE exclusive competence to interpret and apply die Charter, significantly 
downgrading the role of the Governmental Committee, enabling the CIE to engage in an oral dialogue 
with governments, and, most importantly, enhancing the role of non-governmental organisations.
23 The Convention established the CPT, which is composed of independent experts. The CPT meets in 
camera and its visits and discussions are confidential as are, in principle, its reports. The latter, 
however, may be released, either at the request of the state concerned or if the state refuses to 
cooperate and the CPT decides, by a two-thirds majority, to make a public statement. This occurred for 
the first time in December 1992, when the CPT concluded, after three visits to Turkey, that the Turkish 
Government had failed to respond to its recommendations to strengthen legal safeguards against police 
torture, specifically in relation to the activities of the so-called “Anti-Terror Departments”. Virtually 
all states visited have voluntarily agreed to the release o f the CPT’s report together with the 
government response to it.
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well in advance but there is also provision for visits with little advance notice. The 
CPT has carried out four visits to Poland; in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2009.
The European Convention is also neglected in relation to the rights of members of 
minorities groups. Under Article 14 (freedom from discrimination), it states a general 
prohibition of discrimination among individuals, but only in relation to rights it 
protects, which has raised a number of problems of interpretation. In 1994, the 
Council of Europe finally established the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, which entered into force in 1998. It was in part motivated by 
the adoption of the 1992 UN Declaration on Rights of Members of Minorities and the 
development of non-binding standards and promotional activities in this field by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Due to the complexity 
and controversy of this issue, however, the Council of Europe had avoided the 
adoption of specific measures. The Framework Convention does not guarantee the 
right of self-determination and the Council of Europe still shows certain hesitation in 
this matter by confining the Convention to programmatic obligations that are not 
directly applicable and that leave considerable discretion about implementation to the 
state concerned. The supervision was left to the Committee of Ministers based upon 
periodic reports to be submitted by member states.
Apart from those new specific conventions, the possibility of future additional 
provisions through the adoption of optional protocols was also a solution found for 
many matters that did not reach an agreement during the preparation of the 
Convention. Since 1952, fourteen protocols have been written, six concerning the 
guarantee of additional rights24. Thus, some human rights guarantees are found only 
in protocols with optional acceptance. This gradualist approach, in most cases, has
24Protocol Number One of 1952, in force since 1954, concerns protection of property, the right to 
education and free elections; Protocol Number Four of 1963, in force since 1988, declares freedom 
from imprisonment for debt, freedom of movement, the prohibition of expulsion of nationals and 
prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens; Protocol Number Six of 1983, in force since 1985, relates 
to the abolition of death penalty; Protocol Number Seven of 1984, in force since 1988, concerns the 
procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of aliens, the right to appeal in criminal matters, 
compensation for wrongful conviction, the right to not be tried or punished twice, and equality 
between spouses; Protocol Number 12 of 2000 declares a general prohibition of discrimination, it 
entered into force in 2005; and Protocol Number 13 of 2002, concerns the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances, in force since 2003. Poland has not ratified the last two Protocols.
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permitted the remedy of some of the Convention’s defects resulting from the authors’ 
to avoid controversial issues.
The Implementing Machinery
The primary responsibility for the implementation of the European Convention, as for 
all human rights conventions, rests with the member states themselves at the domestic 
level. The primacy for domestic resolution is clear in various provisions of the 
Convention. It states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms (...)  are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority (...)” (Article 13). Furthermore, 
the implementation machinery provided in the Convention can only come into play 
when the domestic remedies are considered to have been exhausted (Article 35); the 
failure to fulfil this requirement is the most frequent reason for rejection of a case by 
the system. In addition, the possibility of a friendly settlement proceeding must be 
sought in the examination of any case (Article 38). The consequence of this primacy 
is that the implementation of human rights mechanisms may vary accordingly to the 
particular government’s desire.
The European Convention has been able to provide a strong enforcement mechanism 
compared to other international human rights treaties. One sign of this relative 
success of the European system is its ability to develop its implementation machinery 
over time in order to develop an educational role in the region by making human 
rights more visible in the political debate, establish human rights standards in the 
region, and make it “justiciable”.
As with the incorporation of new rights, the Convention has also faced changes in its 
mechanisms through the adoption of protocols related to procedural matters. The 
most important protocol is Protocol Number 11, which reformed the Convention by 
restructuring its control machinery25; it replaced the two-level system - Commission 
and Court - with a single permanent Court of Human Rights.
25 It replaced Protocol Numbers Two, Three and Five, and made Protocol Numbers Eight, Nine and 
Ten otiose. Protocol Number Two, in force since 1970, granted the Court a limited power to give 
advisory opinions. Protocol Number Three, in force since 1970, and Number Five, in force since 1971,
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The Council of Europe has sought to adapt to the radical changes within Europe. In 
this sense, it has begun to develop a much greater focus on broader rule of law issues, 
and in 1990 it established a European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
better known as the Venice Commission because it meets in that city. The 
Commission has played a discreet but relevant role in addressing important matters in 
new constitutions and laws.
Together with the task of supporting and monitoring the consolidation of the new 
democracies and the full respect of human rights, several new challenges were posed 
to the Council of Europe since it has found itself in a more complex and less stable 
environment. The conflicts in the former Soviet bloc countries; the upsurge in racism, 
anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance; social exclusion and 
minorities; migration; the increasing levels of unemployment and homelessness; the 
expansion of organised crime and corruption are some examples of this increasing 
complexity.
Despite the constraints and problems identified, the European political and 
institutional dynamic has permitted a great acceptance of the European Convention 
by its contracting states and has made its reform possible. The changes resulting from 
the institutional development of the EHRS itself have produced a more transparent 
and efficient system.
The European Institutional Context
The European system is located within a broader European institutional framework 
built after the Second World War. The Council of Europe was the first inter­
governmental organisation to be founded in Europe in this period, but it was soon 
joined by other institutions. The result is a complicated institutional architecture with
amended the enforcement machinery. Protocol Number Eight, in force since 1990, contained certain 
provisions relating to the Commission and the Court; Protocol Number Nine, in force since 1994, 
established the direct access to the Court by individuals; and Protocol Number 10 changed the majority 
required for a decision of the Committee of Ministers under the original Article 32 of the Convention. 
In addition, Protocol Number 14 of 2004, in force since 1 June 2010, amends the control system of the 
Convention in order to improve the operational efficiency of the Court.
47
three major mechanisms dealing with human rights’ issues. Besides the European 
system of the Council of Europe, there are human rights mechanisms within the 
European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). These mechanisms operate in very different settings and at times tensions 
may be created by their attempt to develop comparative advantages. Some 
arrangements to facilitate consultation and coordination among them exist, but they 
are still deficient or very recently created.
The European system has the longest and most significant track record in the human 
rights field. However, this does not diminish the importance of the other mechanisms, 
particularly in their role of promoting human rights and democracy as European 
values and supervising their observance. In this sense, the activities of each 
organisation have been relevant to the others, and to the building of a human rights 
culture.
The European Union
The origins of the European Union lie in the 1952 European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSC)26, and subsequently in the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community created by the two 1958 
treaties of Rome. Those treaties were amended by the 1987 Single European Act, 
which for the first time included a section on European Political Cooperation.
With the entry into force of the Treaty on Economic Union on 1 November 1993, 
signed at Maastricht in 1992, these communities were converted into the European 
Union, which currently consists of twenty-seven members27. The Maastricht Treaty 
created the European Union initially composed of three pillars: the European 
Community (EC), which contains amendments to the EC treaties; the Common
26 Signed in Paris in 1951, it expired in 2002.
27France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg (original EEC members in 1957); 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark (since 1973); Greece (since 1981), Spain, Portugal (since 
1986); Sweden, Finland and Austria (since 1995); Malta, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia (since 2004). Bulgaria and Romania since 2007; 
Croatia is in accession negotiations; The Republic of Macedonia and Turkey are currently candidate 
countries and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo under the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244, and Iceland are potential country candidates.
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) that 
institutionalised cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty has been revised three times: in 
1997 with the Amsterdam Treaty that entered into force in 1999; in 2001 with the 
Nice Treaty that entered into force in 2003; and in 2007 with the Treaty of Lisbon 
that came into force in 2009. In 2004, a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
was also signed in Europe; however, it failed to be ratified after referendum defeats in 
France and Netherlands.
Although all twenty-seven members of the European Union are also part of EHRS at 
the Council of Europe, there has been a prevalence of negative human rights 
integration in the Union’s sphere; that is, a lack of clear human rights policy in 
relation to its own member states. Some positive integration occurred only by the 
coincidence of some topics, such as gender discrimination at work due to the issues 
concerning the common market. There is still some resistance to providing the Union 
with the means to positively integrate human rights. The adoption of a bill of rights 
was proposed in the early 1950s; however, none of the treaties related to the 
European Community and later to the European Union contain such a bill or even a 
list of enumerating rights. Until 1992 neither fundamental rights nor the concept of 
European citizenship had been recognised in the various treaties. As a matter of fact, 
the original constituent treaties were more concerned with protecting states’ rights 
from Community encroachments than with the individuals’ rights. Due to the context 
of the Community, which was driven by economic issues, there was the assumption 
that these rights should be left to the national level (Steiner and Alston 1996 p. 576).
It is true that the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the judicial organ of the European 
Union, had already begun to evolve a specific doctrine of human rights in 1969. By 
recognising the constitutional traditions of the member states and the international 
treaties accepted by them, together with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome, the 
Court of Justice had identified different “normative underpinnings”. In this sense, in 
1977 the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission issued a Joint 
Declaration emphasising the importance of those rights and pledging the member 
states to respect them in the exercise of their powers (Steiner and Alston 1996 p. 
576). However, it was only with the Amsterdam Treaty that it was stated for the first 
time that the EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, and
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the rule of law, and that the European Convention was directly mentioned. The 
Amsterdam Treaty was also responsible for introducing the possibility of suspending 
the rights of a member state for human rights breaches, and requiring to the European 
Court of Justice to apply human rights standards to the actions of the Community 
institutions (Alston 1999 p. 18). The European Convention on Human Rights has 
particularly received privileged attention within the Community legal order. The 
Court of Justice has cited the Convention in its case law, tending to interpret its 
provisions in line with the approach adopted by the European Court of Human 
Rights. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has generally applied the concept of human 
rights to the actions of the Community itself, but not to actions of its member states 
(Alston 1999 p. 30), and the role played by the European Convention at the EU still 
lacks a formal basis. Although the Amsterdam Treaty refers to the European 
Convention and the European Court of Justice veiy often cites it, the European Court 
of Justice concluded that the Treaty must be amended to permit the Union accession 
to the European Convention.
Already in 1979 the Commission proposed beginning a process to lead the European 
Community’s accession to the European Convention. This proposal for formal 
adherence was revived in the 1990s; however, it received both technical and political
9ftobjections (in particular from member states such as the United Kingdom , Ireland 
and Denmark which had not incorporated the European Convention into their 
domestic law). The accession is not only important because of the symbolism of 
incorporating this important and powerful regional actor, but also for subjecting the 
Union’s measures to the obligations stated in the European Convention, which 
implies more than only negative obligations. To date, it has continued to face the 
reluctance of the member states to take action to accomplish a formal accession or to 
adopt a Union bill of rights per se (Steiner and Alston 1996 p. 576) since it may 
imply new conditionalities for them. In 2000, the Nice European Council adopted the 
Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is a non-binding document 
that requires a discussion about its incorporation into the EC law. The European 
Constitution signed in 2004, contained a version of the Charter, however, it was never
28The United Kingdom incorporated the European Convention into its domestic law only in 1998 
through the Human Rights Act, which came into force in 2000.
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ratified. Additionally, the EU is still not part of any international human rights 
treaties.
Ironically, the EU has produced a double standard regarding human rights policy. 
More serious than the lacunae in the judicial protection of human rights within the 
Union legal order, and the lack of an internal policy and institutional coordination to 
deal with human right issues that has predominated, has been the lack of coherence in 
the Union’s human rights policies. Membership in the European Convention system 
became a prerequisite for accession to the Union, and countries seeking accession 
must review their legislation and practice in order comply with EU requirements for 
human rights protection, while the Union itself remains outside that system. It is also 
hypocritical to take into account the ratification of human rights treaties by the states 
applying for EU membership while not all current EU member states have ratified all 
of them. The two minority rights treaties adopted by the Council of Europe have been 
ratified by few EU member states. The European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, in almost twenty years since its elaboration in 1992, has not been ratified 
by Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy or Portugal; the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995, has not been ratified by Belgium, 
France, Greece, or Ireland; besides these instruments, some of the additional 
protocols seeking to update the European Social Charter of 1961 and to provide a 
more appropriate procedure have not been ratified by many countries. In this sense, 
the EU's practices are inconsistent relative to negative measures required for third 
countries.
Recently, internal concern for human rights has started to change with the creation of 
the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), by a Council Regulation in 2007, 
in order to extend the mandate of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC) created in 1997, and to provide the Community institutions and 
member states assistance and expertise on human rights when implementing the 
Community law. The activities of the Agency are determined by its multi-annual 
framework. The current framework, covering five years, defined nine thematic areas 
for action: racism, xenophobia and intolerance; discrimination; compensation of 
victims; the rights of the child; asylum, immigration and integration of migrants; 
visas and border control; participation of the EU citizens in the EU’s democratic
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functioning; information society; and access to efficient and independent justice. The 
Agency can work outside this framework at the request of the European Parliament, 
Council or Commission. In 2008, the European Community and the Council of 
Europe finally signed an agreement for cooperation between the European Council 
and the FRA with the objective of facilitating consultation, complementing their work 
and avoiding duplication.
Until the reforms introduced in the last decade, in contrast to the EU’s active external 
human rights policy, at the internal level there was a very fragmented human rights 
policy within the large institutional apparatus. The Union’s institutions had a very 
vague human rights mandate, and there were few units of the European Commission 
with a specific mandate in this area, focusing mainly on external activities to promote 
human rights. They were: Unit Two of Directorate A of Directorate General 1A, 
responsible for human rights and democratisation; and Unit Four of Directorate 
General VIII, responsible for the coordination of issues relating to the rule of law, 
fundamental freedoms, democratisation, and institutional support. There was also the 
“Standing Inter-Departmental Human Rights Coordination Group” responsible for 
general guidelines for funding the main external relations human rights budget. It was 
only in 1999 that the area of Justice, Freedom and Security was expanded into a full 
directorate general in order to cover this new area of the EU competence.
Regarding the EU’s policy towards third countries, since 1986, the EC has given 
small amounts of aid to some Latin American and ECE countries, with the objective 
of improving their human-rights records and promoting democratic reforms. Under 
EP pressure, in 1994, the various EU funds were consolidated under one budget 
heading, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights with 
approximately 100 million Euros per year (European Commission 2001 p. 13). 
Although it represents a small percentage of external relations budget, which is 
already a small percentage of the EU’s budget, it is a significant amount in 
comparison to the budget that other states and international organisations give to the 
same issues, with the exception of the US (Smith 2003 p. 113).
The EU operative criteria for promotion of democracy has been: (1) genuine, free 
elections; (2) the ‘right’ electoral results, i.e. a predominance of pro-democratic
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parties; (3) a reasonably stable government; (4) leadership by a credible (and pro- 
European) figure; and (5) the inauguration of a liberal democratic constitution 
(Schmitter in Whitehead 1996 p. 43; Pridham 1991 p. 235). In this sense, the EU has 
established electoral monitoring and assistance programmes.
In contrast to the US “carrot and stick” policies, until the 1980s the Community 
refused to use aid or trade agreements to punish human rights violations. EC trade 
sanctions were used for the first time in 1982, when the EPC condemned the USSR 
for the imposition of martial law in Poland (Smith 2003 p. 65-66). And, starting in 
1983, the EP has adopted an annual report and resolution on human rights in the 
world. This report is used to review the Community activities in order to request that 
the Commission link EC aid with minimum conditions of human-rights protection 
and build human-rights considerations into development programmes and 
cooperation agreements with third countries. By the end of the 1980s, the Community 
became an active promoter of political conditionality, applying measures such as the 
suspension of aid, or trade preferences in favour of a more pro-active emphasis on 
promoting the development of democratic-institutions, strengthen the rule of law, 
working through civil society and funding specific human rights initiatives (Alston 
1999 p. 30). In 1987 and 1988, for instance, it refused to approve financial protocols 
with Turkey and Israel over human-rights concerns (Smith 2003 p. 104). However, 
the predominant assumption in most EU programmes has been that “development 
itself contributes to better protection of human rights and democratic principles” 
(Smith 2003 pp. 113-114)29.
In 2005, the EU launched the European Consensus for Development, a policy statement that 
identifies values, principles, commitments and goals to be followed by its Directorate-General, 
EuropeAid, responsible for implementing external aid programmes designed by the Directorate 
General for Development for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and the Directorate General 
External Relations for other regions and countries of the world. It particularly mentioned the UN 
Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty; Europe’s democratic values, including respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedom and the rule of law; and the countries’ responsibility for their 
own development. The Consensus for Development identifies nine areas for action (trade and regional 
integration; environment and sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, 
communications and transport; water; energy; rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and 
food security; governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional 
reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; and social cohesion and 
employment) and four cross-cutting issues (democracy, good governance, human rights, rights of 
children and indigenous people; gender equality; environmental sustainability; fight against 
HIV/AIDS).
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The main example of EU conditionality has been the ‘human-rights clause’ of 1995, 
which is supposed to be incorporated in all cooperation and association agreements. It 
is a significant instrument because it allows the EU to respond directly to human- 
rights violations. The human rights clause defines respect for human rights and 
democratic principles as an essential provision for accomplishment of the purpose of 
all EU treaties; hence, the EU can apply the 1969 Vienna Convention rule on 
suspending and terminating treaties if a party commits a material breach of a bilateral 
treaty (Riedel and Will in Alston 1996).
In general, external reviewers have evaluated the EU's human-rights and 
democratisation programmes positively. Nevertheless, some problems have been 
observed, such as programmes with a top-down approach, lack of connections among 
programmes, and delays in disbursements. Those problems led the Court of Auditors 
to pronounce in 2000 that the Commission was not adequately assessing the situation 
and needs of the beneficiary countries, and it was necessary to define priorities. As a 
result, in 2002 the European Initiative established the following priorities (Smith 
2003 pp. 113-114): (1) support to strengthen democratisation, good governance and 
the rule of law; (2) activities to promote the abolition of the death penalty30; (3) 
support for the fight against torture and impunity and for international tribunals and 
criminal courts31; and (4) combating racism and xenophobia, and discrimination 
against minorities and indigenous peoples.
Launched in 2006, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) replaced the European Initiative and, since 2007, the Development 
Cooperation Instrument and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) complement the tools used by the EU to implement its policies for democracy 
and human rights32. Those instruments represent a significant change in the EU 
bureaucracy and implementation of its policies, and demonstrate the recognition of 
the deficiencies that the Community presented in addressing human rights and
30 Initiative launched in 1998 (“Guidelines for EU Policy toward Third Countries on Death Penalty”, 
Annex 6 to Council of EU).
31 Initiative launched in 2001 (“Guidelines to EU Policies towards Third Countries on Torture”, 
General Affairs Council).
32 Since 2007, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) has also replaced several instruments in order to 
address global security and development challenges, in fields such as drugs, mines, uprooted people, 
crisis management, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
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democracy issues. Nevertheless, they will not be further discussed here since they 
were created after the period of democratisation and accession of the ECE in the EU.
Regarding the ECE countries, the main EU programme has been PHARE, the 
programme of Community aid to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, set up 
in 1992. PHARE -  “Poland and Hungaiy Assistance for the Restructuring of the 
Economy” - was initially developed to support the reconstruction of the economies of 
Poland and Hungary, but gradually it has been extended to include all EU candidate 
countries. It constituted the main channel for pre-accession assistance and focuses on 
two priorities: institution building and investment financing. The EU also sponsored 
the Pact for Stability for Central and East European countries, from May 1994 to 
March 1995, the EU set up regional roundtables in order to identify and promote 
projects and agreements that would facilitate good-neighbourly relations (Smith 2003 
p. 63). For the 2007-2013 period, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
became the only financial instrument for EU candidate countries, replacing PHARE 
and all existing forms of pre-accession assistance.
Despite the pertinent criticism of all the lacunae and the incoherencies of the EU 
human rights policies, the EU has been able to develop a relevant role in promoting 
human rights in Europe, mostly because of its strategy of adopting an approach based 
on legal texts; the legal approach to human rights is perceived as more neutral and 
less intrusive regarding domestic affairs. In turn, the EU adoption of this strategy was 
possible specifically because of its role as a political actor. First, the EU member 
states and the countries aiming to accede to the EU expect that their membership will 
be permanent. Secondly, those countries perceived EU membership as a key to 
accessing an expanding variety of economic and social opportunities, both in the near 
and distant future. Thirdly, the EU is backed up by an increasing interdependence 
involving different types of actors at different levels of interaction, strengthening a 
complex regional network (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996 p. 44). Thus, the most 
powerful EU diplomatic instrument has been the cross-pillar instrument of the offer 
of EU membership. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council set up the requisites 
for EU candidate countries: democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for 
human and minorities rights; and the implementation the Community acquis (the 
rights and obligations that bind all EU members); and in 1999 the Helsinki European
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Council added the condition of “willingness to resolve disputes with neighbouring 
countries”.
The Helsinki Process
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has its origin in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This conference was 
opened in 1973 and concluded in 1975 with the Final Act of Helsinki (known as the 
Helsinki Accord), signed by the 35 participating states (Canada, the United States and 
all European states except Albania). The process established by the Helsinki Accord 
continued in the form of long-running diplomatic meetings until 1995, when the 
CSCE was transformed into an organisation. Its main official organs include a 
Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), and the ‘Chairman-in-Office’ which is a 
rotating post held by each Member State’s Foreign Minister. Currently, its 
membership of 56 states is broader than the Council of Europe.
In the beginning, it was an East-West forum for debate focusing mainly on the area of 
preventive diplomacy in security (Basket One) and also in economic issues (Basket 
Two). Taking advantage of a detente period during the Cold War, the Western 
countries were mainly interested in obtaining concessions regarding security issues 
and the Soviet Union was interested in obtaining formal recognition of its European 
borders and legitimating its geopolitical position in Europe. In fact, human rights and 
democracy (Basket Three) did not represent a central concern of the CSCE. It was 
only at the end of the 1980s, with the democratisation process in the ECE states, that 
the CSCE started directly performing an important role in these fields by legitimating 
human rights discourse and developing new standards regarding democracy, the rule 
of law, national minorities and freedom of expression. These new activities of the 
CSCE came to be known as its “human dimension” (Steiner and Alston 1996 pp. 
577-578).
Nevertheless, the publication of the full text of the 1975 Final Act, including human 
rights principles, and its dissemination had the effect of calling the public attention to
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the human rights situation in the USSR and its allied countries and, most importantly, 
of providing support for domestic human rights groups. The Helsinki process helped 
to legitimise political dissidents in the ECE countries and to provide human rights 
and democratic standards once the democratisation process was initiated.
Since 1991, with its institutionalisation process, the CSCE started to acquire 
operational tasks regarding democracy and human rights issues. Besides the general 
secretariat in Prague, it has also established a set of arrangements responsible for its 
“human dimension”: a Conflict Prevention Centre, based in Vienna; a High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, based in The Hague; an Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)33, based in Warsaw; an Office of the Special 
Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings; an 
Office for Civil Society Development Centres in Albania; and a Representative on 
Freedom of the Media. Paradoxically, due to the non-binding diplomatic origin of the 
CSCE, it was able to create new standards and to provide a “focus for non­
governmental activities at both the domestic and international levels” (Steiner and 
Alston 1996 pp. 578-579, p. 564). Thus, the OSCE added a third dimension to 
regional human rights cooperation in Europe.
Old and New Challenges for the European Regime
The eternal challenge of regional or international human rights systems is to regulate 
the relationship between politics and law. As systems of sovereign states, which in 
the end depend on the political will of the member states, they face the challenge of 
finding the balance between the pressure of a raison d ’etat approach and the “judicial 
activism” alleged by the states (Dijk and Hoof 1998 pp. 617-618). In other words, 
while it is correct that judicial protection is a foundational dimension of human rights 
systems (Alston 1999 p. 13), it is also true that the legal perfection of the normative 
structure does not necessarily mean an actual impact on the promotion and protection
33 The OSCE, through ODIHR, monitoring and reporting on the compliance o f the states with the 
protection of human rights and democracy, mainly in the areas o f freedom of assembly and 
association, the right to liberty and to a fair trial, and the use of the death penalty. It also offers 
technical assistance, training and education.
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of human rights (Tomuschat in Steiner and Alston 1996 p. 588). The protection and 
promotion of human rights are inserted in a complex dynamic with elements of 
power, morality, and cooperation.
Human rights promotion requires not only legal but also political bases upon which a 
human rights programme can be implemented. For this reason, a strong regional 
human rights system requires a certain level of regional integration and not a merely 
intergovernmental cooperation. This requirement is important for two reasons: first, 
to avoid parochial and selfish attitudes of which any regional system could be the 
expression, signifying the danger of a serious blow to the idea of the universality of 
human rights (Vasak and Alston 1982 p. 569) reaffirmed by the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights; and, secondly, for true effectiveness of the human 
rights protection.
Although the European system operates within an intergovernmental cooperation 
framework, the effectiveness of the European human rights system can be evaluated 
both in its own terms, which implies its judicial decisions as well the state responses, 
and in comparison to other human rights systems. The fact that the Council of Europe 
became merely one of the starting points for European integration at first glance 
would undermine the argument presented here; however it does not. Neither does it 
contradict the initial hypothesis about the impact of the regional promotion of human 
rights for many reasons. First, the Council of Europe has retained a relevant role in 
the European scene, and in recent decades it has played a vital role as an 
“antechamber” for negotiating the transition from authoritarian towards democratic 
regimes. Secondly, the regional integration process, once initiated with the Council of 
Europe, has guided the strategy of the political actors of the continent, involving all 
the regional actors and establishing the dynamic of interaction among them. Thirdly, 
the Council of Europe in fact became an element of political integration, and 
therefore, the European system has been used not only as a scenario for the forum of 
shame. The importance attached by the states of ECE to membership of the Council 
reflects their determination to gain ‘respectability’ within Europe in order to qualify 
for certain membership ‘benefits’ and, particularly, their strategy for possible 
admission to the EU.
58
The compatibility of domestic law with the European Convention on Human Rights 
implemented by the Council of Europe through its Directorate of Human Rights has 
been taken into account by the organs of the EU in the process of assessing the 
situation in candidate countries (Nowak in Alston 1996 p. 692). Other human rights 
monitoring procedures have been used by the EU during this process, especially now 
with the current admission practice of the Council of Europe regarding countries such 
as Albania, Croatia and the Russian Federation, known for their poor human rights 
situation. Although the Council of Europe has been criticised for its increasing 
flexibility for admission of new members, it is still perceived as a pre-requisite for 
postulating membership at the EU, and, most importantly, this new practice has not 
impacted the functioning of the EHRS.
The Council of Europe and the development of the EU have helped to strengthen 
each other in different aspects. The Council of Europe has been responsible for the 
building of the European human rights body. At the same time, the EU has indirectly 
reinforced the institutions of the Council of Europe and has given it a new dynamic 
that enabled institutional changes to occur within the system.
As with regional integration, the idea of process is also implicit in human rights 
systems. Internally, when deciding a case the Court must make a judgement in 
accordance with the standards currently accepted in the European society, not with 
those prevalent when the Convention was adopted. If new social standards have 
achieved sufficient wide acceptance, they can affect the meaning of the Convention. 
The dynamic feature of the Convention has also been emphasised by its law-making 
character. The Convention is not a contract of reciprocal obligations among the 
parties, but a contract that imposes obligations upon them. Thus, externally, the 
impact of the EHRS on the human rights situation is based on its institutional 
effectiveness as well as the political pressure in the region for the observance of its 
decisions.
The simultaneity of the development of the EHRS and of the European regional 
integration process is a keystone in differentiating it from the processes that took 
place in other regions. The building of a European identity from the idea of 
integration has supported and been supported by the EHRS. In this sense Alston
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(1999 p. 30) observes that the European system “has become more than a legal safety 
net. It is now a part of the cultural self-definition of the European civilisation.”
It is neither the Council of Europe nor the EU alone that is able to promote and 
protect human rights. The real impact on human rights protection depends on the 
political dynamic of the network established by and around those organisations, and 
the legitimating process of the principles they defend in a broad “Europeanisation” 
process (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 2001). In this sense, the role of the Helsinki 
process as disseminator and legitimating of human rights principles within the ECE 
countries is also relevant for the effectiveness of the EHRS vis-a-vis the response of 
those states and the identification of those principles with the construction of the 
European identity. Other regional organisations or organisations operating in the 
region, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that are not discussed here, and 
different organs of the EU, add a further dimension to this “Europeanisation” process.
It is clear in the case of Europe how the political dynamic throughout the building of 
its regional institutions has created a “regional structure of consent” and a complex 
network responsible for protecting, promoting and monitoring human rights and 
democracy in the region.
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Chapter 2 - The Inter-American Context
Introduction
In a comparative perspective with the European institutional and political dynamic for 
protection and promotion of human rights and the democratic rule of law, this chapter 
analyses the inter-American context with special attention to the Inter-American 
System for Protection of Human Rights (henceforth the Inter-American System or 
IAHRS).
This chapter develops three levels of analysis - historical, institutional and political -  
in order to understand the foundation of the Inter-American System and its 
development, the regional institutionalisation of mechanisms for protection of human 
rights and democracy, and the extent that the regional political dynamic has promoted 
or impeded such institutionalisation.
The Origins of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime
Concerns related to human rights in the Americas developed parallel to the principle 
of Pan-American solidarity, on which the construction of a regional system for 
cooperation among states was based. Since the struggle for independence in the 
American continent, the idea of Pan-Americanism has been in the political 
imagination; however, it is difficult to define. In order to avoid the discussion about 
its definition and content, Pan-Americanism is approached here through the 
institutionalisation process it also expresses. In this sense, since the Congress of 
Panama in 1826, it is possible to find regional concern with democracy and certain 
human rights. During that Congress the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and 
Confederation was signed by representatives of Grand Colombia34, Peru, Mexico and 
the Central American Federation35. Together with the defence of the political and 
territorial independence of those countries and the creation of an American 
Confederation of States for the consolidation of peace and solidarity among them, the
34 Constituted by Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.
35 Constituted by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
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text of the Treaty also highlighted: (1) representative democracy as the sine qua non 
for joining the Union; (2) the principle of continental citizenship that established 
juridical equality for individual rights between nationals and foreigners of a state; and 
(3) the promise of the parties to abolish slavery. In the end, only Grand Colombia 
ratified it and, consequently, it could not come into force. Despite its failure, this 
Treaty has been considered the great antecedent of the Inter-American System (Navia 
1993 p. 11). Before the Second World War, there were several regional meetings to 
discuss the political independence of the American states, their territorial integrity, 
the consolidation of peace, and some questions related to nationality, asylum and the 
rights of foreigners and women (Buergenthal 1990 p. 33). The initial landmark for 
human rights protection in the region can be identified more specifically as the 1902 
Convention Related to Foreigners Rights, established in Mexico City.
In order to keep the focus of this research, the discussion starts with the post-Second 
World War period, when the institutionalisation process of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) began. The landmark for this process was the Inter-American 
Conference of Chapultepec, which took place in Mexico City in 194536. The 
Declaration of Mexico reaffirmed the adherence of states to democratic principles and 
the need to conciliate the interests of the collective with those of individuals. This 
Conference approved resolutions regarding freedom of information, defence of 
democracy in the continent, international protection of the essential rights of men, 
racial discrimination and social principles in the region (Navia 1993 p. 17). It was 
during this Conference that the proposal for the Charter of the OAS and the proposed 
American Declaration of Human Rights were prepared. Both documents would serve 
as the basis for the IX International Conference of American States, which in 1948 
would inaugurate what is called the Inter-American System for Protection of Human 
Rights. On 30 April 1948, during the IX Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
in Bogota, the Charter of the OAS was signed and it became effective on 13 
December 1951. The Charter was responsible for providing a conventional and
36 In 1889, a cycle o f conferences with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American states was 
inaugurated. The precursors o f the OAS emerged from this period. The First Conference took place in 
Washington, D.C. in 1889-1990.
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institutional basis to the Pan-American ideal37 while transforming the OAS into an 
organism of the United Nations.
In the Charter, there are some references to human rights, particularly in two articles. 
Article 5J states that the fundamental rights of a person are a principle of the OAS 
and Article 13 reaffirms the rights of states to develop their cultural, political and 
economic life freely and spontaneously, and states that the rights of a person and the 
principles of a universal morality are to be respected during this development. 
Nevertheless, all these statements were written in very generic terms without 
establishing the rights and the mechanisms for their protection and promotion. During 
the same conference, the American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties38 was 
also adopted, seven months before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by the General Assembly of the UN, in December 194839.
However, the Declaration was not considered a part of the OAS Charter; in other 
words, it did not create juridical contractual obligations. Accordingly to the Inter- 
American Juridical Committee, the Declaration lacks the character of substantive 
positive law because it was adopted as a simple resolution of the OAS (Resolution 
XXX). This put the Declaration in the category of a “declaration of principles”, 
without the coercive power of a treaty. In contrast, there is another position supported 
by international jurisprudence, which states that declarations express the “moral 
conscience of humanity”. By signing a declaration, a state assumes the protected 
rights as general principles of law, and consequently, also assumes the obligation to 
respect them. In international law, an accepted and recognised norm by the 
international community becomes a jus cogen norm (Buergenthal and Maier 1990 p.
37 The origin of the General Secretary of the OAS is the Commercial Office, the secretary of the 
International Union of the American Republics created during the first Conference that took place in 
Washington, D.C. The purpose of the Union was to collect and distribute commercial information 
through its secretariat. In 1920, during the Fourth Conference in Buenos Aires, both the Union and the 
Commercial Office were renamed respectively as the Union of the American Republics and the Pan- 
American Union.
38 In this conference, the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees was also signed. This did not 
receive the same status as the American Declaration. Forty years later, this Charter would be used as 
the basis for the 1988 Protocol of San Salvador.
39 The American Declaration should also be distinguished from other human rights instruments for 
defining not only rights but also duties of citizens in relation to society, their children and parents, 
duties such as education, suffrage, obedience to the law, service to the collective and their nation, 
assistance and social security, paying taxes, working, and not becoming involved in political activities 
in foreign countries.
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107-108). But, even sharing the view that the declaration should be understood as 
general principles protected by law, the fact is that it did not establish international 
juridical mechanisms for supervision.
The efforts to establish a mechanism to deal exclusively with human rights issues in 
the region would only start to be concretised in 1959 at the Fifth Consultative 
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile. The debate during this 
meeting was guided by the perception of a threat to the “security of the region”. The 
political tension in the Caribbean, and mostly the Cuban revolution, led to the 
creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (henceforth the Inter- 
American Commission or IACHR), revealing the strong political ingredient of the 
Inter-American System from the very beginning. Created in 1959, the Inter-American 
Commission began to operate as an autonomous entity of the OAS in Washington, 
D.C. in October 1960. Although it was the first organ effectively in charge of 
problems related to human rights issues, its autonomous status left the IACHR in a 
fragile situation within the Inter-American System. As in the case of the American 
Declaration of Human Rights, the IACHR was based on a weak constitutional 
arrangement of a resolution adopted at a conference.
Initially, the IACHR had very limited powers: (1) promoting human rights awareness 
in the Americas; (2) formulating recommendations to the governments of the member 
states when deemed necessary; (3) preparing reports on human rights violations in 
specific countries; (4) asking the member states for information about human rights 
measures adopted; and (5) serving as the consultative body of the OAS in this field. 
The Commission also conducts on-site visits to member countries at their invitation. 
In its first years, the Commission concentrated its work on the supervision of the 
human rights situation in Cuba, dedicating its first reports to this country, and 
reflecting the ideological intentionality of its creation. However, as other political 
tensions became evident, the Commission had to broaden its focus. With the 
multiplication of military regimes in Latin America, there was an enormous increase 
in the Commission’s workload as these regimes constantly violated human rights. It 
was necessary to ask the Council of the OAS to enlarge the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, enabling it to start paving a more independent institutional path.
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In 1965, the Commission’s powers and attributions were expanded through 
Resolution XXII of the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference, which 
took place in Rio de Janeiro. The Commission gained a more active role in the 
protection of human rights. Complementing its work, the Commission started to write 
an annual report to the Inter-American Conference or to the Consultative Meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and established a system to receive individual petitions. 
Over time, these new activities would become the most important.
The most significant changes, however, occurred in 1967, with the adoption of the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires that reformed the OAS Charter, and in 1969 with the 
adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Protocol of Buenos 
Aires, which entered into force in 1970, modified the OAS structure40 institutionally 
legitimising the Commission as an OAS organ (Article 51 of the revised OAS 
Charter). The Protocol strengthened the normative character of the American 
Declaration to judge activities related to human rights in all member states. 
Gradually, the Commission was able to strengthen itself and change from a body 
exclusively for the promotion of human rights into an organ for the protection of 
human rights.
The different activities and norms of the Commission are stated in four documents, 
which are, in hierarchical order: the American Convention; the Statute adopted for the 
V Consultative Meeting of the Council of the OAS in 1960; the Statute, written and 
approved by the Commission itself in 197941; and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission, approved in 200042. As the Commission is an organ included in the 
OAS Charter, it has power to receive legal petitions with allegations of human rights 
violations against any member state of the OAS, applying the American Declaration 
on Human Rights in these cases. The Commission increased its capacity to react to 
situations of gross human rights violations. It can write, by motu propio, a report on 
the human rights situation of any country without requesting authorisation from any
40 Currently the structure of the OAS is constituted by: the General Assembly, its supreme organ; the 
Permanent Council and the Inter-American Council for Integral Development; the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee; the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; the General Secretariat, its 
central and permanent organ; and specialised organisations and other entities established by the 
General Assembly.
41 The Statute of the Commission was later modified in 1985, 1987,1995,1996, and 1997.
42 It has already been amended in 2002,2003,2006, and 2009.
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OAS organ. The Commission can also develop in loco investigations of emergency 
situations. The latest thematic report of the Commission, presented in 2009, is about 
citizen security and human rights. Regarding Ecuador, the Commission made one on­
site visit in 1994; and in 1997, it dedicated a report to the human rights situation in 
the country.
The American Convention on Human Rights
At the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference, which took place in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1965, a decision was made to convoke a Specialised Conference on Human 
Rights (Resolution XXIV). For this purpose, the Council of the OAS was asked to 
update and complete the proposed Convention on Human Rights that had been 
prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists in 1959. The Conference also took 
into consideration the opinions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and two proposals on the Convention presented at the Conference by the governments 
of Chile and Uruguay.
The work on the proposal for the Convention was extended until 1968 when the text 
of the Convention’s bill was ready. It was this text, with comments from the 
governments of the continent, that became the substantive work for the Specialised 
Conference. Although 1968 had been declared by the UN General Assembly as the 
“International Year of Human Rights”, the atmosphere in the continent did not seem 
to be the most favourable to human rights. While it was true that most of the member 
states were not under military rule, they could not be considered democratic regimes. 
The Specialised Conference also had to be postponed for two months due to a conflict 
between El Salvador and Honduras43.
Finally, from 7 to 22 November 1969, the Specialised Conference on Human Rights 
took place in San Jose, Costa Rica44. At this Conference the American Convention on
43 A football match in Honduras, between its national team and the national team of El Salvador, 
provoked disturbances that unleashed reprisals against the Salvadorian minority in the country. It was 
the excuse for El Salvador to invade Honduras, with which it had a territorial dispute.
44 Nineteen of the 23 member states which comprised the OAS at that time participated in the 
Conference: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
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Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San Jose, was adopted. The American 
Convention established the rights and gave the necessary jurisdiction for their 
protection; however, the Convention would not come into force until 1978, when the 
government of Grenada deposited the 11th instrument necessary for ratification with 
the OAS General Secretary45.
Thus the Inter-American System has two different legal sources, one developed from 
the Revised OAS Charter and other from the American Convention. Theoretically, 
this dual institutional structure was not supposed to be permanent since the 
ratification of the Convention for all member states would end this duality. However, 
there has been great resistance from the states to fully accessing the Convention, that 
is, the ratification and recognition of the Inter-American Human Rights Court 
(henceforth the Inter-American Court) created by the Convention (see Annex for 
signatures and current status of ratification of the American Convention). The delay 
in the convention entering into force reflected the level of commitment that states had 
to human rights and the place they have in their intra-regional relations.
Rights
In terms of rights, the American Convention distinguishes itself for encompassing a 
broad number of rights. It is more extensive than most international instruments in its 
protection of human rights, and has been considered the most ambitious of the 
existing conventions in this field and has even been called “unrealistic” as some of its 
clauses are so advanced that there is a question whether any state can completely 
fulfil it. Many of the Convention’s provisions were more advanced and encompassed 
more than the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the UN Pact for Civil and Political Rights. Both were 
used as model for the American Convention. It is the first international human rights 
instrument to explicitly prohibit the suspension of “essential guarantees” for the
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. The four member states which did not take part of 
the Conference were: Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba and Haiti.
45 The Statute of the Court was approved by the General Assembly in 1980, and its rules o f procedure 
were later modified in 1991, 1996,2000,2003 and 2009.
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protection of rights46 and to embody substantive norms related to these rights as well 
as norms endowed with sanctions in a single instrument.
Most of the rights defined by the Convention are civil and political rights. Only 
Article 26 mentions economic and social rights, but without defining them, and states 
that their effectiveness would be progressive. The proposal for the Convention 
presented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had two different 
articles concerning these rights. Article 25.1 included a long list of rights and Article 
26 determined that states had to inform the Commission periodically about the 
measures that they are undertaking in order to guarantee those rights; it also proposed 
the development of a Special Convention or Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention.
During the Specialised Conference on Human Rights, there was a controversial 
debate about the rights that should be included in Article 25 and strong opposition by 
member states against the obligation to present reports on this topic. As it was 
impossible to include all economic and social rights in only one article and the 
mechanism for their protection was still very vague, the solution was to postpone the 
discussion. It would not be until 1988 that the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San 
Salvador, would be signed, and it entered into force only in 1999. In its first section, 
besides defining rights, the Convention establishes the obligation of the member 
states to respect the norms introduced in the treaty, responding to the pacta sunt 
servanda, and to adopt the provisions of their internal laws to make those norms 
effective. Only 14 of the 35 OAS member states have ratified this Additional 
Protocol47.
The states that participated in the Conference were concerned about establishing an 
ample system for reservations; the resulted was the Article 75 of the Convention, in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention about the Right of Treaties (1969), which
46 The rights that cannot be suspended are: right to the recognition of juridical personality, right to life, 
right to personal integrity, prohibition of slavery and servitude, principle of legality and retroactivity, 
freedom of thought and religion, protection of the family, right to a name, right to nationality, rights of 
the child, and political rights (Article 27).
47 They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.
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allowed states to ratify the Convention with any reservations provided that they are 
not incompatible with the objective and purpose of the Convention. The interpretation 
of incompatibility of the reservations is open to controversy. In 1983, the Inter- 
American Court issued an Advisory Opinion about the Restrictions to the Death 
Penalty (OC3/83) affirming that reservations could not suspend any fundamental 
right in Article 27.2 of the Convention; however, many states have presented 
reservations regarding those rights. Most of the reservations illustrated the singularity 
of the legislation in each country and the difficulty in harmonising them. The 
application of the death penalty by some countries of the region is the most sensitive 
issue. Contrary to the European System, the Inter-American System admitted its 
application but makes some restrictions that ended up receiving reservations. In 1991, 
the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death 
Penalty48 came into force, but it has been ratified by only 11 OAS member states49.
The Implementing M achinery and its Development
The American Convention, in its second section, establishes means for protection of 
the human rights it recognises through its organs: the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
As mentioned before, the American Convention expanded and strengthened the 
powers and jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission. Most of these changes, 
however, were the result of a state-centric vision rather than a focus on individual 
rights. During the Specialised Conference that created the American Convention, the 
question of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Commission generated much debate. It 
is its semi-judicial character that makes the Commission’s jurisdiction mandatory for 
all the states; its decisions are not considered sanctions, but mere recommendations.
48 Other Human Rights documents are: the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 
in effect since 1987; the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, in effect 
since 1996; the Inter-American Convention on Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Woman (Convention of Belem do Par£), in effect since 1995; the Inter-American Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, in effect since 
2001; the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Person Deprived of Liberty in the 
Americas, approved in 2008; and the Declaration of Principles and Freedom of Expression.
49 They are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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As the minutes and documents of the Conference50 illustrate, the major concerns of 
the states were regarding the inter-state petitions. The establishment of direct access 
by individuals to the Commission was, in fact, an attempt to depoliticise the process 
by creating an alternative that might avoid the direct involvement of states in the 
human rights issues of other states. In practice, however, regional politics in the Inter- 
American System were expressed by other means. Until 2006, there was no case of 
inter-state petition either at the Commission or at the Court. The only case brought to 
the Court by a state was the Viviana Gallardo case, which was presented by the state 
in question itself. In a communication on 31 July 1981, the Secretary of the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights reported to the Commission that the Government 
of Costa Rica had presented a case to the Court under the terms of Article 62.3 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and remitted the Court’s resolution on 22 
July 1981. The resolution, in addition to other matters, asked the Commission to give 
its point of view on the jurisdiction of the Court to follow the case and decide 
whether Costa Rican authorities had violated any of the human rights protected in the 
Pact of San Jose. This case concerned the death of Viviana Gallardo and the injuries 
to her cellmates as a result of the actions of a member of the Civil Guard while they 
were detained in jail. Curiously, it was with this case that the Court was activated for 
the first time, and in its decision the Court reaffirmed the process at the Commission 
as a prerequisite51.
The paradox of the ongoing process of the IARHS is that the weakness of the 
Commission as a semi-judicial organ led it to become the pivotal organ of the system. 
The Commission is not only the organ capable of reacting to systematic and gross 
human rights violations, but it is also the gatekeeper for this human rights system
50 OAS, Conferencia Especializada sobre Direitos Humanos, 1973, pp. 44, 47, 51, 99, 100, 102 and 
342-367.
51 There was a case presented to the Commission by the State of Nicaragua against the State of Costa 
Rica, however, it was considered inadmissible. On 6 February 6, 200(6, the IAHRC received a 
communication from the State of Nicaragua which alleged that the State o f  Costa Rica had committed 
violations o f Articles 1 (obligation to respect rights), 8 (right to a fair trial), 24 (right to equal 
protection), and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights; 
Articles 2, 7, 8, and 28 o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Articles II (right to equality 
before the law) and XVIII (right to a fair trial) o f the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man; and Article 9 (elimination of all forms of discrimination) o f the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, due to the alleged failure by the State o f Costa Rica to fulfil its duty to ensure protection for 
the human rights of the Nicaraguan migrant population under its jurisdiction!.
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since individuals have no direct access to the Inter-American Court. Although the 
idea of a regional court of justice dates back to the Fifth Pan-American Conference of 
1923, when Costa Rica proposed a plan for establishing it, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights was only created in 1969 by the American Convention and finally 
installed in Costa Rica in 1979. The 11th ratification deposited by Grenada in 1978 
that made the Convention effective and established the Court was not expected; in 
fact it was considered by many observers to have been an “accident”.
The Court has two functions, one consultative and the other contentious. The 
consultative function was created to interpret the American Convention and other 
human rights treaties related to the American states. It has contributed to the 
development of the Court’s jurisprudence and has strengthened the principles that 
orient the Inter-American System, particularly in its first years when the Court 
received very few cases. The objective of the contentious function of the Court is to 
apply the Convention to individual petitions. The Court is the main organ of the 
system; however, it depends on the Commission or the member states to develop its 
contentious function. This situation has created a double role for the Commission, 
first it acts as judge in the cases it receives, then, once it decides to send a case to the 
Court, the Commission becomes a party in that process. In an attempt to diminish this 
contradictory role it has been given more space for the victims’ representatives during 
the process at the Court.
The development of the Inter-American System occurred within an environment 
defined by the dictatorships of the region. This is reflected in the constraints it 
presents as much as in the advances it has achieved during this period. In contrast to 
its European counterpart that was created and developed within a democratic regional 
context, the Inter-American System, especially the Inter-American Commission, had 
to assume a confrontational attitude in relation to the governments of the region 
during the 1970s. Violating human rights was part of the policies of those regimes, 
and, consequently, the Commission could not expect collaboration with its work. 
With little resolution about individual cases, the Commission assumed a role similar 
to many human rights NGOs, concentrating its work in denouncing violations. The 
objective was to question the credibility of the dictatorial governments before the 
international community and to legitimise the opposition in each country. As an organ
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of an inter-governmental organisation, the work of the Commission played an 
important role during the liberalisation process in many countries. A paradigmatic 
case to illustrate the importance of the Commission is still the visit in loco to 
Argentina in 1979. During this visit, the Commission found 42 political inmates that 
had been reported as dead and received cases related to more than 3,000 disappeared 
people. Moreover, both the visit and the resulting report had a great impact on the 
international community; it was important in helping to give support to social and 
political sectors of Argentinean society that were marginalised by the military regime 
while also publicising the American Convention and the work of its organs (IACHR, 
1980).
With the regime change in the region, the Court moved from 15 ratifications to the 
American Convention and no recognition of its jurisdiction at the end of the 1970s, to 
nine more ratifications and, by the year 2000, recognition by the 24 states that are part 
of the Convention (see Annex table 3). To date, the IAHR Court has processed 211 
cases, including eight demands against the Ecuadorian State. The first case against 
Ecuador was brought by the IACHR in 1995, the Suarez Rosero case, and the Court 
issued its decision in 199752. Most of these cases involve violations of rights related 
to personal integrity, arbitrary arrest, torture and murder committed by state agents. 
The most recent cases, bring different issues; the Alb&n Cornejo case is related to 
medical practice and the lack of investigation by the Ecuadorian state; and the 
Salvador Chiriboga case involves the lack of compensation by the state after 
expropriating private property. In both cases, the domestic remedies were considered 
to have been exhausted after the victims had tried all domestic recourses for years 
without any results. There are also Provisional Measures dictated by the Court 
regarding the Sarayaku Indigenous People and its rights on its territory, a centre of 
conflict between the indigenous community and the Ecuadorian state due to the 
petroleum reserve in their ancestral territory. As the cases against the Ecuadorian 
state illustrate, in recent years the Court has been able to discuss broad rule of law 
issues, reflecting the diversity of the human rights problems in the region and 
increasing the jurisprudence in the field. Gross human rights violations still persist
52 The other contentious cases are: Benavides Cevallos; Tibi Case; Acosta Calderdn; Zambrano V61ez 
and others; Chaparro Alvarez and Lapo tfiiguez; Albdn Cornejo and others; and Salvador Chiriboga.
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but the democratisation process made it possible to introduce other human rights 
issues into the regional debate.
At the same time that the Court begun to be more frequently activated, the 
governments of new democracies started to give more attention to the Commission’s 
work. Seeking internal and external legitimacy, and attempting to avoid bad publicity 
from the release of a critical report or having a case sent to the Inter-American Court, 
states started to consider the Commission’s friendly solution mechanism to be a 
convenient instrument. Until 1994, the friendly solution was interpreted as a 
discretional faculty of the Commission (Article 48.1 .f of the Convention), but since 
the Court’s recommendation in the case of Caballero Delgado and Santana against 
Colombia, a case brought to the Court in 1992, this instrument became a mandatory 
step in the process for all cases.
The conciliatory character adopted by the Commission is a consequence of its 
increased strength within a democratic context, but at the same time it reveals the new 
problems faced by the human rights system. On the one hand, the Inter-American 
System has gained new vitality and more visibility. The friendly solution mechanism 
saves time and expenditures per case and has the advantage of permitting the 
participation of the victims or their representatives in the negotiations.
On the other hand, the collaboration by the state accused of human rights violation 
may be an attempt to neutralise the work of the Commission. Admitting a violation in 
vague or general terms can lead to the end of investigations and result in timid 
decisions against the state in question. The visibility that the Inter-American System 
received with the democratisation process in the region also meant a greater desire by 
governments to control its organs, and a greater political cost for the Commission in 
developing its work.
The human rights discourse employed by the democratic governments of the region 
does not correspond to the small budget established for the system; the Inter- 
American Commission has usually received around 3.5% of the total OAS budget53.
53 The 2008 budget allocated to the IACHR was $3,362.9 (in thousands o f U.S. dollars), which is 
equivalent to 3.8% of the total OAS budget. 68.5% of the OAS budget went to administration,
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Among the member states, the U.S. is the main contributor, followed by Canada and, 
with a much smaller contribution, by Brazil, Mexico and Colombia54.
Besides the lack of financial resources and personnel to deal with the increasing 
number of cases received, the Inter-American Human Rights System does not 
constitute an element of regional identity. First, it establishes different obligations and 
mechanisms for states that are party to the Convention and non-party states; secondly, 
it is still more of a Latin American system than an Inter-American one. The 
democratisation process in the region provided space for the ratification of the 
Convention by many Latin American countries; however, due to their common law 
legal systems, there are still problems for countries from the Commonwealth, Canada 
and Caribbean countries, in adhering to it. Yet, more serious is the absence of the 
U.S. in the system. Although Jimmy Carter signed the Convention during his 
presidency (1977-1981), the U.S. still resists ratifying it.
U.S. Human Rights Policy
Successive Congresses and Administrations have enacted laws linking U.S. policy 
and actions toward a country to its human rights performance. The Carter 
Administration broadened the country annual reports on human rights produced by 
the State Department and made them more serious; eventually they became a 
valuable source of information about human rights conditions around the world. 
However, the U.S. leadership on human rights has been very inconsistent, and 
depends on non-interference of major security and economic interests (Forsythe 2000 
p. 123).
The containment of communism during the Cold War, and then the increasing 
perception of new threats, such as drug traffic, migration and terrorism, since the 
1990s, has resulted, on many occasions, in support by the U.S. of non-democratic 
regimes, militaiy interventions and different U.S. foreign policies that undermine
infrastructure and common costs, the remaining 27.7% was allocated to 45 other sub-programmes 
(CIDH 2008).
54 The U.S. gave $1,360.0; Canada $853.3; Brazil $300.0; Mexico and Colombia $100.0 each; Chile 
$10.0; and Costa Rica $2.9 (in thousands of U.S. dollars) (CIDH 2008).
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human rights protection. Domestically, the application of the death penalty, including 
the execution of juvenile offenders and the mentally impaired, and the resistance to 
recognition of socio-economic rights as such, are examples of the contradictions in 
U.S. human rights policies.
Regarding the international mechanisms for protection of human rights, the 
contradictions are no fewer. The U.S. has actively participated in the creation of a 
series of international human rights documents and instruments; however, it has been 
sceptical of domestic implementation of them, and when it does ratify such treaties it 
usually imposes so many reservations that they remove any domestic effect.
Most explanations about the ambivalence of the U.S. human rights policy or its 
outright hypocrisy of rhetorically supporting universal human rights with great 
enthusiasm while following a national particularism within the U.S. (Forsythe 2000 p. 
148), have been based on the idea of exceptionalism, that is “a pervasive sense of 
cultural relativism, ethnocentrism or nationalism” (Moravcsik 2001 p. 335). 
However, the belief in the greatness and distinctiveness of the United States as the 
first modern democracy, founded on personal freedom, can only partially explain 
U.S. unilateralism in human rights. As Moravcsik argues, the U.S. “is sceptical of 
domestic implementation of international norms because it is geopolitically powerful, 
stably democratic, ideologically conservative, and politically decentralised” 
(Moravcsik 2001 p. 347).
The judicial model of multilateral human rights enforcement, in contrast to legislative 
institutions, means great sacrifice for powerful countries in terms of their bargaining 
power and influence. This realist approach is important in explaining many U.S. 
foreign policies and actions at the international level. However, the geopolitical 
imperatives of a superpower alone does not explain everything; it does not account 
for why the U.S. does not ratify the multilateral treaties, apply specific reservations 
and maintain a parallel unilateral human rights policy. The aversion of the U.S. to the 
domestic application of binding international legal standards for human rights can be 
better understood by three complementary domestic determinants pointed out by 
Moravcsik (2001 pp. 349-350).
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The scepticism toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international human 
rights mechanisms is also due to the fact that the U.S. has been a stable democracy, 
“there is no overarching sense of the need to protect the U.S. political institutions 
against a slow slide into right- or left-wing authoritarianism” (Moravcsik 2001 p. 
352), as in the case of Europe in the 1950s and in Latin America in the past few 
decades. Additionally, the U.S. is a conservative nation; its fundamental policy goals 
are underlined by conservative national identity, political institutions, and ideas of 
socio-economic redistribution. The most important rights for Americans probably 
will not coincide with those defined by other liberal democracies, placing “the nation 
distinctly outside the mainstream of the global consensus on the definition of human 
rights” (Moravcsik 2001 p. 355). The singular broad constitutional protection that the 
U.S. reserves for the rights to bear arms, own property and enjoy freedom of 
expression, and the exceptionally weak guarantees for welfare rights, labour rights, 
and rights against cruel punishment are good examples of this. The reason for that is 
the distinctive and idiosyncratic U.S. political and legal system that has generated 
constitutional rights over more than 200 years. The consequence is a partisan and 
ideological division over human rights issues in the country; two outstanding 
examples of salient elements of conservatism in the U.S. are racial discrimination and 
economic libertarianism (Moravcsik 2001 pp. 352-355).
The third domestic determinant of U.S. human rights policy is the structure of its 
political system, which is veiy decentralised and with divided political institutions. 
Moravcsik points out two decentralising elements of the U.S. political system that are 
of particular importance in limiting its domestic support for international human 
rights norms: the existence of “the super-majoritarian Senate voting rules on treaty 
ratification”, and “the strong separation of powers among the three branches and 
between federal and state government”. This political system results in a great 
number of “veto players” that are able to block government actions to accept 
international obligations (2001 p. 358).
The consequences of those peculiarities of the U.S. political and social institutions 
are, as we have seen, the preference for unilateral policies and a distrustful position 
toward international judicial regimes as well as any regional integration process. The 
U.S. has insisted in establishing a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) as
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an extension of the free trade agreement that it has had with Canada and Mexico, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since 1994; talks started in that 
same year, but with the resistance it has received from many countries in the region, 
the process has been paralysed. At the same time, the U.S. started to promote bilateral 
free trade agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries, thus avoiding 
negotiations with regional blocks. In the case of the Andean countries, the U.S. has 
not only ignored the Andean Community of Nations, but has tried to replace the trade 
preference system it had with Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador55 with bilateral 
agreements. In 2006, the U.S. signed the Trade Promotion Agreement with Peru and 
the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia; Bolivia rejected negotiation of an 
agreement and the negotiations with Ecuador have failed. There is much debate about 
the benefits of this type of bilateral agreement instead of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) instruments or other multilateral agreements; however, what is 
relevant for the discussion here is the preference of the U.S. for unilateralism and 
how regional actors are neglected and set aside by U.S. foreign policy56.
The Institutional Development of the Region
At the end of the Cold War and with the democratisation process experienced in the 
region, the OAS member states have intensified their cooperation and emphasised the 
commitment to democracy as the main core of the OAS. The ad hoc summits were 
institutionalised into a regular “Summit of the Americas”; the first of these summits 
was held in Miami in 1994, and established broad political, economic and social
c n
goals . The main management body of the summit process is the Summit 
Implementation Review Group (SIRG) created in 1995.
55 In 1991, the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) was signed within the framework of U.S. 
foreign policy to combat the drug traffic in the region; in 2002, the programme was renewed as the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA); since 2006, the ATPDEA has gained 
successive short periods of extension, the last one was in 2009 and the U.S. Congress approved the 
extension for one more year; in 2008, Bolivia was removed from the agreement by the allegation that 
the country has failed to cooperate with efforts to counter drug trafficking.
56 At the same time, the EU was recognising the Andean Community o f Nations as a valuable 
interlocutor and was trying to negotiate an agreement with it. In 2003, the Political and Cooperation 
Agreement was signed; it will constitute the framework of the relationship between both regions when 
it enters into force.
57 To date there have been six more summits: the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable 
Development, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in 1996; the Second Summit of the Americas, in Santiago, Chile,
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The Third Summit, held in Quebec in April 2001, adopted the democracy clause 
which establishes that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the 
democratic order in a member state constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to its 
government’s participation in the Summit process. On 11 September 2001, the OAS 
member states adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the democracy 
clause was incorporated into Article 19 of the Charter.
The Democratic Charter defines the elements of democracy and the procedures to 
undertake when it is ruptured or seriously at risk. Article 3 states: “The essential 
elements of democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, access to and exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the 
holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal 
suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of 
political parties and organisations, and the separation of power and independence of 
the branches of government.” Part II (Articles 7 to 10) is dedicated to democracy and 
human rights. In Article 8 the member states “reaffirm their intention to strengthen 
the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights for the consolidation 
of democracy in the Hemisphere”.
The first time the Charter was invoked was in 2002 when an attempted coup d ’etat 
temporarily forced Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez out of office. As the Rio 
Group was holding a summit in San Jos6, Costa Rica, when the news of the coup 
broke, they were able to issue a declaration on the Venezuelan situation and to invoke 
the Charter; however, Chavez returned to power before any further step was taken to 
convene the General Assembly. In 2005, Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolafios 
invoked the Democratic Charter under the assumption that democracy was at peril 
because the National Assembly, dominated by the opposition parties, passed 
constitutional reforms that significantly reduced his presidential prerogatives. In 
response, four missions were sent to Nicaragua at different moments and several 
resolutions and declarations were adopted; as a result, the OAS was recognised as a
in 1998; the Third Summit of the Americas, in Quebec, Canada, in 2001; the Monterrey Special 
Summit of the Americas, in Monterrey, Mexico, 2004; the Fourth Summit of the Americas, in Mar del 
Plata, Argentina, in 2005; and the Fifth Summit of the Americas, in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, in 2009. The Sixth Summit will be held in Cartagena, Colombia, in 2013.
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legitimate interlocutor and advisor in the democratic process. The Charter was 
formally invoked again in 2009 when a constitutional crisis in Honduras culminated 
in a coup that removed and forced President Manuel Zelaya into exile.
Although the Charter is only a declaration and not a treaty, it has been differentiated 
from other declarations since it is considered a tool for interpretation and updating of 
the OAS Charter. Before 2001, the OAS Charter, the Protocol of Washington and 
Resolution 1080 of 1991 were the instruments invoked during political crises. The 
Protocol of Washington, which amended the OAS Charter, was signed in 1992 but 
only entered into force in 1997 when it was ratified by two-thirds of all member 
states. The Protocol granted the General Assembly the power to suspend or expel a 
member state when a democratically-elected government has been overthrown by 
force. Resolution 1080 on representative democracy provides for an emergency 
meeting of the hemisphere’s foreign ministers when democracy is interrupted in order 
to define a collective action. It has been invoked in four cases: Haiti (1991), Peru 
(1992), Guatemala (1993) and Paraguay (1996).
Yet in 1990, the OAS created the Unit for Promotion of Democracy (UPD). Its main 
activity has been the observation of elections in the region, but it also supports efforts 
to strengthen civil society and national legislatures, decentralise governments, 
modernise political parties and promote democratic values. The OAS role of arbiter 
and monitor of the electoral process is still the main tool of the organisation to defend 
democracy. These activities imply less controversial actions for the organisation and 
do not require member states to take part in the discussion and decisions of more 
sensitive issues. Most governments still fear that they can be subjected to criticism 
about human rights and the rule of law.
The Ecuadorian political instability of the last decades is a good example to put in 
evidence the problems of the collective mechanisms of the OAS to protect 
democracy. In 2005, the National Congress impeached President Lucio Gutierrez 
after he had sacked the highest judicial authorities of the Constitutional Tribunal and 
the Supreme Court of Ecuador. The Andean Commission of Jurists (Comision Andina 
de Juristas) and the Carter Centre evoked the Charter and called for OAS members to 
defend democracy during undemocratic actions taken by the Gutierrez government;
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nevertheless, neither the OAS nor any other regional organisations or mechanisms 
such as the CAN and the Rio Group took action. Although there was already a report 
made by the UN Special Rapporteur for Judicial Affairs, Leandro Despuy, warning of 
the severe threat to judicial independence in Ecuador, an OAS mission was only sent 
to Ecuador when Gutierrez was overthrown. There is still no institutional channel for 
civil society groups to activate the Permanent Council or the General Assembly of the 
OAS. After the crisis, however, the OAS developed a significant role in providing 
technical assistance for establishing the procedures for electing the new magistrates in 
accordance with the Democratic Charter.
The OAS presents a clear bias in favour of current presidents and a lack of political 
will to take action to protect other democratic institutions or democratic processes. 
The current difficulty in dealing with different threats to democracy is a consequence 
of the historical development of defence of democracy in the political context of the 
transition from military authoritarian regimes and the fear of intervention. The OAS 
remained unreliable in directly protecting democracy greatly due to “lingering 
widespread fears about the U.S. power” (Forsythe 2001 p. 130). There is a history of 
U.S. military intervention and different operations in the region (see Annex 
Chronology of the US military and clandestine operations in Latin America and 
Caribbean countries since the post World War II), and the defence of democracy has 
been one of the reasons listed to justify these.
The OAS is still perceived as the reflection of U.S. power. In fact, the U.S. is
CO
responsible for about 60% of the amount contributed by the member states . The 
consequence is that it has not been possible to develop an authoritative interpretation 
of democratic standards (Levitt 2006). For this reason, the actions in the region have 
been veiy erratic and uneven.
Sub-regional Mechanisms
58 In the budget approved in 2008, the U.S. was responsible for 59.470% of the contribution to the 
OAS, followed by Canada with 13.761%, Brazil with 7.626%, Mexico with 6.513%, and Argentina 
with 4.282% of the assessed percentage (OAS 2008 p. 18).
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Parallel to the development of the OAS, there have been different attempts at regional 
integration. Most of them have been aimed at creating more than a free trade area; 
however, the development of these processes has been veiy erratic.
The most advanced process has been the Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR is its Spanish acronym). Founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, 
it brought together Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and has expanded its 
partnership to other countries in the region. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru currently have associate member status. In Central America, the current 
integration organisation is the Central American Integration System (Sistema de 
Integration Centroamericana, SICA)59 established in 1991 by the Protocol of 
Tegucigalpa, which amended the Charter of the Organisation of Central American 
States (ODECA)60, and came into force in 1993. In 1973, the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
was signed with the purpose of transforming the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA)61 into a Common Market and established the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM)62.
In the Andean Region, the Cartagena Agreement created the Andean Community 
(CAN is its Spanish acronym). The Cartagena Agreement was signed in Bogota , 
Colombia in 1969 by delegates from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In 
1973, Venezuela acceded to it and in 1976 General Augusto Pinochet withdrew 
Chile, claiming economic incompatibility. The CAN was intended to initiate an 
integration process of the Andean countries through its integration system (Article 6); 
however it has faced a series of political crises that have interrupted this process. In 
2006, Venezuela formally denounced the Cartagena Agreement and left the 
Community.
59 The member states are: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama; the Dominican Republic participates as an associate state.
60 The Charter of the ODECA was signed in 1962.
61 CARIFTA was founded in 1965 by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
62 The CARICOM member states are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands are associate members.
63 It received the name of this other Colombian city because it was there that negotiations were 
concluded.
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Recently the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, the Spanish 
acronym for Alianza Bolivarana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America) was created. 
It is an international cooperation organisation associated with left-wing governments 
that emerged in part as a response to the U.S. FTA proposals in the hemisphere. The 
cornerstone of ALBA was an agreement between Venezuela and Cuba, signed by 
Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro in 2004, to respectively exchange petroleum for 
medical and educational resources. In 2006, Evo Morales brought Bolivia into the 
Peoples’ Trade Agreement (TCP, the Spanish acronym for Tratado de Comercio de 
los Pueblos), which aims to implement the principles of ALBA. In 2007, Nicaragua 
entered the agreement when Daniel Ortega signed the TCP; Dominica joined the 
agreement in 2008 and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines joined in 2009. Ecuador, 
under President Rafael Correa, also officially joined the TCP in 200964.
Additionally, there is the Rio Group, a permanent mechanism for consultation and 
converted political action created in 1986 by the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro. The 
Declaration was first signed by the Members of the Contadora Group (Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) and the Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
and Uruguay)65, which had previously worked together on the Central America crises. 
The Rio Group was created as an alternative regional body to the OAS and U.S. 
predominance.
In 2008, the Constitutive Treaty creating the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR is its Spanish acronym) was signed in Brasilia, Brazil. The UNASUR 
aims to integrate MERCOSUR and CAN as part of a continuing process of South 
American integration. It is still a very embryonic process modelled on the European 
Union.
Regarding human rights and democracy, the only regional mechanisms for protection 
operating in the region are those offered by the OAS framework. In the Andean 
region, CAN has three reference documents regarding those issues: the Cartagena
64 Honduras had joined ALBA in 2008. However, with the position of Venezuela against the coup 
d ’etat that removed President Manuel Zelaya from the Presidency in 2009, and all the events that 
followed this political crisis, Honduras formally withdrew from ALBA at the beginning of 2010.
65 Currently its member status are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Charter (1969), the Riobamba Code of Conduct (1990) and the Machu Picchu 
Declaration on Democracy (2001); however, none of them establish effective 
enforcement mechanisms. The Code of Conduct states the democratic nature of the 
commitment by the Community and member states to respect human rights. The 
Machu Picchu Declaration on Democracy, the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the 
War against Poverty, signed in 2001, reiterates the will to strengthen the Inter- 
American Human Rights System, including the possibility of progressively 
permanent operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the fostering 
of the universality of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights.
The Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, the “Andean Community 
Commitment to Democracy”, written in 1998, has not been ratified yet. The 
Additional Protocol establishes the procedures to be followed in the event of 
disruption of the democratic order in any of the member states. The measures (Article 
4) include: the “suspension of the Member country’s participation in any of the 
bodies of the Andean Integration System”; the “disqualification by the Andean 
financial institutions from obtaining access to facilities or loans”, and the “suspension 
of rights to which it is entitled under the Cartagena Agreement and of the right to 
coordinate external actions in other spheres”.
In 2001, at the Thirteenth Andean Council of Presidents in Valencia, Venezuela, the 
decision was announced to approve an Andean Human Rights Charter to ensure the 
protection of human rights, reinforce democratic governance and the rule of law, and 
promote a culture of peace. In 2004, the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, in 
Guayaquil, Ecuador, adopted Decision 586 for a “Working Programme for the 
Dissemination and Execution of the Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights”. The Programme establishes specific goals for the promotion, 
implementation and follow-up of the Andean Charter.
Deriving from this Protocol and the 1998 MERCOSUR Protocol of Ushuaia, the 
Presidents of the CAN and the MERCOSUR approved the so-called “democratic 
clause” in a communique in 2000. The clause states that: “Maintenance of the rule of 
law and full respect for the democratic system in each of the twelve countries of the 
region constitute an objective and a shared commitment, which as of today is a
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prerequisite for participation in future South American meetings.” Both documents 
state that punitive financial measures might be taken when democracy is overthrown. 
However, the response to a steady erosion of democracy is open to interpretation. As 
Levitt has argued “[w]hat has hampered the defence of democracy regime in the 
Americas is not precisely compliance, but the development of authoritative 
interpretation of democratic standards” (Levitt 2006).
The alternative to the lack of strong multilateral responses to erosion of democracy is 
still the Inter-American Human Rights System. Individuals may file complaints of 
violations of human rights, which include political and civil rights, with the Inter- 
American Human Rights Commission.
The Continuing Challenges for the Inter-American Regime
The regional network has played an important role in denouncing human rights 
violations or the breakdown of democracy, but it has not gone much further in the 
strengthening of the regional regime and the legal status of the party countries. In 
contrast to the European context, the regional instruments and political actors that can 
be identified in the Americas constitute, at most, a weak regional structure of consent.
The Inter-American Human Rights System continues to play a paramount role in the 
defence of those rights and, indirectly, of democracy in the hemisphere. Evaluating 
the IAHRS on its own terms, there have been significant changes in the last decade; 
however, in comparison to its European counterpart, the IAHRS still presents many 
problems and faces serious resistance to further development. It is far from allowing 
individual access to the IAHR Court and from becoming a single permanent court.
Building a regional identity based on democracy and human rights is still an 
enormous challenge in the Americas. The OAS and the IAHRS have developed for 
many years through a dynamic established with non-democratic states. The 
consequence is not only the initial antagonism between states and the protection 
mechanisms, but also the slow progress toward broader support for them. The new 
dynamic of dealing with supposed democratic regimes has also, on many occasions,
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resulted in timid or ambiguous approaches. Yet, the IAHRS is still more a Latin 
American than an Inter-American system, due to the non-participation of the U.S. and 
the Commonwealth countries.
Paradoxically, the OAS is not perceived as a reliable forum due to the predominance 
of the asymmetric power of the U.S., which has greatly contributed to the 
proliferation of alternative regional institutions to the OAS. Thus far, the 
multiplication of organisations with autonomy-minded agendas in the region has not 
resulted in mutual strengthening of these organisations and has not created powerful 
networking66. On the contrary, the superposition of many institutional frameworks 
has usually undermined power and created competing political actors. More recently, 
the regional interlocutors started to recognise each other and move towards what 
seems to be convergence. It is not clear what approach or pace the OAS will assume 
with all these regional interlocutors in moving toward convergence in the European 
model or whether they will converge at all. Meanwhile, the hemisphere requires a 
regional political process that supports broad integration, and effectively builds a 
“regional structure of consent” and a network able to promote democracy and human 
rights.
66 There are other regional inter-governmental organisations, such as the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI - Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integration, created in 1980 by the Treaty of 
Montevideo), that are not mentioned here since they are not directly relevant to the arguments made.
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Chapter 3 - Police Assistance: Cooperation or Cooptation?
Introduction
The international assistance agenda has changed perspective and strategy over the last 
decades. On the one hand, it has been influenced by political events, such as the third 
wave of democratisation. On the other hand, it has contributed to shaping this process 
by emphasising different aspects of democracy.
Democratisation processes always involve a great number and variety of actors, and 
as they advance, more actors are included as a result of the democratic process itself. 
The consequence is much more complex interactions and dynamics. This is true not 
only at the domestic level but also at the international level as seen in the discussion 
about the European and the American institutional contexts in the previous chapters. 
Regardless of their approach and efficiency, there is a noteworthy number of new 
actors, institutions and instruments concerned with democracy, rule of law and human 
rights at the regional level.
The aim of this chapter is to specifically discuss assistance to the police and to 
analyse: (1) how it has emerged in each region; (2) if there is a difference in the 
approach to the rule of law; and (3) the impact that it has had on new democracies. It 
is not an exhaustive analysis of the existing assistance, but an overview of its 
situation in each region.
International Assistance
Since the end of the Second World War, a variety of mechanisms have been 
consolidated for international assistance to developing countries and the number of 
actors interested in this has multiplied. The orientation and scope of the agenda for 
international aid have also changed, resulting in the great complexity we know today.
86
From the 1950s until the 1970s, democracy per se had no priority on the international 
assistance agenda since it was understood as an outcome of socio-economic 
development. The predominance of the modernisation theory gave priority to the 
formation of capital in developing economies. The Cold War context also implied 
constraints on democratisation efforts because of the primacy of the fight against the 
spread of leftist movements and the Soviet influence. Thus, international assistance 
was focused exclusively on traditional security and development issues. Programmes 
concerning the strengthening of public administration focused more on technical 
aspects of improving government capacities and, in more than a few cases, the 
programmes were carried out in non-democratic countries. Although assistance to law 
institutions, civic education, legislatures and local governments, among others, had 
already been introduced in the 1960s, this assistance lacked a democratic focus.
Yet in the 1960s, criticism of the idealism or determinism of the modernisation theory 
had raised discussion about international assistance and had started changing the 
emphasis from economic growth to basic human needs -  such as food, shelter and 
medicine. This would culminate, in the 1980s, in a change of emphasis from physical 
capital to human capital. Furthermore, in the 1970s, gross human rights violations 
committed by non-democratic regimes began to receive attention from the 
international community. In Latin America, as we have seen in the previous chapters, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights started playing a more active role 
in condemning human rights violations, and in East Central Europe, the Helsinki 
process was responsible for placing a focus on human rights. In both regions, an 
international network of human rights NGOs emerged and, with the introduction of 
those issues into the international political agenda, there was an increasing demand 
for complementary assistance.
It was the democratisation in Southern European and Latin American countries 
during the 1980s that consolidated a new approach in international assistance. 
Democratisation processes opened up space for more assistance, with increased 
quantities and complexity. Although it was only with the democratisation occurring 
in East Central Europe that the international dimension of this process gained special 
attention, transition theoiy helped to introduce a new view about developmental 
assistance and put political institutions at the centre of the debate. The break-up of the
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Soviet Union left democracy as the only political ideology with broad international 
legitimacy. The end of the Cold War and the democratisation process itself led to a 
redefinition of the interests and needs of donors and recipients. Democracy, therefore, 
became a specific assistance field.
In this new field, international assistance is basically divided into two main areas: 
electoral processes -  political parties, free and fair elections, and state institutions in 
their different aspects -  constitutions, judicial systems, legislatures, local 
governments and civic-military relationships. Of particular interest for this research 
are the reforms of state institutions, especially the assistance related to the areas that 
have been put under the rubric of “rule of law”.
The rule of law programmes are related to efforts to improve the functioning of the 
major state institutions directly involved in the making, implementation and 
enforcement of laws, and to some extent the legislative strengthening programmes. 
Although the expression “rule of law” produces broad consensus, the rule of law 
agenda is veiy broad, and may be marginally related to human rights and other 
aspects of democracy not included in its minimalist definition.
In the rule of law assistance, following Thomas Carothers’ analysis for Latin America 
(in Rachel and Sieder 2001) but applicable for ECE countries, it is possible to identify 
five, sometimes overlapping, major specific programme areas. The consensus that 
democracy requires an independent and efficient judicial system is presented in all 
the areas, although using different rationale, and sometimes based on competing 
motivations.
The first area corresponds to programmes for advancing democratisation that focus 
on accessibility, equitability and competence concerning the legal system. Those 
programmes concentrated on personnel training and equipment needed to process 
cases more efficiently. The practice of external donors has been to directly sponsor 
projects of the judiciaiy and government.
The second area refers to programmes aimed at the advancement of human rights and 
social justice. Their main objectives are to promote access to the legal system for all
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citizens and to prevent human rights violations with special concern for marginalised 
and vulnerable groups in society. In this area, the external assistance has usually been 
directly to human rights NGOs, grassroots organisations or advocacy groups. As 
democratisation processes advanced, there was a demand for other activities, such as 
promoting legal aid and legal advocacy skills for those groups that had previously 
concentrated their activities on denouncing gross human rights violations committed 
by authoritarian governments.
The third area concerns programmes to strengthen civil society. These usually focus 
on the improvement of legal education (revising curriculum, promoting discussion on 
alternative rule of law reforms), the independence of the media, the promotion of 
legal aid clinics, and the strengthening of human rights NGOs in their monitoring 
work, and of trade unions, and especially bar associations, in order to establish ethical 
standards.
The fourth area relates to economic programmes. They primarily emphasise the 
modernisation of the judicial system and are mainly concerned with commercial, 
financial and other laws related to the institutionalisation of market reforms. The 
structural adjustment policies and liberalisation of the economies in Latin America in 
the 1980s, and the transition from a communist economy to a market economy in 
ECE in the 1990s, introduced new issues into the rule of law agenda, including the 
enforceability of private contracts and laws related to taxes, antitrust issues, banking 
and bankruptcy. In sum, these programmes focused on updating commercial law and 
improving the efficiency of the commercial work of the courts.
The fifth specific area involves programmes directed at advancing international law 
enforcement. In fact, it is more appropriate to refer to this area as international order, 
rather than law enforcement programmes because the main focus has been on 
strengthening national capacity to fight international criminal activity rather than 
strengthening public international law and universal rights. In the 1980s in Latin 
America and in the 1990s in ECE, rising crime rates and especially the increase in 
organised crime, and the cost of this for development, has focussed the attention of 
the international community. Police assistance has been introduced mainly in this 
area of the rule of law agenda. The programmes that especially address police and
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prosecutors became part of the strategy of the international actors against organised 
crime, particularly international drug trafficking.
The rule of law agenda may also be identified with the good governance agenda, both 
in a narrow approach with emphasis on public administration management, or in a 
broad approach with an “emphasis on the normative dimension of the openness, 
accountability and transparency of government institutions” (Crawford 2001 p. 23). 
The tension between a narrow and a broad agenda of political-oriented programmes 
generated a false duality between efficiency and accountability of institutions. In the 
judicial system this tension can be translated in prioritising assistance to the criminal 
justice system based on the order enforcement approach or to programmes promoting 
judicial accessibility based on the law enforcement approach. The police, as part of 
the criminal justice system, are also embedded in this duality between improving 
police operational capabilities and efficiency, or promoting human rights and 
democratic accountability. It is in this context that policing issues emerged in the 
international assistance debate, revealing that policing may not be an exclusively 
domestic affair.
While the law enforcement approach encompasses the normative guidelines provided 
by human rights, the order enforcement approach, although dissimulated in 
democratic discourses, is not concerned with human rights and is barely concerned 
with some aspects of democracy. In terms of police assistance, the order enforcement 
approach may perpetuate abuse of power and corruption in controlling people instead 
of strengthening people’s mechanisms for controlling the police.
The issue of police assistance is relatively new for multilateral development agencies. 
The security system is considered a pariah for most donors because of the risk it 
implies and the minimal noticeable impact it produces (quoted in Ziegler and Nield 
2002 p. 59). However, despite the little attention it has received, police assistance is 
not new in foreign affairs, either as part of assistance in post-conflict contexts or as 
part of general military programmes.
The sensitivity of approaching internal security issues of foreign countries has led to 
the disguise of police assistance under broad issues in bilateral relations. The
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priorities for money and technical cooperation for police forces, more than any other 
issue in the assistance field, are developed more in accordance with the donor 
motivations than the recipient needs. Assistance is an effective instrument to promote 
the security agenda of donor states, mostly in new democracies that usually lack a 
clear public security policy. Police assistance may play an important role in the 
process of building democracy, but it can also digress from this process. The 
consequence may be the incapacity of new democracies to control their repressive 
forces and institutional changes that do not follow the priorities of the recipient 
country. For this reason, it is crucial that there be discussion of the context in which 
the debate about police reform emerges domestically as well as the context in which 
police assistance develops regionally. The impact of the assistance for police forces 
depends on two factors: 1) the type and motivations of the donor; and 2) the regional 
political dynamic in which the assistance is developed.
The main regional actors were already defined in the previous chapters. Now, it is 
necessary to identify the police assistance programmes developed in each region in 
order to analyse: (1) their approach to the rule of law; (2) to what extent they 
incorporate or subordinate human rights guidance; and (3) how the level of regional 
commitment to democratisation and human rights by donors affects the strengthening 
of the rule of law in the recipient countries.
The focus at the regional level makes it possible to observe how the police issue is 
also part of a more complex political dynamic that involves domestic and regional 
interaction. Police issues are not restricted to the area of good administration, they 
have historically been instruments of dominance and, in this sense, they are part of 
the power relationships.
Police Cooperation in ECE
In the ECE several donors related to the rule of law or police assistance can be 
identified. Nevertheless, in the political context already discussed in the Chapter One, 
the primary role in this area was developed by two multilateral organisations, the
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Council of Europe and the EU. In the following section I will present an overview of 
the police assistance.
The European Union and the Council of Europe
The EU, as we have seen, is a “foreign policy system” based on three pillars -  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and 
the European Community (EC) -  and each member state’s foreign policies. The 
Rome Treaty did not present foreign policy objectives since the original concern was 
with economic integration. The 1970 Luxembourg Report, followed by the 1973 
Copenhagen Report and the 1981 London Report, began to frame a specific 
mechanism for cooperation. Initially, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
introduced in 1970 and formalised since 1987 by the Single European Act, permitted 
the EC to build itself as an international actor. The EPC was based on 
intergovernmental rather than supranational principles. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty 
replaced the EPC with a new mechanism for foreign policy cooperation, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in order to cope with all the regional and 
international changes67. Decisions on aid are supposed to follow the general EU 
orientation towards third countries and take into account the CFSP discussion on 
violations of human rights and democratic principles (Smith 2003 p. 67). The 
European Commission manages the aid programmes through its directorate generals 
(DGs) and offices related to external relations - External Relations, Trade, 
Development, Enlargement, the European Aid Cooperation Office, and the 
Humanitarian Aid Office.
During the 1980s, there were attempts to establish the common interests and 
international objectives of member states; however, it was only with the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union that the objectives of a common foreign and security 
policy were established. In general terms, it states the following objectives: (1) “to 
safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union”; 
(2) “to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”; (3)
67 See the Maastricht Treaty chapter on development cooperation.
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“to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter”; (4) “to promote international 
cooperation”; (5) “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Title V: Provisions on a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.l .2).
The Maastricht Treaty also establishes, under the JHA pillar, matters for cooperation 
of common interest to the members: (1) asylum policy; (2) rules governing the 
crossing by persons of the external borders of the member states and the exercise of 
controls therein; (3) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third 
countries including (a) conditions of entry and movement by third country nationals 
in the territory of member states; (b) conditions of residence by third country 
nationals in the territory of member states, including family reunion and access to 
employment; (c) combating unauthorised immigration, residence and work by third 
country nationals in the territory of member states; (4) combating drug addiction 
insofar as this is not covered by 7 to 9; (5) combating fraud on an international scale 
insofar as this is not covered by 7 to 9; (6) judicial cooperation in civil matters; (7) 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters; (8) customs cooperation; (9) police 
cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including, if necessary, 
certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organisation of a 
Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office 
(Europol) (Maastricht Treaty, Title VI, Article K.l).
The JHA pillar had its origin in the network formed by the Trevi Group, in 1975, 
which was initially created to coordinate actions against terrorism - at that time the 
concerns were the IRA in the UK, the Red Brigades in Italy and pro-Palestinian 
groups across Europe -  and later to deal also with football hooliganism, international 
crime and immigration (Smith 2003 p. 31). It was only during the second half of the 
1980s that the EC started incorporating human rights considerations into assistance 
programmes and promoting political conditionality. It has established small 
programmes to promote human rights aid to democracy in Chile and ECE countries. 
During the Cold War, the EC prioritised trade ties and persuasive diplomacy to
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promote liberalisation in ECE countries instead of retaliation policies regarding 
human rights situation. It was only in 1992 that the EU created the programme of 
“Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy” (PHARE).
With the democratisation process initiated, the EC started to provide aid for economic 
reforms and use conditionality to encourage political change. In contrast to the EU 
strategy with other regions, in the beginning, the EU’s relations with the ECE 
countries were predominantly bilateral (Smith 2003 pp. 103-105). Individually, 
France and the UK in 1990 and Germany in 1991 announced that democracy and 
human rights considerations would guide aid distribution (Smith 2003 p. 105), and 
since 1995 - with the human rights clause -  human rights and democracy started to 
orient the EU’s policies.
Finally, in 1994, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was 
created and its funds from the ECU increased from 59.1 million Euros to 410 million 
Euros for the period from 1999 to 2004. This is a small percentage of the EU external 
relations budget, but it is more than most states and international organisations give 
(Smith 2003 p. 113). The Initiative’s priorities have been: (1) support to strengthen 
democratisation, good governance and the rule of law; (2) support to the abolition of 
the death penalty; (3) support for the fight against torture and impunity and for 
international tribunals and criminal courts; and (4) combating racism and xenophobia, 
and discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples (Smith 2003 p. 114). 
Launched in 2006, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) has replaced the European Initiative and, since 2007, the Development 
Cooperation Instrument and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) complement the tools used by the EU to implement its policies for democracy 
and human rights.
In the process of preparing for accessing the EU, all candidate countries made an 
effort to harmonise their laws and institutions with those of the EU member states, 
including the police. Candidate countries “try to give the impression that the laws on 
the police organisation, authority, and legal status comply with European norms” 
(Koszeg in K&d&r 2001 p. 5). Although the practice within the EU is to respect 
different traditional administration systems and common and civil law, the
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harmonisation of human rights norms is “just as much a condition of integration as 
harmonisation of economic and commercial practices” (Koszeg in Kdddr 2001 p. 6).
In fact, the EU conditionality mainly addresses legislation and involves issues that 
meet their interests. In this sense, regarding the police, there is a positive 
conditionality68 in relation to law, but less concern for more structural problems, such 
as its organisational and supervisory framework. As the JHA recommendations are 
non-binding, close cooperation is needed among judicial authorities and police forces. 
The main cooperation programmes among the EU members and the ECE countries 
have been in the areas of regional security matters, focusing on combating organised 
crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration. However, despite the predominance of 
bilateral relations with the ECE countries, the tendency for police assistance has been 
to channelling it through the EU’s mechanisms. In this spirit, Europol was created to 
pursue the priorities of the EU public security agenda and promote cooperation 
among police forces of the member states. Although the negotiation process for its 
creation was slow, the Europol convention entered into force in 1998 and became 
operational in 1999.
In Europe, the acquis communitaire of the European Union and the admission criteria 
developed during the rounds of enlargement was backed by significant material 
incentives for the European values already constructed and promoted by the Council 
of Europe. These values have fostered a regional identity, the promotion of 
democracy and human rights also in non-member states in Europe.
The Council of Europe, as we have seen in Chapter One, has been the main political 
actor for cooperation and assistance to East and Central European countries. The 
European Commission for Democracy through Law, based in Venice and comprised 
of independent experts, assisted the transitional countries in drafting their
68 Positive conditionality means benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative conditionality 
involves reducing, suspending or terminating those benefits if the state in question violates the 
conditions. The EU often holds out the promise of an agreement if the country concerned meets certain 
conditions (such as respect for democratic principles or implementing structural adjustment 
programmes). Negotiation and conclusion of agreements can be delayed if the conditions are not being 
met. For example, since September 1997, the Council has put off the conclusion of a partnership and 
cooperation agreement with Belarus, because that country does not respect human rights and 
democratic principles.
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constitutions and other laws. Its work was complementary to the Council’s assistance 
programmes for legal reforms. Several special programmes were launched before and 
after the countries’ accession. These programmes were dubbed Demosthenes, Themis 
and Lode, and gave priority to work on the ground (Council of Europe 1989).
Demosthenes covered all areas of activities of the Council of Europe and had the goal 
of bringing each country’s legislation and institutions into conformity with Council of 
Europe norms, especially the European Convention of Human Rights. Themis was a 
programme specifically designed for legal cooperation aiming at the establishment of 
an independent judiciary; it trained judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police officers, 
prison administrators and public servants in the judicial system. And the Lode 
Programme was designed to promote grassroots democracy and was addressed to 
local leaders and administrators in local politics (Diana Pinto in Council of Europe 
1996 pp. 47-58).
Furthermore, the Directorate of Cooperation has developed activities in the areas of 
legal and human rights capacity building, economic crime and judicial reforms. 
Regarding the police, the legal and human rights capacity building office has recently 
launched the police and human rights programme in order to raise awareness, develop 
training tools and build networks for police and human rights across Europe. 
However, for the period targeted by this research, the most important impact on the 
police forces was the strengthening of oversight mechanisms and human rights values 
that began to frame the police activities and the institutional reforms.
An early attempt to establish a pan-European framework for the police occurred in 
1979, with the adoption of the Declaration on the Police (Resolution 690) by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Declaration aimed to provide 
ethical standards for the police. In 1998, the European Committee on Crime Problems 
adopted the terms of reference established by the Committee of Experts on Police 
Ethics and Problems of Policing, and it became the basis for the European Code of 
Police Ethics adopted in 2001. Together with the United Nations documents related to 
law enforcement, the Code has become a reference for the concept of democratic 
policing. The Council of Europe’s effort to develop rule of law and human rights
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standards has been a unique and paramount work in Europe, as illustrated by the case 
of Poland which is discussed in Chapter Five.
Police Assistance in Latin America
In Latin America, police reform has received more bilateral support while multilateral 
agencies have emphasised the reform of the courts (Ziegler and Nield 2002 p. 68). 
The primary donor in police assistance to Latin America has always been the U.S. It 
was only beginning in the 1990s that other bilateral donors, such as Spain, France, the 
UK and Canada, and multilateral organisations, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the UN, the EU, and the OAS started 
working on police reform in the region. Below, I will present an overview of police 
assistance by multilateral organisations in the region with special attention to 
programmes in Ecuador.
With the assumption that there is a strong link between violence and losses in gross 
domestic product, since 1996, the IDB has supported research and projects on crime 
prevention and public security initiatives, and has drawn up policy guidelines for 
lending in the area. The Bank has projects in different stages of preparation or 
development in Colombia, Chile, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay, and has identified possible citizen security 
programmes in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela 
(Buvinic et al. 2005). The Bank’s guidelines for projects in the area of violence 
reduction proscribe certain areas for support, such as “acquisition of lethal or 
potentially lethal equipment (e.g., weapons, ammunition), activities designed to 
preserve state security or investigate crimes committed with political motivations 
(support for counterintelligence or state security) and all other areas that are 
associated with human rights abuses or that have political aspects” (Bruvinic et al. 
2005 p. 12 Footnote 8). And, so far, the Bank has not financed more comprehensive 
police restructuring or reform projects. In the case of Ecuador, since 1998, the IDB 
has already supported “non-reimbursable” technical cooperation for legislative 
development, training systems, an administrative system for judicial operations,
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access to justice, and juridical security for the improvement of competitiveness (BID 
1998). However, there is no project that includes the police.
The rule of law aid from the World Bank is basically related to economic reforms and 
some projects on legal access following the economic view of the Bank’s definition 
of good governance69. In 1994, the World Bank evaluated the justice sector in 
Ecuador and developed a loan operation of US$10.7 million for a Judicial Reform 
Project initiated in 1996 and completed in 2002 (Project ID PO36056). The project 
included improvement in the efficiency of justice, development of legal education, 
justice access, and improvement of physical structures. In 2002, a grant of US$1.78 
million was approved for the Law and Justice for the Poor Programme (Project ID 
PO87390). The other two projects addressing Ecuador focused on legal institutions 
for the market economy and state enterprises.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through its Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), established a Justice and Security Sector Reform 
(JSSR). Specifically regarding the police institution, as of 2006, JSSR has activities 
only in Argentina, Brazil, Belize and Guatemala. In Ecuador, it has developed 
activities related to the establishment of a civilian oversight office (ombudsmen 
office) and provides support for the development of national plans to reform the 
security sector70 (UNDP 2006). The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute (UNICRI) is also developing a project for judicial training in the Andean 
countries; it is called "Assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in the Fight 
against Corruption and Drug Trafficking". This project is based on training courses 
forjudges and public prosecutors. The donor for the project is the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, but training and technical contributions have been provided by 
academics, magistrates and officials from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Italy, Mexico, 
the U.S., and senior representatives of the OAS. The aim of the project is to promote
69 The World Bank defines governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are 
selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its 
resources and implement policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them” (World Bank 2004).
A similar programme has been developed in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua.
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knowledge of international and regional legal instruments against corruption and 
organised crime, and to establish a basis for cooperation.
Among its thematic priorities, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights in Third Countries identified the strengthening of democratisation, good 
governance and the rule of law. In Latin America, the focus countries have been 
Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. In Ecuador, the Initiative supported the project for 
“Strengthening Constitutional Justice” (Project Number 2001/0990) of the Spanish 
University Carlos III. Following the EU policy of dealing with third countries on a 
regional basis, in general, cooperation from EU to Ecuador has been carried out under 
the Framework Agreement between the EU and the Andean Community, signed in 
1993 and entered into force in 199871, and under the 1996 Declaration of Rome. 
Nevertheless, a new Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated in
2003. Once ratified, it will replace the previous documents and will extend the areas 
of cooperation to include good governance, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and 
migration (EU 2006)72.
Under this framework, the EU has focused on two priorities. First, the support for the 
Andean integration process in order to develop a single market and project the 
Andean Community as an international player. Secondly, the support of an Andean 
Peace Zone in order to fight against drugs and promote the management of natural 
resources. For the 2000-2006 period, 27 million Euros have been allocated for three 
initiatives in these domains: involvement of civil society, harmonisation of statistics, 
and prevention of natural disasters. The EU is the main donor for Andean regional 
projects since donors have usually opted for a national approach (EU 2006 pp. 5-6). 
However, with the exception of Spain, EU Member States do not engage in 
cooperation with the Andean region as such. Spanish cooperation has been 
specifically related to the fight against drug trafficking. The Spanish national anti­
drug plan has designed projects to support police assistance and other aspects of law 
enforcement to complement the initiatives of the European Commission.
71 By 1983 the EU had established a regional framework agreement with the region, at that time called 
the Andean Pact.
72 In 2008, the EU-CAN negotiations failed and a new negotiation format was adopted: regional 
negotiation with the Andean Community on political dialogue and cooperation, an update of the 2003 
Agreement; and multi-party trade negotiations with individual Andean Community countries.
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The OAS, through its main areas of activities - defending democracy, protecting 
human rights, strengthening security, fostering free trade, combating illegal drugs, 
and fighting corruption -  has developed a framework for human rights, rule of law 
and good governance, and has created agencies responsible for cooperation in those 
fields. Until 2005, the OAS Secretariat for Political Affairs (SPA) was responsible for 
activities related to democracy, good governance and prevention of conflicts, and had 
no specific programme for the police. Although, the discussion about citizen security 
was already present in the regional debate, with the exception of the OAS Special 
Mission “Support for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti”73, police assistance had 
represented a small effort by the OAS and usually within programmes concerning 
drug trafficking, terrorism and international organised crime.
Following the new concept of security adopted in the Declaration on Security in the 
Americas (2003), the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security was created in 2005, 
for the purpose of coordinating cooperation among the member States to deal with 
threats to national and public security. The Secretariat is comprised of three divisions: 
the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD), already created in 1986; the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee 
against Terrorism (CICTE), established in 1999; and the Department of Public 
Security (DPS), created in 2006.
CICAD has provided police training through different projects concerning supply 
reduction. In the area of counterdrug cooperation and capacity building, CICAD 
helped to establish, in 1999, the Andean Community Regional Counterdrug 
Intelligence School (ERCAIAD) based in Lima, Peru. It developed a project for 
counterdrug enforcement training for all member states, and a community policing 
project for the Dominican Republic (CICAD website). With the exception of the 
community policing project which was funded by Canada alone, all the other projects 
had been developed with funds from Canada and the U.S. CICAD also had projects 
involving police training in the area of maritime drug-trafficking, chemical control, 
and organised crime; some of these projects were funded by France and Spain
73 Initiated in 2000, this makes the regional community responsible for building a new police 
institution in the countiy.
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(CICAD website). Police training also has been provided by CICTE through 
programmes on port security, customs and border protection.
The DPS is responsible for promoting public policies on security, legislation and 
technical assistance to member States, and this includes the responsibility for 
promoting police training, activities to improve the penitentiary system, legislative 
assistance and information systems on crime and violence. Very recently, DPS has 
launched the Inter-American Training Programme (PICAP). The main purpose is the 
exchange of information, transfer of experience, and analysis of political actions 
among the member States in order to develop tools for the prevention and control of 
crime and violence. DPS has also focused on the modernisation of police education 
through the development of a model curriculum. This has been a significant change in 
the OAS concern for public security74 and, in the broad picture, in its approach to 
strengthening democracy in the region. However, it is a very recent trend, and PICAP 
is in a veiy early stage. It will be interesting to follow the development and 
application of PICAP’s activities in order to analyse its approach to policing and the 
rule of law as well as to evaluate its impact on the police institutions of the region. It 
is an issue for another study since the argument of this research focuses on the first 
years of the democratisation process in the region.
In the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), political cooperation has focused on 
security matters in the region - basically drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption - 
in order to create a common external security policy for the Andean Community as 
stated in Decision 587 of the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers adopted in July
2004. Related to the citizen security field, in June 2003, through Decision 552, the 
“Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in all its Aspects” was approved. In Ecuador, the Andean 
Community, together with the OAS and the UN, participated in the process of naming 
the new Supreme Court of the country in 2005. However, assistance for police forces 
is not part of its agenda.
74 The OAS has also initiated a process of Ministerial Meetings on Public Security. The first one was 
held in Mexico in 2008.
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The Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the financial institute of the Andean 
Community, has a strategic programme of governance with four main areas: “ethics 
and transparency for development”, “institutionality”, “decentralisation and citizen 
participation”, and “leadership for transformation”. The latter area has a project for 
education of youth with democratic values. Nevertheless, there is no programme 
related to the judicial system, and most of CAF’s programmes in Ecuador focus on 
infrastructure, commerce and microfinance (CAF 2004).
Police assistance from multilateral organisations is a very recent activity and, in 
general, relates to specific cases without continuity or real concerns regarding the 
police institution itself. Although the UN has already developed an important 
conceptual framework related to human rights and law enforcement, it is rarely 
incorporated into police assistance. At the same time, bilateral donors, directly or 
through multilateral organisations, have also increased their participation in police 
assistance in recent years. In comparison to other countries, the U.S. is far ahead in 
the police assistance field. Moreover, many of the programmes developed by 
multilateral agencies are totally or partially financed by the U.S. For this reason, it is 
fundamentally important to discuss U.S. police assistance.
U.S. Police Assistance
From the 1950s to the 1970s, U.S. police assistance was developed through the 
“Public Safety Programme”75 developed under USAID’s Office of Public Safety
75The public safety program was created in 1954 to provide assistance for foreign governments. The 
first country to receive assistance was Indonesia, followed by Iran, South Korea and Cambodia (GAO 
1976 p. 9). “Preventive doctrine” - “NSC Action Memorandum 1290, dubbed a “Review of Basic 
National Security Policy”, directed, in Sub-clause “d”, that the NSC’s Operations Coordinating Board 
(OCB) present to the [National Security] Council a report on the status and adequacy of the current 
program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of 
the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to communist subversion (NSC 1954b 2). 
The police program that grew out of this directive came to be known throughout the U.S. national 
security bureaucracy as the 1290d Program. From then on, foreign police assistance would be 
reorganised as part of the U.S. national security bureaucracy. The 1290d Program was thought to be 
necessary because “many countries threatened with communist subversion [had] neither the 
knowledge, training nor means to defend themselves successfully [against communism]” (OCB 1955c, 
1). To correct this, 1290d would train foreign countries’ “regular and special police gendarmerie and 
carabinero, constabulary and investigative types of forces” as a first line of defence against 
Communist subversion (OCB 1955c, 5). However, recognising that police training alone would not 
prepare host countries against Communism, in 1957, the OCB broadened its internal security initiative
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(OPS), the Military Assistance Programme (MAP), and the Military Service Funded 
programme in South Vietnam (GAO 1976 p. 1).
The OPS was set up in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
1962 as an attempt to centralise the public safety programmes. The Kennedy 
government, according to Martha Huggins (1998 pp. 104-107), acknowledged that 
police training was a political rather than a military instrument and for this reason 
should be controlled by USAID or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, 
the CIA did not want official control of its activities since it was afraid of exposing its 
personnel by having them act overtly.
In 1963, the International Police Academy (IPA) was established to train foreign 
police officers. The Inter-American Police Academy (IAPA) established in 1962 by 
the CIA’s Panama Station at Fort Davis Army Base in the Panama Canal Zone was 
later transferred to Washington D.C. to operate at IPA. In 1974, USAID decided to 
close the IPA due to the allegations that the CIA recruited informants and operatives 
through the academy (Huggins 1998 p. 108) and “(1) encouraged or condoned police 
brutality, (2) taught or encouraged use of terror and torture techniques, and (3) 
promoted creation of police states” (GAO 1976 p. 14).
In 1973 and 1974, the U.S. Congress passed legislation incorporating human rights 
into aid policies and abolishing U.S. assistance to foreign police forces and prisons76. 
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1974 introduced Section 660 which prohibits 
the U.S. “to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, 
prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any 
programme of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign 
government within the United States or abroad” (GAO 1976 p. 6). The OPS was also 
accused of assisting human rights violations through foreign police forces, or at least, 
having knowledge about it. For this reason, Gerald Ford’s Administration completely
to include the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP). This top secret internal security program 
combined 1290d police assistance with a variety of strategies to coordinate international security 
planning more carefully by integrating military and police assistance with judicial reform, using USIA 
[the U.S. Information Agency] propaganda to convince vulnerable countries that they needed OISP 
internal security assistance”, (Huggins 1998 p. 80).
76 Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (17 December 1973); Foreign Assistance and Related Programs 
Appropriation Act, 1974 (2 January 1974); and Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (30 December 1974).
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dismantled the OPS in order to avoid investigation of its past activities (Huggins 
1998 p. 195).
Nevertheless, the prohibition stated by the FAA did not apply to the activities of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(GAO 1976 p. 4). This legislation only concerns the Departments of State and 
Defence. However, Defence also interpreted that the Congress did “not intend for 
military assistance to be prohibited to countries under martial law or to units assigned 
dual militaiy-police functions” (GAO 1976 p. ii). Subsequently, there were numerous 
amendments to Section 660 establishing exemptions for specific countries or areas, 
mostly related to narcotics control and counterterrorism issues but also to illegal 
migration.
The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 granted 
exemptions to Haiti in order to assist Haitian police forces to stop illegal emigration 
to the U.S. The International Security and Development Assistance Authorisations 
Act of 1983 removed the prohibition to train foreign police for the anti-terrorism 
programme. With the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1985, a series of police assistance activities were allowed, mostly related to judicial 
reform involving police assistance in judicial investigative roles for Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. In 1988, the Congress expanded the judicial reform 
programme to include the promotion of law enforcement training curricula and 
improved administration and management of law enforcement organisations. The 
International Narcotics Control Act of 1986 allowed the Department of Defence 
(DOD) to train foreign police in the use of aircraft to control drug trafficking. The 
International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 expanded the training for the police units 
specifically organised for narcotics control in certain countries of Latin American and 
Caribbean; through this act the Colombian police started receiving economic support 
for protection of government officials, judges and members of the press against what 
were called “narco-terrorist attacks”. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989 
extended the DOD’s activities to train and provide defensive equipment to police 
units in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru; this extension was reaffirmed in the 
International Narcotics Control Act of 1990. Other examples are the Urgent 
Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 and the Foreign Operations, Export
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Financing, and Related Programmes Appropriations Act of 1991 related to the 
Eastern Caribbean (GAO 1992 pp. 8-11). Exemptions to the police assistance 
prohibition can also be made by the president, who may authorise foreign assistance 
when “it is important to the security interests of the United States” (quoted in GAO 
1992 p. 11). With the end of the Cold War and the democratisation process in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe the exceptions have proliferated.
In 1974, Ecuador was among the 17 countries where the Public Safety Programmes 
had to be phased out (GAO 1976 p. 11). Already in the 1970s, the U.S. Narcotics 
Control Programme helped to establish special narcotics units by the police in 
Colombia, Peru and Ecuador (GAO 1976 Appendix II p. 68). These special units 
permitted the U.S. to keep aiding and training the police despite the prohibitive 
legislation. Ironically, the 1973 and 1974 legislation, which intended to incorporate 
human rights and prohibit support to authoritarian governments, promoted 
imbalances between those special units and the rest of the police. Moreover, it 
promoted a partial approach to what should be a comprehensive security system as 
will we discuss in Chapter Six on the Ecuadorian police.
USAID was the main entity responsible for narcotics control projects financed 
through the Department of State; however, since 1973, the administration and 
supervision of the narcotics control funds were transferred to the Senior Advisor to 
the Secretary of State and Coordinator for the Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters (INM) which provides training and equipment in order to strengthen the 
enforcement and interdiction capabilities of the recipient countries. For fiscal year 
1990, with a minimum of US$45 million, INM assisted police in countries recognised 
as producers or traffickers, mostly Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey (GAO 1992 p. 12). In 
1990, U.S. police assistance reached 125 countries all over the world, including 
countries that may have received assistance only through the participation of one 
person in a training course. Most programmes were developed through INM, which 
includes training provided by the DEA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs 
Service (GAO 1992 pp. 19-22). There are also other agencies involved in the 
Narcotics Control Programme. The narcotics training provided at the academy, closed 
in 1974, was primarily transferred to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Training
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and equipment are also provided by the DOD; for fiscal year 1990, it provided at least 
US$17 million to Mexico, US$1.3 million to Bolivia, US$10 million to Colombia, 
US$1 million to Peru and US$1 million to Ecuador (GAO 1992 p. 13). For fiscal year 
1974, the U.S. Congress gave US$42.5 million for international narcotics control 
(GAO 1976 p. 20). During fiscal year 1992, the GAO identified a cost of at least 
US$117 million in police assistance. These numbers do not represent the total 
expenditure on drug control since some agencies do not maintain such data (GAO 
1992 p. 2).
In the mid-1980s, the U.S. increased the administration of justice programmes in 
Central America, mostly through USAID. The Reagan administration, which was 
providing significant militaiy aid to the region, was under pressure from the House of 
Representatives, controlled by the Democrats, to develop a human rights policy for 
the region (Carothers 1999 p. 6). Originating with the Republican government policy 
strategy in the region, those programmes were inserted within a democracy 
promotion programme. The assumption was that promoting an independent, efficient 
and effective judicial system was fundamental to democracy; however, the 
programmes were concentrated on criminal justice, in particular on reforming 
criminal law, and training prosecutors, judges, and police (Carothers 1999 p. 6).
In 1986, the Department of Justice (DOJ) established the International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) with funds transferred by 
USAID. ICITAP operates with oversight from the Department of State and its main 
goal is to improve criminal justice in Latin America. Training programmes have 
expanded to include police management and police academy development. In 1989, a 
special programme emerged after the U.S intervention in Panama; the National Police 
Force Development project was created by ICITAP with the goal of helping to 
develop the newly formed police force in the country. For fiscal year 1990, ICITAP 
received US$7 million from the Department of State to develop its regional 
programme. ICITAP has become the primary coordinator of U.S. assistance to 
foreign police (GAO 1992 p. 13).
Aid for police through programmes like ICITAP is justified by the reasoning that 
crime and violence are a major obstacle for development in Latin America (World
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Bank 1999). In fact, in late 1994, a USAID Administrator approved the integration of 
police assistance efforts into USAID rule of law programmes “explicitly 
acknowledging the role that an effective and law abiding police force plays in the 
development and functioning of a justice system”. This policy guidance was never 
developed, but USAID’s Rule of Law Working Group recently proposed formalising 
that 1994 suggestion (Ziegler and Nield 2002 pp. 54-55). Initially, USAID’s work 
was not “so much driven by the objective of reducing ordinary crime as by that of 
improving the treatment of citizens at the hands of the system for the reduction of 
crime” (Carothers 1999 p. 9), however, the increase of criminal activity during the 
1990s redirected its work.
There are many other U.S. agencies involved in foreign police assistance at the 
Department of State, DOJ, and DOD, such as the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), 
the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Secret 
Service and Customs Services. Training for law enforcement officials is also 
provided by the FBI through its own allocated funds. The result is a great deal of 
overlapping assistance.
The main U.S. assistance provided to foreign police identified by GAO (1992), 
already in the early 1990’s were: (1) Antiterrorism Assistance; (2) International 
Narcotics Control; (3) Investigative and International Police Training; (4) 
Counterterrorism and Militaiy Assistance; and (5) National Police Force 
Development (GAO 1992 p. 12).
Since the 1980s, U.S. foreign policy has become more and more decentralised among 
many agencies. There is a decentralisation of programmes through a multiplication of 
source institutions in the U.S. bureaucracy and receptor institutions in the foreign 
countries. The result is not only the overlapping of objectives, but this also makes 
assistance policies less accountable to Congress and makes the U.S. presence less 
visible in other countries (Huggins 1998 pp. 76, 195-196). Even the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office at the Congress (GAO) is not able to determine the exact 
amount of aid and the number of police officers trained because of the number of 
agencies involved and the lack of details and cross-referenced information among 
them. Moreover, most agencies do not distinguish between assistance provided to
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police and assistance provided to the military (GAO 1992). It is also difficult to have 
an overall evaluation of U.S. police assistance because of the lack of U.S. policy 
guidance in the area. Each agency has its own programme agenda (GAO 1992); 
sometimes in conflict with each other, as in the case of USAID and NAS, with the 
former developing projects in the sector of the penal system with emphasis on the 
strengthening of civil society, and the latter with an emphasis on combating drug 
trafficking.
Directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, during the Cold War, U.S. 
foreign police assistance meant a contribution to the creation of Latin American 
bureaucratic-authoritarian states. The rationale behind police aid, in many cases, 
continues to be to transform such police into transmission lines for U.S. foreign 
policy and U.S. economic and political interests abroad, providing a mechanism for 
the U.S. to penetrate foreign states through their police systems (Huggins 1998 pp .2, 
117). U.S. police training is still developed under the same model described by 
Huggins in 1898 and in 1974, the “U.S. personnel who were training Latin America 
police most often and increasingly came from the U.S. military or national security 
agencies, and not from civil police organisations. Accordingly, the policing and social 
control techniques taught were oriented toward military, not civilian, models of 
control” (Huggins 1998 p. 8). It is still conceived on the idea that the local police 
force is not prepared to combat the threats perceived by the U.S., and thus it requires 
their technical support and ideological orientation. The rationale of the U.S. police 
assistance has not changed with the end of Cold War, and all these programmes 
enable it to reproduce the internationalisation of the U.S. security agenda, first 
developed to contain communism, then to fight narco-trafficking, and now also to 
combat terrorism and control migration. The U.S. police assistance to Ecuador, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Six, is illustrative of the U.S. political dynamic in police 
assistance.
Conclusion
In both regions, there has been an increased development of mechanisms for the 
promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. As we are talking about
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open processes at different levels, it is the work of a Sisyphus to maintain an updated 
analysis regarding the changes and advances on all fronts. Thus, the intention of this 
chapter was to give an overview of the international assistance related to policing at 
the initiation of the democratisation processes in each region.
The European guidelines have been developed within different institutional sets; 
however, they have operated in a complementary fashion, promoting shared values 
and objectives among different European actors and fostering the construction of a 
regional public space. Without overlooking structural problems in different countries, 
more attention must be given to the regional political dynamic in order to understand 
the timing and success of democratic processes. The existence of strong multilateral 
organisations responsible for the promotion of human rights and democratic values 
and the network of oversight mechanisms is crucial for the democratisation process. 
The strength and efficiency of these mechanisms have more to do with the features of 
the regional political dynamic than with the human rights problems on each continent.
On the one hand, EU conditionality imposed during the accession process has been 
crucial for promoting human rights and democracy in the candidate countries. On the 
other hand, the process of supranational institutionalisation itself has been favoured 
by the Council of Europe’s political dynamic; the Council has promoted shared 
perceptions of interests and identities that constitute an important support for regional 
integration. The fact is that these different regional instruments have created a system 
of collective efforts to frame practically all the political actors’ activities in the region 
in line with democratic values and human rights. Although bom out of different 
concerns -  police reform, democratic accountability, human rights, organised crime, 
terrorism, illegal migration -  police assistance has been framed in the same way.
The institutional context of the Americas is not comparable to the regional law 
enforcement framework developed in Europe. The lack of long-term perspective 
based on regional institutionalisation and the prevalence of bilateral relations have 
created a regional context that is less favourable to developing and incorporating 
regional parameters for democratic policing. Most bilateral programmes related to 
police forces have focussed on pursuing order enforcement rather than law 
enforcement. Strengthening citizenship in other countries will hardly be the priority
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of bilateral donor countries. In many cases, assistance programmes may be used as 
instruments with an economic and political rationale that has little or nothing to do 
with human rights and law enforcement.
U.S. assistance for foreign police “is provided in an ad hoc way responding by and 
large to concerns about criminal threats to the United States rather than to the goal of 
expanding democratic criminal justice practices” (Bayley 2006 p. 48). Instead of 
working as external stimuli for democratic policing, these prime motivations may be 
obstacles to democratisation.
It is true that activities of multilateral organisations are more prone to be framed and 
monitored than bilateral ones. The question is not so much whether the police 
assistance is delivered by a bilateral or a multilateral donor, but whether this 
assistance is framed within established democratic and human rights standards and 
whether there is oversight by different control mechanisms. Donors have to be subject 
to the same democratic and human rights norms in order to be successful in 
producing police and law enforcement reforms in other countries, as Bayley remind 
us “ [rjeform abroad begins with reforms at home” (Bayley 2006 p. 143).
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PART II
Chapter 4 - Policing Democracy 
Introduction
One of the essential problems of human rights in transitional societies and new 
democracies is to control the arbitrariness exercised by corruption or violence in daily 
and ordinary police work. It is a permanent challenge for any democratic society, but 
it acquires a more urgent character in countries trying to change their interior power 
relationships, or at least the way that power is exercised. The police, together with the 
judiciary, are the most conservative areas in society and usually the last to change in 
the transition towards democracy. The two extremes of the debate about the police 
are whether police forces are an organic part of democracy or whether they are 
intrinsically contradictory to democratic values because of their quasi-military 
character and their function of ensuring public security (Szikinger in Kdddr 2001 p. 
15). Between these extremes, a variety of views abound about police institutions that 
enable us to discuss ways to democratise police forces and make them function more 
effectively.
Regardless of regime type, the police are essentially a political issue. This issue 
implies building a political policy and designing certain institutions, as well as 
finding and keeping the social support for the police (Chevigny 1995 p. 119). Police 
officers are the closest and most visible representatives of law enforcement for the 
majority of citizens; and the police force is possibly the state institution most exposed 
to social problems and political changes, especially in transitional societies (Losing in 
Waldmann et al. 1996 p. 381). In this context, the problem of the police presents two 
analytical faces. The first relates to the rule of law; it concerns the question of which 
law is to be constructed by and enforced by whom, in other words, how democratic 
and inclusive the concept of the rule of law embraced by the state is. The second, and 
the topic for this chapter, concerns the implementation and protection of this law or, 
more precisely, how the police work to achieve the rule of law.
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Police practices help to reproduce the order of a society, and consequently, they are 
also an indicator of the extent to which a given society is democratised. By saying 
that, I am not assuming that the police merely reflect society. In modem society, as 
Paul Chevigny (1995 p. 7) observes, “policing allows for enormous discretion. The 
police may enforce status distinctions or try to minimise them in the interests of 
reducing conflict; they may impose them through an ‘order’ (in a slightly different 
sense) that ranges from that of an autocratic military to an impersonal ‘legal’ order. In 
reproducing order, the police have the power to represent it as well, and, through 
interpreting, to influence it.” The police institution, through its own subculture, can 
become part of a democratisation process or, on the contrary, can reinforce the 
authoritarian legacy of the previous regime.
In this sense, it is inconceivable to have a democratisation process without 
encompassing the police forces, not only in relation to dismantling the repressive 
apparatus of the previous regime but also in reference to the building of a democratic 
one. However, police have been almost absent in the literature on democracy and 
democratisation. It is because, as Mercedes Hinton (2006 p. 4) observes, the police 
“have not been as politically decisive or as historically prominent as the military: they 
rarely perpetuate coups or wrestle power from the state”, which has led to a 
misconceptualisation of policing. It is assumed that “explaining the state explains the 
police” (Marenin in Das and Marenin 2000 p. 314); that is, analysing the state and its 
relation with society is enough to understand the police institutions and their actions. 
The consequence is that police are not perceived as an actor, nor have their 
discretional capacity and specific organisational culture been recognised.
The police are subject as much as object in the reproduction of the political system 
and in the relation between state and society (Marenin in Das and Marenin 2000 p. 
314). Consequently, the police are a central institution and political actor for any 
attempt to democratise both state and society. For this reason the police should not be 
considered, in Lone Lindholt’s (2003 p. 1) words, “only as an obstacle to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The police are, and should be viewed as, 
an important target group for improvement in the sense that efforts invested in this 
area may effect a direct positive change in the human rights situation. In this way, the
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police may become a constructive force in the process towards democratisation and 
respect for human rights.”
Thus, this chapter aims to discuss the main problems regarding the police institution 
that are faced by new democracies: (1) their function; (2) their relationship with the 
government and the military; (3) their possibility to reform; and, essentially, (4) their 
paramount role in efforts toward further democratisation.
The Emergence of the Police Institution
Despite the differences in the development of police forces that each country may 
present, functionally, they have basically the same origin and basic role. The concept 
of police emerged with the Absolutist State in Europe in the fifteenth century. 
Initially, their functions were as broad as the functions this type of state attributed to 
itself; the police forces were related not only to security but also to the general 
welfare of society. Not until the nineteenth century were the police transformed into a 
bureaucratic and professional institution. This transformation implied two main 
changes: first, the monopoly over physical coercion by the state apparatus; and 
secondly, the separation between military and police functions (Waldmann et al. 1996 
pp. 35-39).
The definitive change in Europe from police forces that represented a vigilant and 
tutelary state to an institutional police force responsible for maintaining the internal 
constitutional order was due to changes originating in the structural transformation of 
the European societies that presented an enormous threat to the traditional 
institutional system. The main changes were related to: (1) the process of 
industrialisation; (2) the rapid growth of the population; (3) the rural migration 
towards cities; (4) the fast urbanisation; (5) and all the socio-economic problems that 
resulted from this structural transformation.
Although there was an emerging debate about the rule of law and the political and 
civil rights manifested in the U.S. Constitution of 1787 and the French Declaration of 
1789, the process of police professionalisation was first framed by a discussion about
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the counterproductive effects of an exaggerated tutelage and disciplinary regime over 
citizens by the state77. For this reason, the decisive action came from within the 
state’s own apparatus, through administrative and judicial institutions in an attempt to 
“control who controls”78 (Waldmann et al. 1996 pp. 35-49).
In the U.S., the police were institutionalised in a similar environment, as Martha 
Huggins (1998 p. 9) describes: “Permanent police forces were established in major 
U.S. cities in the 1840s during a period of intense industrial, social, and political 
turmoil, when immigration was increasing rapidly, when class, ethnic, and racial riots 
were exploding in the bigger U.S. cities, and when labour strife was constantly on the 
rise”. There, the same context of socio-economic changes resulted in the perception 
of new threats and the necessity to regulate the armed groups to deal with them.
In Latin America, between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the organisation of the police in a professional, bureaucratic and 
hierarchical institution followed a similar pattern. In Peru, just to give an example, 
the establishment of the police in the 1920s “coincided with the expansion of the 
Peruvian state and with the emergence of the public [sector], highlighted by an 
eruption of political movements, parties and periodicals that functioned as debate 
platforms. The police as a corporate body was devised to secure order and to 
safeguard a particular power structure in society in support of the oligarchy against 
insurgency” (Acha 2001 p. 87). The intention of regulating the existing security 
forces and permitting the police to develop their own operational logic was clearly to 
respond to the new demands imposed on them.
77 Despite the impact that popular movements and individual freedoms had in the birth of the modem 
state in countries like England and France, Waldmann argues that the differences between the Prussian 
model of state police and a police that represents society and citizenship should not be overestimated. 
In England and France the evolution of the police institution did not produce its democratisation, but 
its centralisation, bureaucratisation and professionalisation under the Prussian model (Waldmann 1996 
pp. 49-50).
78 Peter Waldemann, based on the example of Germany in 1859, offers some established arguments 
against the excessive production of police norms that still apply for contemporary situations: (1) if for 
any trifle people had to pay a fine or go to jail, the notion of just and unjust would be lost and they 
would do whatever they wanted; (2) if people considered the police as a threat and an adversary, it 
would create obstacles for police work. In order to avoid these negative effects of policing, German 
authorities decided to reduce the punitive norms and ordered the police to be more tolerant and use a 
generous interpretation of police orders (Waldemann 1996 pp. 48-49).
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Thus, urban police forces were established, in the first place, for political motives. In 
a broad view, all police professionalisation processes were initiated by a relatively 
strong state and were characterised by police bureaucratisation, centralisation, and 
differentiation from the military. Despite each country’s history, the police gain 
specific attributes as part of the administrative apparatus in similar processes. As 
Renate Weber (in K&d&r 2001 p. 39) argues, it “means that similar rules should 
function with respect to fundamental aspects of the police in every country. Of 
course, disparities will still exist because there are many differences between 
countries, but they should not be extreme”. Consequently, it is possible to discuss 
common principles for policing and, at the same time, to discuss how to reform the 
police institution in a given country within a broad political dialogue.
Police Functions
The police are a central institution for any attempt to democratise state and society. In 
this sense, the most basic discussion in reforming the police is about the functions 
developed by them. These functions may include: (1) controlling people and specific 
groups; (2) disciplining people and specific groups; (3) regulating social relations; (4) 
investigating crime and lawless actions; (5) preventing crime and lawless actions; (5) 
protecting property; or (6) protecting people and rights. Some of these functions do 
not exclude others; however, some become incompatible in democracies. The notions 
of order and freedom in society are still approached in a contradictory way by the vast 
majority of contemporary democracies. It seems that the clash between the Hobbesian
7Qand the Lockean concepts of state are not easily resolved as the democratisation 
process does not necessarily conciliate both notions.
Thus, the law enforcement role of the police may take two different directions, one 
with an emphasis on punishing criminals or anyone who challenges a given order, 
and the other with an emphasis on protecting rights. The conciliation or balance 
between punishment and protection is determined by the nature of the rule of law in
79 In the Hobbesian state, sovereigns govern by the awe they inspire in their subjects. It is not the terror 
of the uncertainty of the state o f nature but a fear of violent death that moves individuals to give up 
their total freedom. In contrast, the Lockean state is not based on awe, but on consensus about 
individual rights and the limits of state power.
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each country. The type of policing chosen reflects a project based on political and 
legal definitions, and is responsible for building institutions and interactions.
Historically, the initial professionalisation process, as mentioned above, was a 
political response to major changes in the structure of society and was basically a 
state initiative. In a very broad sense, it meant the building of a specific institution 
within the “legal-rational bureaucratic state” to take care of internal threats to security 
in contrast to external ones. The centralisation and specialisation of the modem state 
created a full-time paid public service occupation. This professionalisation process in 
Western Europe or in any other country lacked human rights and democratic 
principles as leitmotifs. In Western Europe and, to a different extent, in the U.S., they 
were gradually assimilated into a continuous process; in the case of many Latin 
American and Eastern Central European countries this professionalisation process, 
especially the separation of the police from the military, was never completed. The 
process was not only interrupted during non-democratic regimes, but it was also set 
back by new authoritarian elements.
As they democratised, these countries were expected to resume this 
professionalisation process and encompass police reforms oriented by human rights 
and democratic components. This late or second professionalisation process presents 
different and more complex driving factors and a variety of actors promoting it. It 
does not correspond to a deep change in societal structure that culminated in the 
creation of the modem state, but to changes related to this state and the way to govern 
it. I do not intend to confuse professionalisation with democratisation or human 
rights, but to emphasise the necessity in new democracies of combining them in order 
to respond to all the legitimate requirements and demands of democratic societies.
Transitional countries commonly foster police professionalisation by applying it 
merely to technical development and efficiency in combating crime; however, 
professionalisation should also encompass the definition of police functions and the 
prioritisation of activities adopted. Professionalisation, as Niel Uldrik and Piet Van 
Reenen (2003 p. 202) remind us, “is not a panacea to all problems since the political 
and societal realities faced by the police are largely beyond their control. 
Nevertheless, by professionalising on a variety of fronts, the police can do much on
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their own to bridge the legitimacy gap regardless of the limiting conditions 
encountered. This involves the enhancement of both knowledge and skills on the part 
of officers, but also encompasses an ethical dimension that increases police officers’ 
awareness of the moral content of their work”. In sum, any democratic process should 
acknowledge two important assumptions: first, the police institution is an actor with 
singular qualities, but equally an actor to be considered; secondly, police work has an 
ethical dimension which should not be ignored.
Thus, the current discussion about police professionalisation should be framed by two 
ethical principles: first, by human rights standards80 that lead the police to prioritise 
human beings and their protection rather than order and protection of the state; and 
secondly, by democratic principles. In this sense, there is an emergent consensus 
around the concept of democratic policing. Dilip Das listed seven values and norms 
that should be present in police institutions and in the development of their activities, 
they are: (1) rule of law; (2) accountability to the public; (3) transparency of decision 
making; (4) popular participation in policing; (5) minimum use of force; (6) creating 
an organisation that facilitates learning of civil and human rights; and (7) internal 
democracy in the organisation (Das in Das and Marenin 2000 p. 5).
Moreover, the Preamble of the 1979 UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials establishes three main components for democratic policing: 
representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability. The police should: (1) 
represent the community they serve, including minorities and marginalised groups, 
and try to distribute their services equally within that society; (2) respond to public 
needs and expectations within a broad social perspective; and, (3) be accountable 
legally, politically and economically to the law, to democratic institutions of 
governance, and to taxpayers81.
The main challenge for democratic policing today is how to translate those values and 
norms into the organisational culture and actions of the police in new democracies. In
80 The following are the most basic human rights related to policing: freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; freedom from 
discrimination; freedom of assembly and organisation; and, to some extent, the right to a fair trial. See 
the Amnesty International’s 10 Basic Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement Officials, 1998.
81 In 2009, the UN Publisher the United Nations Criminal Justice Standard for United Nations Police.
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this sense, in the following sections, I will discuss three main efforts that should be 
made in order to effectively encompass democratic and human rights dimensions in 
policing, they are: (1) the departisanisation of the police forces; (2) the 
demilitarisation of the police and, at the same time, the total exclusion of the military 
from policing; and (3) the establishment of oversight and control mechanisms in 
order to make the police institution fully accountable.
The Relationship between Government and Police
The most visible problem related to the police occurs when a government, in 
establishing the police functions, either disregards the constitution or creates a 
constitution that permits political policing. Nevertheless, the greatest challenge for 
new democracies goes further than eliminating political policing. The 
departisanisation of the police (I prefer to use the term “departisanisation” instead of 
“depoliticisation” in order to keep the emphasis on the political aspects of policing) 
implies that particular groups in society cannot control the police; the police force 
must serve all of society equally.
Almost all constitutions of new democracies have provisions on human rights, but 
they are often vague in relation to the police force. Usually, the new provisions of the 
constitution are related only to the political system. Especially in negotiated 
transitions, many branches of the state apparatus are left untouched at the beginning 
of the process. Nevertheless, the notion that violence is simply the result of arbitrary 
behaviour on the part of the police is false, as Koseg (in Kdd&r 2001 p. 7) argues: 
“The great majority of human rights violations are the result of legislation that runs 
contrary to the constitution or to international human rights agreements [...], or laws 
that are formulated in such a way as to make possible deliberate misinterpretation or 
unlawful enforcement.” In this sense, changing the legal status of the police and its 
related laws through democratic and human rights principles is the first and necessary 
step towards reforming the police.
However, human rights violations committed by the police are also the result of 
different political choices that orient the operation of the police and the lack of
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political will to hold the police accountable. It is a misconception to interpret police 
brutality as if the police were “out of control” for operating outside the bureaucratic 
legal norms of the state. The democratisation process gives the impression of 
establishing an apparently neutral police force with respect to politics and dominant 
social groups; the consequence is the “disclaiming [of] responsibility for any police 
repression and malpractice” (Huggins 1998 p. 11). In the case of the police 
institution, this creates the perception in society that the police are no longer a 
political issue and, consequently, do not have to be introduced into the 
democratisation agenda.
Most of the literature about the police distinguishes between what is called “high 
policing”, selective and calculated official violence focused on political dissidents, 
and “low policing”, systematic police violence when dealing with crimes and crowds, 
mostly focussed on poor people. Paul Chevigny and Ferenc Koseg argue that this 
distinction does not hold up. Chevigny (1996) calls attention to the methodological 
rather than functional nature of this differentiation since both are “means to control 
people”.
In society, the differentiation between “high policing” and “low policing” makes it 
difficult for human rights activists to foster as much sympathy against social 
repression as there is against political repression. For this reason, in most cases, it is 
not police abuses that propel a move to reform the institution in new democracies; it 
is the transformation of the crime problem that drives the debate on police reform. In 
recent decades, Latin America and also Eastern Central Europe have experienced a 
rise in the number of crimes and violence and a growth in the complexity of the 
criminal problem due to the development of technology and the internationalisation 
of crime.
Additionally, the more accessible and better publicised the statistics on crime are, the 
greater the perception of a threat from increased criminality. The public lack of 
information in non-democratic regimes, especially in the ECE, contributed to the 
impression that crime was totally under control. Ironically, the visibility of the 
criminality issue that permits a debate on policing also allows the manipulation of 
statistics to justify tough legislation and policing practices inherited from previous
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regimes. The population’s perception of increasing threats also generates impatience 
with the judicial system and an incentive for varying degrees of vigilantism. 
Democratic societies are not immune to hypocritical and conflicting demands. The 
incapacity of the state to deal with conflict and violence on the societal level may 
compromise the state’s monopoly over the use of force. In extreme situations, 
confrontations may result in the formation of private militias or the practice of 
lynching.
Without well-defined police reform in concept and strategy by all the actors involved 
-  domestic, regional and international -  there is the risk of opening a space for 
conservative groups to dominate the debate and push for tough actions without a 
social approach to criminality issues. Another serious risk is the promotion of the “re­
privatisation” of police forces or the “commoditisation of security” (Bayley and 
Shearing in Newbum 2005 p. 728), which means the transformation of security into a 
market product. In the end, it would be equivalent to the “partisanisation” of the 
police institution to the benefit of those who are “better-off’ in society. Private 
security forces, which are becoming prevalent in many countries, directly undermine 
efforts to professionalise and democratise the functioning of the police (Ziegler and 
Nield 2002 p. 13).
The immediate and demagogic solution for the problem of crime is to transfer the 
state’s responsibility or, more precisely, to partially give it up. This might be efficient 
in decreasing crimes against property (a solution still in question and deserving of 
further research), but certainly not in decreasing crimes against people. On the 
contrary, it leaves people more vulnerable with regard to their basic rights, since 
security becomes a product not related to citizens but to consumers.
Notoriously in many Latin American countries, the transition period was also 
characterised by an ineffective political government (“desgobierno politico”) of 
public security that allowed a “police self-government”; public security issues 
became exclusively controlled and operated by the police institutions themselves. The 
orientation and administration of the security policies were based on corporative 
concepts defined by the police without interference from any other state agency (S&in 
in Enlace Julio-2005 p. 2).
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The political autonomy of the police and an increase in criminality have contributed 
to strengthening the invisibility of the police in the political agenda of new 
democracies. The control of police abuse should assume that the police are an integral 
part of the state and that policing is a political issue. Consequently, it implies the 
building of appropriate legislation and mechanisms to prevent the police from 
functioning outside the state apparatus and from being privatised by any particular 
group in the government or in society. The imperative is to departisanise the police 
function without pretending it is no longer a political issue.
The Distance between the Military and the Police
The functions attributed to police forces and the modes under which they operate 
depend greatly on the type of approach to internal security taken. Military-style police 
have their historical origins, in part, in the development of the police from militias, 
but most of the lasting features are the consequence of an interrupted 
professionalisation process. With the functions of the police and the military not 
clearly separated or with a militarised police institution, there is much room for 
democratic as well as non-democratic governments to use both, indistinctively, to 
preserve the order and protect the state.
A military-style police force assumes an approach focused on crime control rather 
than public service. The restrictive scope of this approach directly affects the concept 
of a democratic rule of law and the function that the police are to execute. First, a 
militarised police lack the flexibility required for ordinary policing. It is, by 
definition, a centralised and hermetic structure that does not permit intermediary 
solutions or compromise in the treatment of citizens, and it may hinder the proximity 
of the police to the community. Secondly, this structure weakens any attempt at 
oversight by civil society. There is a secretive mentality in relation to most kinds of 
information, including organisational issues, budget, and type of education. This 
confidentiality is more severe in matters concerning offences committed by police 
officers. Specific criteria and corporate loyalty are the guidelines in investigating and 
prosecuting those officers; the existence of special courts to judge police officers
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demonstrates and stresses corporativism. Thirdly, a militarised concept of policing 
requires an “enemy” and the demarcation of an “inimical territory”. Fourth, it 
necessarily demands tough legislation and exclusive policies, since there is the sense 
of dealing with emergency situations. A soldier has to eliminate his enemy and is 
allowed to kill. This type of approach to policing permits a proliferation of practices 
that restrict, if not violate, rights. Fifth, a military-style police force is more easily 
assigned tasks related to the military, such as involvement in secret service activities, 
than a civil police force (Weber in Kdddr 2001 pp. 40-41).
The end of the Cold War would suppose the end of the discourse of war for “non­
war” situations, but that has not been entirely the case. If states are not able to 
dismantle their authoritarian repressive apparatus, their former political-ideological 
enemies must be replaced with others in order to justify certain continuities. The 
militarised police and the secret services reminiscent of non-democratic regimes 
need an inimical figure to justify their activities and their discretion in the restriction 
of rights (Koszeg in K&d6r 2001 pp. 9-10). Increasing crime rates and a realist 
approach to politics, especially when combined with a right-wing reading of 
inequality and the implementation of neo-liberal reforms, are a fertile terrain for the 
discourse of war. The “naturalisation” of inequality makes it easy for people from 
underprivileged groups in society to be perceived as categorically different. 
Marginalised and vulnerable social groups like migrants, ethnic minorities, and 
religious minorities, those who are treated as “second class citizens”, may be the 
ones eligible for the label “enemy”. It is no less true for former communist countries 
that have undergone market reforms than it is for the very unequal Latin American 
nations.
The perverse side of political democratisation processes is that, by banning political 
repression as a state policy, the state’s repressive apparatus must find other 
“dangerous” or “threatening” groups on which to focus their activities. In the “war 
against drugs”, the “war against crime”, or the “war against terrorism”, it is easy to 
remove political issues from the centre of the debate. The consequences are the stress 
on police autonomy and the military approach to social problems that keeps the 
apparatus almost intact. The war terminology also helps to increase the perception of
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insecurity in society and is frequently used as a justification for continuities in police 
practices. It may also aggravate the confusion between “public security” and 
“national security” and, consequently, the confusion between police and military 
functions. Besides strengthening the militarisation of the police, it may also promote 
the “policialisation” of the military in what are primarily civilian issues.
A militarised police force also has implications for the police officers’ rights. Unlike 
civilian public servants, they are not allowed to organise themselves into trade 
unions. They also follow a strict disciplinary code in which, as Renate Weber 
observes: “disobeying an order issued by a superior is a crime, in some cases even if 
the order is unlawful. The advantages enjoyed by police officers in a military 
structure are rather privileges than rights and there is a price to be paid, namely, the 
fact the privileges may also easily be withdrawn; generally, the judicial review of 
unlawful internal measures, including dismissal from the force, is absent” (Weber in 
K&d&r 2001 pp. 40-41). Members of the police force should be subject to a 
disciplinary code which is in accordance with their functions in a democracy, and 
they should be allowed to organise themselves in order to demand better conditions 
for developing their obligations, such as regulating the number of working hours, and 
establishing life insurance and health plans, among other rights.
Accountability
Intrinsically related to the departisanisation and demilitarisation of the police forces is 
the process of making them accountable. The police, as any other institution claiming 
to be democratic, must be accountable legally, politically, and also economically. 
Regarding the use of force and power, the police must be guided by three principles: 
subsidiarity, meaning the use of force by police only when there is no other 
alternative; proportionality, referring to the use of the minimum amount of force 
required under the given situation; and human rights. Therefore, in addition to a clear 
definition of the functions of the police and their mandate, it is crucial that internal 
and external management is implemented for oversight control in order to regulate 
the relationship between the police and various branches of the state as well as the 
relationship of the police with citizens.
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Accountability and liability involve the quality and distribution of police services in 
society. The more accountable the police are, the higher the level of legitimacy and 
trust in the police (Uildrik and Van Reenen 2003 pp. 204-205). In this sense, the 
transparency of the police institutions concerning the control of their use of violence 
as well as their corruption becomes a central issue. A respectful and trustworthy 
police institution is fundamental for the functioning of the entire judicial system; 
since both corruption and brutality are part of the police endeavour to enforce a 
specific order directly, without any intervention by other parts of the criminal justice 
system or the government (Chevigny 1996).82
Internal instruments of control are basically the administrative disciplinaiy 
procedures (internal reports and a discipline code) that help to foster an internal 
culture through formal accountability to superiors and informal accountability to 
colleagues. The education and training of police officers are also important 
instruments for improving accountability and bringing the police closer to citizens.83 
The advantages of the internal regulations are that they can be better informed; more 
thorough and extensive; and more varied, subtle and discriminating than external 
ones; however self-regulation depends on the will of the police to follow community 
standards (Bayley 1985 pp. 177-1178). In the case of police institutions without a 
democratic and human rights basis for their police work, the capacity for self­
regulation is mostly reduced to the observance of disciplinary norms.
External instruments of control are comprised of a set of various mechanisms: 
adequate legislation; a consolidated and independent criminal justice system (courts, 
attorneys, civil litigation); the existence of external oversight bodies (independent and 
investigative bodies, civilian complaint review boards, ombudsmen, special 
commissions, etc.); a vibrant civil society; and strong, trustworthy regional oversight 
instruments. All these instruments for external regulation should make the police
82 Comparing the polices of cities as different as Los Angeles, New York, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, 
Mexico City, and Kingston, Paul Chevigny shows how corruption as much as political interference is 
responsible for perpetrating police brutality.
83 The control o f arbitrariness by the police, as Uildrik and Van Reenen point out, can be improved 
with “adequate training in techniques and strategies to enable them to control situations by forceful and 
non-forcefiil means depending upon the exigencies of a situation, and by integrating and 
operationalising abstract concepts such as the minimum and proportionate use of force” (Uildrik and 
Van Reenen 2003 p. 207).
124
accountable to law -  not to the government, not to any group in society - but to the 
law. In countries where democracy is a mere facade or corruption and violence are 
endemic, the reliance on and efficiency of many of the domestic instruments will be 
compromised. In fact, as Bayley (1985 p. 176) reminds us “control systems in 
themselves do not determine conformity between police behaviour and community 
wishes”, yet “identical formal control systems can accommodate enormous variations 
in performance”. In these cases, the existence of a regional network and regulating 
instruments will have a great impact in checking police activities and especially in 
strengthening the process for fostering efficient and reliable domestic instruments.
In practice, it is the complementary nature of all these internal and external 
instruments, domestic and regional, that will guarantee an appropriate control system 
and help to consolidate democratic and human rights policing. In my view, it is the 
existence of cross-mechanisms of control that can overcome the limitations of each 
instrument and may bridge the gap between the formal systems of accountability and 
the unwritten norms, the “living procedures” (Bayley 1985 p. 176) of the police 
culture. This requires an integral vision about the police, as a singular actor with a 
particular organisational culture and special attributions within the state apparatus.
Models of Policing
While the initial process of police professionalisation meant the creation of a 
completely new institution, the current trend in new democracies means three 
interrelated processes - departisanisation, demilitarisation and democratisation -  are 
occurring within an already consolidated institution. Professionalisation implies the 
reform of a body of rules and mechanisms as well as the most difficult task of 
changing the institutional culture that guides the behaviour of members of the police 
force. The challenge remaining for these democracies is to transform their police 
forces into civil public service institutions meant to protect human rights.
Most police reforms in transitional societies tend to be merely superficial, removing 
the officers identified with the old regime rather than promoting structural changes in 
the institutions. Democratisation, as already discussed, cannot be automatically
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translated into democratic guidance of police activities. The police institution 
demands specific efforts in order to change. Police reform is a political choice even 
when it is based on technical elements. Obviously, a lack of reform is also a political 
choice.
The democratisation process has raised the question of whether there is much 
difference between the discourse of progressives and conservatives in relation to the 
police, as in general, “governments and legislative bodies react to the failures of 
police forces by expanding their powers, overlooking human rights violations, and 
increasing budgetary support” (Koszeg in Kdd&r 2001 pp. 8-9). Usually, 
governments, regardless of their ideological orientation, do not assume their 
responsibilities for police violence and rarely inquire about it.
According to Geza Finszter (in K&d&r 2001 pp. 138-139), contemporary 
professionalisation84 efforts can take two approaches: one based on reform and the 
other based on evolution. In his analysis of the Hungarian police during the ten years 
after 1989, he defines “reform” using three terms similar to the ones proposed in this 
research: depoliticisation, decentralisation, and demilitarisation. He identifies 
“reformers” as “primarily theoreticians, academics who, in the course of the political 
changeover, were appointed to various influential positions within the police, despite 
their lack of previous practical experience”. The “evolutionists” are usually 
government politicians and police leaders that want an “efficient” police force. In his 
view, “evolution” has three main objectives: functionality, self-confidence, and 
discipline. While “evolutionists” seek a police model based on efficiency, 
“reformers”, we could say, seek a police model based on democratic and human 
rights principles.
The typology created by Uildrik and Van Reenen (2003 pp. 31-36) is very useful 
when discussing different principles in policing and the model of policing pursued by 
reformers. They differentiate between democratic policing and human rights-oriented
84 Finszter uses the term “modernisation”; I prefer to use the term “professionalisation” to differentiate 
it from the modernisation explanatory model.
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policing85. In democratic policing, the police force is supposed to operate within 
some kind of political system, act in the framework of the rule of law, and observe 
human rights principles. It implies “police subordination to the law”, “their 
accountability to an independent judiciary”, and “the separation of policing and 
policing responsibility”. In other words, there is a clear distinction between the police 
attribution of “policing” and the state responsibility of defining security policies. This 
type of policing seeks to obtain democratic legitimacy at both the domestic and 
international level. Nevertheless, human rights-oriented policing, the new policing 
model, goes beyond the incorporation of human rights principles by the national law 
and the overseeing of human rights based on legal principles; it involves the 
development of the concept of community-oriented policing and a far more ample 
concept of public accountability. The new police model corresponds to a model of 
policing that is more interactive and integrated into the social fabric in contrast to a 
reactive and proactive model of policing (Wright in K&d&r 2001 pp. 168-170).
Human rights-oriented policing adds the community component to democratic 
policing. Although the definition of a community policing model varies, it is possible 
to establish some common characteristics attributed to it. Hugo Fruhling (in Lindholt 
et al. 2003 pp. 107-125) identifies the following: (1) the prevalence of police 
activities focused on small geographic areas; (2) the establishment of a close, ongoing 
two-way relationship with the community, consulting with community members to 
consider their needs and demands as well as welcoming the monitoring of police 
actions by community members; (3) efforts by police to incorporate the community in 
preventive actions; (4) the initiative to give the police a more ample and social vision 
of criminality by engaging them in the study of conditions and circumstances in 
which criminality develops; and (5) the priority given to problem solving and
85 Uildrik and Van Reenen (2003 pp. 31-36) created a policing typology based on the lines of political 
development in transitional societies in the ECE. They define four types of policing: (1) authoritarian 
policing; (2) crisis policing; (3) democratic policing; and (4) human rights-oriented policing. Crisis 
policing is defined as a “continued repressive policing where officers are preoccupied with order and 
the control of violence”. Human rights still do not have an impact on routine policing. Political 
instability defines short-term goals for their actions, and there is much uncertainty for the police 
organisation, not only related to its personnel, but also to its functioning and orientation. Authoritarian 
policing is “an integral part of an authoritarian political system”. It presents a very hierarchical 
structure and a military concept. Its function is not to serve the population but to control it and keep 
the populace distant. Human rights violations are part of the political system and any rights 
considerations, at most, concern formal legal arrangements in order to satisfy international pressures or 
obligations. Additionally, the police tend to be self-supporting; with access to their own services and 
shops, and in some cases even have separate living quarters for police officers and their families.
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prevention rather than to reactive strategies in police work. All of these characteristics 
of community policing imply a reorganisation of the police institution and the 
reordering of its priorities.86
Despite all the positive elements of the community policing model, mostly in its 
efforts to increase police legitimacy and limit police arbitrariness, the most important 
element of human rights-oriented policing is its stress on the concept of public 
accountability. Without the implementation of appropriate internal and external 
accountability mechanisms and organised watchdogs, the proximity of the police to 
the community may create some dangerous distortions. Strong groups in the 
community may be able to impose their interests over the rights of other groups that 
are not as powerful or well-organised, and in the end it may result in another kind of 
partisanisation of the police. The police force, as one face of the state and its 
governance activities, must work against any type of discrimination and unequal 
distribution of their services in society; the general principles guiding police work 
and a long-term vision cannot be obscured by immediate and partial interests.
Yet, the community approach is not a panacea for all the problems related to policing. 
Depending on the emphasis given to community, there is a risk of strengthening the 
autonomy of the police by transferring decisions to the community that must be made 
by the government in its responsibility of designing a public security policy, which 
involves the whole judicial system and is meant to serve the entire society.
At the same time, the concept of professionalisation process that I am using implies 
more than a professional police force in the aspect of their departisanisation and 
effectiveness; it implies an integral vision of the functions of the police force within a 
democratic state, as well as its priorities in society. Thus, the definition of human 
rights-oriented policing as an ideal type instead of democratic, community, or 
professional policing is not only a matter of labelling; it requires the police institution
86 Another typology of policing that takes into account societal and political elements is presented by 
Wright and Mawby (in Kaddr 2001 pp. 168-172). Combining the two sets of variables, state and civil 
society, they identify three types of policing: (1) authoritarian, a coercive and control-oriented 
policing; (2) community, an interactive and integrative policing, bringing police and community into 
closer proximity; and (3) minimum-oriented policing, an ideal type o f policing that implies a strong 
integration between police and community, in this case the police present a high capacity to adapt 
immediately to the needs of community. This typology also highlights the obvious tension between 
state and society, and the possibilities of interaction between them.
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to find a balance between an obligation to the community and its legitimate demands, 
on the one hand, and an obligation to principles based on the universality of human 
rights, on the other hand.
Here, there are two main questions: First, in new democracies, which factors 
contribute to a change in the police? Secondly, how are those factors responsible for 
determining the emphasis of the change on a “reformer” approach aiming to establish 
a democratic policing model or on an approach that will establish a human rights- 
oriented policing model? Transition and modernisation theories provide the main 
explanatory theoretical models for problems related to the building of a pro-reform 
debate and competing approaches. In the next section I will discuss the contributions 
and limitations of these explanations.
Transition Theory and Police Reform
Most of the transition literature, as discussed in the introductory chapter, is based on 
two main explanatory lines for understanding the problems of democratic 
consolidation. The first is related to the type of former non-democratic regime and its 
legacies, and the second is related to the type of transition process the country 
experiences.
As the police institution is part of the state, it would be expected that the type of non- 
democratic regime experienced would determine the type of police institution that 
develops and the problems it faces. However, given the specificity of police 
functions, their development under non-democratic regimes does not vary 
significantly from one type of authoritarian regime to another. More differences occur 
among police institutions of democratic countries than among authoritarian ones. In 
fact, police forces of authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, contrary to what 
would be suggested, present many similarities, the most important of which include a 
centralised structure, militaiy principles, and corporate culture. In this sense, Geza 
Finszter (in Kdddr 2001 p. 4) observes that “Police cooperation developed since 1990 
between East and West has convinced experts that there are far more common traits 
than differences between the various national police forces, despite the different
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political structures”. In the case of Hungary and Poland, in the late phase of the party- 
state, the regimes bear a greater resemblance to the military bureaucratic regimes than 
the totalitarian regimes; yet, the daily work of the police follow primarily national 
priorities.
One relevant difference between the military dictatorships in Latin America and the 
party dictatorships in Eastern Central Europe that should be mentioned is the 
extensive control system over the militias. There were dual external controls; one 
exercised by the ministries of internal affairs and another by the communist parties, 
as well an internal control developed by inspection bodies. The militias’ work was 
basically evaluated by the fulfilment of defined quotas and the detailed reports they 
had to provide as part of their routine work. Nevertheless, those reports were 
manipulated and under this control system there was little scope for public oversight 
(Adrian Beck and Annette Robertson in Hinton and Newbum 2009 p. 62). Yet, the 
high degree of corruption within the militias throughout the Soviet era questions the 
entire control system. On the one hand, the external accountability system typical of 
the Soviet model may have left a legacy that facilitated the establishment and 
development of external control mechanisms. On the other hand, the legacy of a non­
reliable control system by itself does not seem to have a positive impact on the 
accountability of police forces, as the Russian case illustrates .
Thus, the differences between distinct types of authoritarian regimes do not determine 
the orientation of the police institutions; not only because, in broad strokes, they 
present similar structures and functions but also because of the corporate culture 
created by these types of military-hierarchical institutions. In both regions, the AR 
and ECE, policing was mostly developed through bureaucratic empowerment and 
corruption (Los and Zybertowicz 2000 pp. 52-57).
The type of transition experienced, in turn, has a great impact on the political decision 
of whether to reform the police or not; and the actors starting the transition or 
involved in it influence the extent of autonomy and relevance given to the police
87 As Beck and Robertson stress: “The absence of accountability -  perhaps the first principle of 
democratic policing -  is a key issue where Russia is found wanting” (Adrian Beck and Annette 
Robertson in Hinton and Newbum 2009 p. 68).
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institution. The type of transition - whether through agreed reform (“reforma 
pactadd”) or agreed rupture (“ruptura pactada”), “defeat in war”, “interim 
government after regime termination not initiated by the regime”, or “extrication 
from rule by hierarchically led military” (Linz and Stepan 1996) -  helps to define the 
place of police reform on the political agenda for the transition. Yet, the nature of the 
path to democracy defines the police institution’s choice to resist or to adapt to the 
regime change. The initial reaction and outcome for the police force may be to: (1) 
support the new regime; (2) defend the previous regime through violent resistance;
(3) negotiate with the new regime; or (4) strengthen its autonomy and continuity in 
the new regime88. Although neglected, the police institution is an important actor in 
the democratisation process. Just as the type of transition influences the police 
reaction to changes, the choice made by the police has consequences for the transition 
process and the level of legitimacy and accountability of the new regime.
From the actor-driven perspective, Paulo Mesquita Neto (in Lindholt et al. 2003 p. 
190) argues that the path toward police reform may have an impact on the 
consolidation of democratic policing and the nature of public security policies, just as 
the path toward democracy may have an impact on its consolidation and quality. In 
this sense, Mesquita Neto (in Lindholt et al. 2003 pp. 181-191) identifies four paths 
of police reform in Latin America that could be extended to Eastern Central Europe:
(1) the first is the reform led by international actors. Facing the complete failure of 
the State, international missions have to build a completely new police institution, as
88 Uildriks and Van Reenen (2003 pp. 28-31) identify five police reactions to regime change in the 
experiences o f East Europe: (1) forceful support for new regimes: “the police did not object to the 
emerging new order, but instead supported and protected it against conservative resistance, using force 
when necessary”. The examples identified are Slovenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, all presenting 
nationalistic undertones; (2) violent resistance to change: police protected the old regime with force. 
The examples are Romania, Latvia, Lithuania; (3) negotiated revolution: “In Poland, the old 
government and security forces used their central position in the power structure during the eighties as 
well as their manipulative strategies to access information and negotiate an acceptable position in the 
new state”; (4) adaptation: “Sometimes the militia did not play a significant role in the early phases of 
the transition, and simply ‘muddled through’ without creating much public anger and instead adapted 
to the new political circumstances. The most extreme example of such an adaptation is the 
Volkspolizei, the police of the German Democratic Republic. After the agreement to reunite Germany, 
the police had no key role to play in the transition. They were simply integrated into the police system 
of what had been the Federal Republic of Germany”; (5) continuity: “As disrespected and feared by 
the population, and perhaps the new rulers too, as the secret police and militia may have been during 
the times o f the former regime, the old police institutions have an important trump card: the capacity to 
use force to solve the ever-present problem of preserving order. The militia, and to a lesser extent the 
secret police, specialised in the use of force to maintain order. They had the organisation, manpower, 
and weaponry necessaiy to use force when called upon, a vital ability during periods of transition”.
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in the case of Haiti and Panama; (2) the second path is the reform initiated by peace 
accords, a successful example being the case of El Salvador following the 1992 Peace 
Accords; (3) the third is the reform led by the government, as has happened in 
Colombia, Peru, and Chile, and in the case of Poland and Hungary; finally, (4) the 
fourth path is the reform initiated by political agreements between political actors in 
the government and civil society, Argentina and Brazil are two examples of this.
These categories do not include the police institution itself as an actor. The 
singularity of the police as a centralised, closed, and militarised organisation makes 
the police institution a specific actor and should permit it to stand out also as a 
leading actor differentiated from the government. By identifying the police as a 
potential leading actor, I do not want to reinforce the criticised autonomisation of the 
police; on the contrary, this recognition is an important step in bringing them into the 
democratic game and in clearly defining the rules that they must follow. There is no 
better path to reform, and similar types of reforms may have different outcomes, but 
there is no question that a police force open to or without resistance to reform makes 
a great difference in the extent of the reform promoted.
There is no evidence to believe in the capacity of the police to democratise itself, it 
may promote a reform but hardly in democratic terms; however, the police must be 
recognised as a relevant actor in this process. The behaviour of the police, usually 
connected to some police leadership, contributes to defining the type of institutional 
change achieved, which may be (1) the promotion of a partial institutional 
restructuring (examples are Brazil, Chile, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary); (2) the 
promotion of a complete institutional restructuring (examples are Argentina and 
Peru); (3) the reshaping of the institutional doctrine and the behaviour of police forces 
(example of Poland); and (4) the building of a completely new institution (typical of 
post-conflict societies, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, 
and Kosovo) (Ziegler and Nield 2002 p. 15; Hinton 2006; Dammert and Bailey 
2005).
Another category of analysis from the institutional change perspective refers to the 
different proposals directed at the creation of a new place for policing in the modem 
division between the public and the private spheres, such as public-private
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associations in Chile and Brazil, and the privatisation discourses in Brazil, Ecuador 
and Peru. Most proposals in this vein defend the privatisation of security. Even if this 
were to be followed by adequate legislation and control mechanisms to guarantee the 
accountability of the police force (and the extent to which this is effectively possible 
is already a debatable issue), the most critical issue is the transformation of the police 
force into a business and the police service into product. It demands a new concept of 
policing that would assume the exclusive function of controlling people and 
protecting property, ignoring any integrative model of policing. The proposal also 
reinforces the false division between effectiveness and accountability, as if they were 
incompatible demands. Breaking the monopoly over the use of force within a given 
society is not the answer. In order to avoid the privatisation of police or police 
resistance to reforms oriented towards human rights, the reforms should focus not 
only on dismantling the repressive police system inherited from non-democratic 
regimes, but also on an effort to incorporate effectiveness as part of the reform goals.
The domestic initiative for police reform poses two considerations. The first is the 
political will of governments to deal with the police issue. This involves not only the 
path towards democracy but also the pressures and different demands in society. In 
most situations, as Mawby (in Kadar 2001 pp. 28-29) highlights, governments “have 
been reluctant to instigate radical change where social, economic and cultural 
changes have added to the pressure on criminal justice systems in general and the 
police in particular. Economic inefficiency, collapse of living standards, and social 
dislocation has bred a criminogenic environment”. Governments in the best cases will 
be “evolutionist” . The second consideration is related to the capacity of the executive 
to promote reforms in the police. In part, this depends on the structure of the police 
institution itself, its reaction to reform proposals, and the attributed power the 
government exerts with respect to the police institution. Both considerations impose 
some limitations on the path towards democracy and explain negligence in the 
supervision of the police or a lack of will to control the police even in agreed upon or 
negotiated transitional paths.
The discussion about the political actors involved in the transition process stresses the 
relevance of the police and how much they have been overlooked. Police are not 
responsible for creating democracy; nevertheless they can reinforce or undermine it.
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At the same time, police reform is part of the democratisation process; however, as 
police forces are a singular part of the state administration, it does not occur with the 
same timeline as the transformation of the political system89. Police reform is one of a 
series of reforms in the permanent and open process of democratisation and as such 
should be analysed through the different dimensions it implies. The relations between 
civil society and the government, and between national and regional or international 
actors are largely responsible for the path taken by the police institution during 
democratisation. It is necessary to look at those interactions to understand why there 
are differences among countries that follow the same transitional path.
Modernisation Theory and Police Reform
Modernisation theorists would look at various societal factors to explain police 
arbitrariness and its continuities in transitional societies: peaceful or violent society, 
histoiy of war, type of political governance, rule of law (impunity for crime and 
human rights violations), level of development, and political culture. Most theorists 
would claim that police reform towards human rights orientation is possible only by 
improving socio-economic conditions and developing a democratic political culture 
first.
In this perspective, the violence of the police is related to the violence in society. 
There are two main problems with this argument. First, it implies that police 
arbitrariness is the responsibility of neither the police institution nor the government. 
Adhering to the idea of a police force “out of control” the government feels exempted 
from thinking about police reform, at least in terms of democratisation and human 
rights orientation. In this case, the automatic answer for problems involving the 
police seems to be tough legislation and a tough approach to criminality. There is a 
significant contradiction in this argument; violence is a socio-economic problem, yet 
the task attributed to the police does not involve a social approach but rather a crime-
89 Police reform, as Finszter (in K£d£r 2001 p. 141) argues “should be placed in the context of 
reforming the state organisation rather than the transformation processes of the political system”. The 
state administration demands more time for transformation than the political system; it “requires a 
lengthy process of professional preparation, while the system of public administration itself has to take 
account of daily needs. The training of personnel to be ready for a changed set of requirements can 
take years, even decades, if it requires new ways of thinking and ethics”.
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fighting approach. The ambiguity of this discourse also reinforces the autonomisation 
of the police as the government does not assume its responsibility for the actions of 
the police.
Secondly, the argument that police violence is related to societal violence does not by 
itself explain similarities in police institutions among non-democratic regimes with 
different socio-economic levels; differences in the levels of societal violence and the 
type of reforms promoted in these institutions during the democratisation process; or 
the differences among police institutions among democratic regimes. Chevigny’s 
comparative research on the police use of deadly force shows that some contributing 
socio-economic elements for police arbitrariness were present in Los Angeles and 
New York City, such as strong class conflicts between the poor and those that are 
better-off, pro-vigilantism feelings, and a weak sense of citizen participation. 
However, neither city presented the same level of abuse of power found in Jamaica 
and Brazil (Chevigny 1996 p. 129). The explanation for the difference in the level of 
arbitrariness is afforded by elements of the police institution itself. The police in both 
U.S. cities were not disciplined along military lines; this was the key element of 
differentiation.
In relation to the political culture within which the police operate, the main points to 
consider are: first, reliance on a legal order; and second, the strengthening of civil 
society. It can be expected that cultural differences in the acceptance of violence and 
the incorporation of rights would result in different police institutions. The problem 
with these arguments is that they exclude the police as actors in this process of 
building strong citizenship and consolidating the rule of law. The question is not 
which comes first, a democratic and human rights-oriented police force or a 
consolidated legal order along with a lively and democratic civil society. All these 
elements are part of the process to democratise the state and society. It is too simple 
to think of the police as a mere result or mirror of a social order they have to protect. 
First, this order is usually very complex, based on contradictory values and full of 
conflicting interests. Secondly, the police are an institution with a singular subculture 
and the capability to interpret a given social and political framework; they make 
certain choices between emphasising the law and controlling the use of violence, on
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the one hand, and acting as delegated vigilantes and controlling people, on the other 
(Chevigny 1996). The police are important actors in the reproduction of social order.
Changes in police behaviour and in their approach to criminality embody necessary 
changes in the external environment within which the police operate as much as 
changes inside the police institution itself. While it is true that socio-economic 
development has an impact on the level of incorporation and consolidation of human 
rights protection in society, it is no less true that the type of policing can improve 
respect and protection for human rights. In this same vein, Melissa Ziegler and 
Rachel Nield (2002 pp. 71-72) observe that “there are clear political implications of 
police reform and considerable risks of seeking to reform coercive institutions in 
environments typically characterised by human rights abuse, authoritarian 
bureaucratic cultures, corruption and politicisation” but that “successful police 
reforms support demilitarisation and democratisation, create a positive environment 
for economic growth and poverty reduction, and have important effects in improving 
respect for fundamental human rights”. Police brutality in most Latin American 
countries is part of an institutional culture that has built its mission outside the rule of 
law and operationalised it through any means available. Demilitarisation of the 
police, appropriate legislation, and oversight mechanisms are fundamental to 
controlling the arbitrariness of police forces.
The participation of civil society is important to limit the state’s ambition for strong 
police forces and the institutional tendency of the police to extend their power. 
Nevertheless, the capacity and willingness of the state to assure its administrative 
monopoly over the use of force and to assume its responsibility in defining a 
comprehensive policy for public security are still fundamental. As part of the 
executive branch in most countries, policing is also an issue of political governance. 
Without ignoring the societal and economic constraints faced by police forces, it is 
essential to approach the police as a political issue. The continuity or discontinuity of 
some practices and concepts related to domestic security rest upon political choices 
and acts. It is at the political and constitutional levels that functional and 
organisational changes of the police institution should be discussed (Szikinger in 
K&d&r 2001 p. 17). Even where the socio-economic problems restrain citizenship, the 
solution is primarily political. Regimes have been responsible for building or keeping
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specific policies and institutional designs for policing. Whether intended or not, the 
police may serve as a shield protecting the power structure. The problem posed by the 
democratisation process and police reform is twofold: the need to first reconcile the 
notion of order with the rule of law, and then the concept of rule of law itself with 
democracy.
Regional Dimension in Reforming the Police
Transition and modernisation theories lend relevant contributions to the debate about 
police reform. Transition theories highlight the police as part of the transitional state 
while modernisation theories point to the relevance of political culture and civil 
society for the type of police institution, and both have presented efforts to make 
connections between the state and civil society. However, as in the cases of Ecuador 
and Poland, the experience of a negotiated transition and relatively low levels of 
human rights violations by non-democratic regimes in both countries do not explain 
their differing approaches to policing.
Both explanations miss the regional dimension of the problems and processes 
involving the police in the political realm. Modernisation theories concentrate almost 
exclusively on the domestic level; they ignore the regionalisation and 
internationalisation of the issues imposed on the police institution, and the multiple 
influences on the state and the police institution as they define their policies and 
activities. Transition theories, in turn, correctly identify international actors in the 
initiative for police reform, however, they do not go further to discuss the different 
types of influence that international or regional actors may have in shaping a reform, 
especially when dealing with processes that do not follow any type of war-to-peace 
transition. Both explanations disregard the diversity of regional actors and the impact 
of regional politics on the police institution.
Assuming police reform is an open process to move towards a human rights-oriented 
police force, there is no hegemonic model for reform. The possibility of creating a 
pro-reform consensus in and among society, government, and the police institution 
itself is inserted into the political debate, both local and regional. Intentionally or
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unintentionally, within the democratisation process, regional politics have an impact 
on policing. This regional dimension may positively overcome the limitations found 
in domestic politics and support a democratic professionalisation process of the 
police, or it may negatively push certain initiatives backward. The regional impact 
can be identified through three channels of interaction with the police institution: 
first, the norm created by regional standards; secondly, the oversight mechanisms 
built and operating in the regional community; and thirdly, ongoing international 
cooperation or assistance in each region.
The regional context may not be responsible for initiating domestic reforms, but it 
does work in shaping and speeding them, especially in the uncertain first years of a 
country’s democratisation process, when governments are more vulnerable and civil 
society is not strongly organised. During this period, the regional norms are important 
referential support for police reformers, and regional oversight and incentives are 
crucial for the success of the reforms.
Although the topic of public security emerged in most processes of transition 
especially in the context of writing a new constitution, in Latin America, police 
reform is still an ongoing process that is at an early stage in many countries. Thus, it 
is pertinent to discuss why in some countries it has taken many years for police to be 
introduced into the democratic political agenda. In both Ecuador and Poland, the 
police of the non-democratic regimes had a political and social disciplinary role. The 
difference, which will be discussed in the following chapters, is that questioning of 
this has begun only recently in Ecuador, while in Poland it was questioned from the 
beginning of the transition. Police reform was never an issue in the democratic 
transition in Ecuador. It was only with rising crime rates and the incapacity of the 
government and the police to respond to that situation that the legacies of 
arbitrariness and corruption have started to receive attention.
Continuities in policing from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones present two 
sometimes interrelated ways of pacifying society; one is intended to maintain an 
order that favours the privileged groups in society, and other is intended to guarantee 
an order based on interests and priorities defined elsewhere. The rhetoric of “state 
security” emerges not only due to the domestic incapacity to reshape the repressive
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apparatus of the state or to the rise of criminality in most cities, but also because of 
the acceleration of two related processes that have an impact on democratisation and 
the guarantee of human rights: (1) the securitisation process of an increasing number 
of issues, and (2) the internationalisation or regionalisation of security affairs. The 
securitisation process is here understood in the constructivist terms used by Bariy 
Buzan: “The exact definition and criteria of securitisation is constituted by the 
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998 p. 25).
More issues have gone beyond the political debate and become securitised. 
Conversely, more perceived threats have emerged. For this reason, an urgent response 
is required and this may justify actions that break certain rules of the game in 
democratic societies. Following the end of the Cold War, security lost its ideological 
anti-communist or anti-capitalist character and, in a supposedly neutral process, has 
enlarged its agenda. Police affairs now go beyond national borders because of the 
emergence of what is perceived as new threats, such as terrorism and organised crime 
-  e.g., financial crimes; the smuggling of arms; and the trafficking of drugs, migrant 
workers, and women. To a certain extent, this blurs the original distinction between 
the fields of action of the police and of the military. The global and regional 
discourses about security may give support to policies that compromise the public 
spaces for democratic socialisation and protection of human rights. The impact of the 
securitisation process faced by each region depends to a great extent on the type of 
the regional securitising actor and the regional public space already created.
In Latin America, and especially in the AR, the democratisation process has been 
followed by a securitisation of the relationship between the region and the hegemonic 
power exercised by the U.S. Besides the U.S. anti-narcotics policy and, since 2001, 
the discourse of “catastrophic terrorism” (Dunlap Jr. in Newbum 2005 pp. 786-196), 
the securitisation process in the region has also come from the U.S. efforts to change 
the Colombian armed conflict, ongoing since the 1960s, from an internal political 
problem to a regional terrorist issue and, more recently, to overlap migration issues 
and security problems.
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In ECE, organised crime and terrorism have also taken a preponderant space in the 
security debate. The difference is that the securitising actor in that region is not a 
single predominant and asymmetric power. In the ECE, countries have combined 
regional mechanisms and policies related to their internal security affairs, an example 
being the creation of Europol. Additionally, ECE countries are facing a 
“Europeanisation” process that moves them towards the Western European public 
space with consolidated standards of human rights guarantees. Limitations on the 
scope of human rights are not totally excluded in Western European democracies; 
however, these democracies provide more guarantees of those rights and impose 
more obstacles to their being overridden. It is possible to identify a number of 
different counter-balancing actors working in ECE, in contrast to the situation in the 
AR, as discussed in other chapters. Conversely, setting the goal of acceding to the 
European Union, followed by the accession process itself, made the Eastern Central 
European governments assume their responsibility to all state institutions in order to 
meet the conditions for admittance to the EU. Democratic policing has been relevant 
to obtaining democratic legitimacy also at the regional level.
Additionally, in the AR, U.S. involvement with previous regimes in the anti­
communist fight compromises their interest in reform of police forces, in contrast to 
the relationship of the European Council and the European Union with the non- 
democratic regimes in ECE. An unfavourable regional context aggravates the usual 
domestic difficulty of defining a strategy for reform and puts more emphasis on the 
quality of individual leadership to promote police reform. Thus, the police institution 
must be understood as an actor inter-relating with national and regional actors in the 
context of demands that are sometimes contradictory.
In addition to historical, cultural, economic, and political factors that condition the 
development and outcome of police reform in the AR, it is relevant to analyse the 
regional factors that interact with all these domestic aspects in order to verify which 
social order is being reproduced by the police in their intermediary role between state 
and society. It seems that in the AR, pressures to combat drug trafficking or to 
implement economic reforms exercised a stronger and better organised influence on 
transitional countries than domestic groups demanding citizen security. The judicial
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reforms experienced by countries of the region since the 1980s should be understood 
in the framework of these pressures.
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Chapter 5 - Poland: Facing Police Reform
Introduction
Compared to other democratisation processes, Poland is a success story in terms of 
police reform. Similarities to the Ecuadorian case, discussed in the next chapter, did 
not prevent the reform of the militarised, centralised and partisan police forces in the 
first decade of the new democratic regime.
In this chapter I analyse the Polish police and its reform through the elements of 
rupture from the non-democratic regime, and the human rights situation. The four 
major categories for this discussion are: (1) continuity from non-democratic regimes;
(2) the existence of external control mechanisms; (3) the human rights situation; and 
(4) their interaction with regional politics.
The Police History: A Struggle for Independence
The Polish history of partition, invasion, lost of sovereignty and war was responsible 
for a very late professionalisation process of the police. The Third Partition, among 
Russia, Prussia and Austria, ended the Polish Commonwealth in 1795, and Poland 
would not regain independence until 1918. In the beginning of the 20th century, the 
embryos of the police institution could be identified in the paramilitary organisations 
which pursued the interests of particular political parties and in the civic 
organisations, such as the citizens’ guards, which became executive organs of the 
emergent local authorities (the so-called Citizens’ Committees). These organisations 
were of a volunteer nature and had very limited power, largely dependent on the 
occupying authority of the moment. The first, created in 1914, was the Citizens’ 
Guard of the Dabrowa Coal Basin, and the first organisation with a metropolitan 
character was the Warsaw Guard, created in 1915. During the same period, the 
Municipal Militias were also established; they worked as both executive organs of 
municipalities and auxiliary organs of occupying authorities, but in contrast to the 
guards, the members of the Militias were paid, uniformed and armed (Grabowski in 
Polish Police 2004).
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In the short period of independence after World War I, there was an effort toward 
unification of all organisations which carried out police tasks; it was a long and 
gradual process. There were many regional guards and militias with different 
functions and that were also based on different gendarmerie models (especially the 
Prussian and Austrian models). In 1918, for the first time, a division for police 
matters was created in the Administrative Department of the Ministry of Interior and 
Administration (MSWiA is its Polish acronym for Ministerstwo Spraw 
Wewnetrznych i Administracji). In 1919, there was a partial unification under the 
Communal Police Decree that transformed most law enforcement organisations into 
communal police forces (Grabowski in Polish Police 2004). The main effort to 
transform the police into a state body came, in that same year, with the Parliamentary 
Police Act of July 24 (now the date of the annual police holiday), which established 
the State Police Headquarters as the central agency. The unification process would 
take some years and would be strengthened by the introduction of training courses 
and the creation of police schools with a certain attempt to make the institution non­
partisan.
With the occupation of part of the country by Germany in 1939, the Polish State 
Police became the Polish Police and this force was incorporated into the German 
public order police with very limited powers. The other part of the country under 
occupation by the USSR arrested Polish Police officers, sentencing the vast majority 
of them to death. After the German defeat in World War II, the USSR took over the 
Polish territoiy and the State Police was formally disbanded. Most of its officers were 
forced to undergo rehabilitation programmes, but were allowed to rejoin the forces.
In 1944, the Citizens’ Militia (MO for the Polish acronym for Milicji Obywatelskiej) 
was created as a legal and public security service, and responds directly to the 
Department of Public Security. This soon became to the Ministry of Public Security, 
which would play the primary role in the repression. The MO would lose its 
autonomy and become an important part of the totalitarian apparatus after the 
imposition of Soviet rule in Poland by the Red Army occupation and the agreements 
of Yalta and Potsdam among the Great Powers. In 1954, after Stalin’s death, the 
Ministry of Public Security was dismantled, and the militia forces were separated
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from the security apparatus. The MSWiA assumed authority over the work of the 
MO, while security decisions were made by the Committee for Public Security 
Matters of the Council of Ministers. However, this structure did not last long.
With the crisis of 1956, there was a major change in the security apparatus. After the 
uprising in Poznan and the army intervention that resulted in the deaths of 56 people, 
the Polish leadership negotiated the new party leader with the Soviet leadership and 
managed to convince them that Wladyslaw Gomulka was the best option. Gomulka 
was very popular and identified with the nationalist cause90. Nevertheless, in order to 
prove to the Soviets that the Party was in control of changes and to avoid Soviet 
invasion, Gomulka became increasingly authoritarian. He reintroduced censorship 
and centralised security (Prazmowska 2004 pp. 177-198). The relationship between 
the MSWiA and the security apparatus was inverted and, for the first time, the 
security apparatus was placed under the MSWiA, which took the lead in security 
matters. The police forces were thus a subsidiary force of the MSWiA, and their main 
units were: (1) the secret police, called the Security Service (SB); (2) the criminal 
police, called the Citizens’ Militia (MO); (3) the public order police, a paramilitaiy 
group called the Motorised Reserves of Citizens’ Militia (ZOMO, the Polish acronym 
for Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej); and (4) the Voluntary Reserve 
of the Citizens’ Militia (ORMO, the Polish acronym for Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji 
Obywatelskiej). In practice, however, the MO was subordinate to the SB, a fact that 
generated great tension within the police institution itself. This structure would 
remain unchanged until 1990 (Grabowski in Polish Police 2004).
In the communist bloc countries as well as in the Soviet Union, the police forces were 
a central part of the political control system. Their primary task was “to sustain the 
political system and safeguard its functioning” (Koszeg in K£d£r 2001 p. 1). 
Detecting and preventing crime was at a secondary level. The reality of low crime 
rates, due in part to the strong social and political control and in part to the existing 
welfare state, contributed to this; however, the role given to police was a deliberate 
political decision. Although the communist regimes pursued the establishment of a
90 In 1948, Gomulka was replaced by the Stalinist Boleslaw Beirut as First Secretary of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party (PZPR, the Polish acronym for Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza). 
Gomulka was dismissed and arrested under charges of being a right wing nationalist.
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classless and more egalitarian society, the police institution was an instrument of the 
political party to defend the status quo reigning in society. Conversely, ethnic, 
religious, national and independent civil society groups received close attention from 
the security services. A popular and submissive way of addressing an officer was 
“Mister Government”, very illustrative of the character of the police institution in 
Poland (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003 pp. 12-17).
Thus, as with other countries in the communist bloc, Poland had a system of political 
and social control based on the Soviet model, which had three pillars: (1) the 
communist party, (2) the state administrative apparatus, and (3) the security 
apparatus. The Soviet system of control was reproduced in all areas under its direct 
influence and in a vast range of social and political institutions, including in the 
philosophy, organisation, training and practice of the security forces. However, as 
Uildriks and Van Reenen (2003 p. 18) observe, despite the shared context of Soviet 
policing, the daily work of the police “proceeded much more along national lines and 
priorities”.
In the mid-1980s, this system of control relied mostly on the security pillar 
(Zybertowicz 2002) and, not coincidentally, repression became more pronounced. 
Although, the police and military had kept separate functions during most of the one- 
party system regime91, as the regime became more unpopular and was directly 
confronted, the police and the military were used to protect and sustain it (Mayby in 
K£d£r 2001 p. 24). This was most evident during the Marital Law period with the 
attempts to repress Solidarity92.
The police were, in essence, set up to command their population instead of serving 
them, and the tendency before initiating the transition process was for the state and 
the police institution to expand their power and activities. As the relationship between 
the MO, which was perceived as the “beating heart of the Communist Party”
91 Interview with Lasocik.
92An emblematic case of this period was the massacre in Kolpania Wujek, a coal mine in Katowice, in 
1981. During a strike against the martial law declared by Wojwech Jaruzelski, the Party’s National 
Secretary and Prime Minister (1981-1985), nine miners were killed and 59 were wounded in a joint 
action of the army, MO and ZOMO. In 1994, the former Minister of the Interior General Czeslaw 
Kiszczak was accused of authorizing the use of force against the striking miners, but as of 2005, the 
case had not been resolved.
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(Kremplewski in K&d&r 2001 p. 204), and the population deteriorated, lower ranking 
officers started a small movement to change the image of the MO and create a militia 
trade union. The movement was repressed by the harassment and dismissal of the 
activists. As a result, the militia officers’ committee was created with the same 
responsibilities of a trade union; however, it was totally subordinate to the authorities 
(Grabowski in Polish Police 2004).
Police Reform
In the context of the transition initiated in 1989 with the roundtable negotiations 
between the government and the opposition, some key positions of power, such as the 
Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence, were first occupied by 
representatives of the former regime, Czeslaw Kiszczak93 (Interior) and Siwicki 
(Defence94) (Sanford 2002 pp. 50-73). However, in the rapid advancement of the 
initial transition process, the MSWiA was soon handed over to the dissidents and by 
the summer of 1990, all communist ministers had resigned.
On 6 April 1990, the Police Law or Police Act dissolved the MO and created the 
Polish Police (Article 147)95. ZOMO was also dissolved and replaced by preventive 
units at the Police, and the SB was replaced by the State Protection Agency (UOP, the 
Polish acronym for Urzad Ochrony Panstwa) under the MSWiA (Mawby in K&d&r 
2001 p. 26). In 2002, the Law on the Internal Security Agency96 was adopted by the 
Sejm (the lower house of the parliament); this Law dissolved the UOP and created
93General Czeslaw Kiszczak was Jaruzelski’s most trusted colleague, and for this reason he was 
designated by him to initiate talks with the opposition and guarantee the negotiated terms. During his 
work at the MSWiA, documents and evidence that could be used in the verification process were 
stolen or destroyed; this has been an issue for debate at the Sejm and in the government.
94 The PZPR also controlled the Ministry of Transport and Foreign Trade.
95The Polish legal system is based on statutes enacted by the Parliament or subsidiary legislation 
passed by bodies under powers conferred on them by Acts of the Parliament. Thus, die domestic 
primary legislation on policing is the Police Law (1990), the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, both from 1997. Secondary legislation includes the Regulation Concerning the Conditions, 
Circumstances and Procedures of Enforcement by Police Force Members (1990) and the Regulation 
concerning the Special Conditions and Procedures related to Firearm Use by Police Force Members 
(1996).
96 Law o f 24 May 2002 (Journal of Laws No. 74, Item 676).
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two institutions: the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency97. 
This restructuring law was the first major change in the Police since the transition 
period. Thus, currently in Poland the non-militaiy security sector organisations are: 
(1) the Police, (2) the Internal Security Agency, (3) the Foreign Intelligence Agency,
(4) the Frontier Guard, and (5) the Office of the Security of Government (Rzeplinski 
2003 p. 90).
The Polish Police remained subordinate to the MSWiA and were defined as a 
uniformed and armed formation serving society and designed to protect people’s 
safety and to preserve public safety and order (Article 1.1) with the duty (Article 1.2) 
to: “(1) protect the life of individuals and property against lawless attempts on those 
interests; (2) protect public safety and order; also to secure peace in public places and 
means of public transport and public communication; in road traffic and on waters for 
public use; (3) initiate and organise activities aimed at preventing offences and 
transgressions as well as crime-producing phenomena, and to cooperate in this sphere 
with State and local agencies and with social organisations; (4) detect offences and 
transgressions and prosecute the perpetrators; (5) supervise communal (municipal) 
guards established under statutory provisions, and specialist armed protective 
formations within a scope specified in separate provisions; (6) supervise the 
observance of public order and administrative regulations pertaining to public activity 
or public places; (7) cooperate with police forces of other States and with their 
international organisations under international contracts and agreements as well as 
separate provisions” (Police Law 1990).
The 1995 amendment of the Police Law (Article 4) defines the organisational 
structure of the police through the following services: (1) criminal; (2) prevention; (3) 
organisation, logistics and technical assistance for police activities. It also includes: 
(1) the police court; (2) the police academy, training centres and police schools; (3) 
separate prevention squads and anti-terrorism sub-units; and (4) research and 
development units. According to the police, currently 30% of the force is constituted 
by criminal police and 70% by preventive police guided since 1997 by the doctrine of
97 There is some concern about the possibility of politisation of the security service under this new 
institutional arrangement (Rzeplinski 2003 p. 98).
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communitarian police98. At the same time, power is still centralised at the central 
agency of the security system in the person of the Commander in Chief of the Police 
(KGP in its Polish initials for Komenda Glowna Policji), who is appointed by the 
Prime Minister and reports to the MSWiA (Article 5.1).
The legal status of police personnel is of public officials under special administration 
regulated by the Police Law and ordinances; that is, executive provisions issued by 
the MSWiA and the KGP. The police structure and doctrine now reflect a civilian 
rather than a military organisational nature. There is important evidence of the 
demilitarisation of the institution. First, although police officers have a special status, 
their ranks are no longer military. The Police Law provides the following order of 
officer corps and ranks (Article 47.1): general inspector, senior inspector, inspector, 
junior inspector, sub-inspector, superintendent, commissary, and sub-commissaiy. 
The aspirant corps ranks are: staff aspirant, senior aspirant, and junior aspirant. The 
non-commissioned officer corps ranks are: staff sergeant, company sergeant, and 
sergeant99. Finally, the private corps ranks are: senior constable, and constable. In 
addition, most personnel decisions are subject to judicial review by administrative 
courts (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_02.htm p.5).
Secondly, police officers, just like any civil servants, may belong to trade unions. The 
Police Law (Article 67.1) still imposes several restrictions on police personnel due to 
their special administration regulation. Only one trade union may operate within the 
police, and they are not allowed to go on strike or join political parties, if they go 
abroad for more than three days they must notify their superiors, they still can be 
transferred to any place in the country without their consent, and they need 
authorisation to run for the Parliament (Weber in K&ddr 2001 p. 49). However, 
despite all these restrictions, members of the police can organise themselves and they 
have a clear channel for expressing their demands.
Thirdly, although police personnel are still subjected to disciplinary sanctions for 
offences and transgressions committed regardless of criminal liability (Police Law
98 Interview with Tomaszewski.
99 The ranks are still different from the standards of the European countries, sometimes leading to 
some confusion (interview with Drzal).
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Article 132) and for violations of duty discipline (Police Law Article 133.1), 
members of the police are not subjected to military discipline. In fact, the provisions 
of the MSWiA’s Ordinance of 19 December 1997 stipulate the principles and 
procedures for disciplinary sanctions for law enforcement officials100. In cases not 
specified in this Ordinance, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are 
applied. The Police Law still defines the courts of honour for cases “of a policeman’s 
failure to observe the principles of professional ethics, and particularly of honour, 
dignity and the good name of the Service” (Article 140.1), but those courts do not 
have jurisdiction in cases regarding disciplinary affairs (Article 140.2), and the law 
includes the possibility of applying educational measures among their decisions.
Fourthly, criminal offences are investigated by a civilian prosecutor, and brought 
before a common court. Criminal proceedings against members of the police are the 
same as those applied to any citizen, the difference is that during the process of 
investigation and trial police personnel are suspended or dismissed from service. 
Thus, disciplinary proceedings are regulated by the Police Law while criminal 
proceedings are regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code applicable to all citizens 
(Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_03.htm, pp. 9-12).
Additionally, in 2002 an Advisory Committee at the KGP was created with the main 
objective of giving opinions on police strategies and drafts of major legal acts. This 
Committee is comprised of seven law professors, two sociology professors, two 
psychology professors, and two human rights activists. Previously, a similar 
Committee operated between 1997 and 1999 (Rzeplinski 2003 p. 106).
Police Personnel
The vetting committees, established in 1990 by Solidarity, initiated the Polish 
lustration process in order to exclude officials who had previously violated human 
rights or basic laws. Of the 24,000 secret police officers, 14,000 underwent this
100 According to Article 139.2 of the Police Law, it is the MSWiA, through an ordinance, that must 
detail principles and procedures of granting awards, disciplinary proceedings, imposing penalties, and 
determining the competence of superiors in such cases.
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process which resulted in 10,000 of them being dismissed. The remaining 4,000 were 
incorporated into the newly created UOP (Zybertowicz 2002). According to the 
KGP, in 1998, the number of former functionaries of the SB in service at different 
periods was reduced to 6,792, about 6.8% of the total (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee 2000 pl_02.htm p. 2). The militia also passed through a verification 
procedure, although very limited. The intention of the government was never to fire 
the personnel; among the reasons was the increasing crime rate that prevented the 
government from pursuing further verification and this process finally stopped in 
1999. Between 1990 and 2005, between 80% and 90% of police officials have been 
changed101. It is doubtful that the reduction of former officials at the police 
institution was due to the statutory vetting procedures initiated in 1990; the change of 
personnel is mainly attributed to retirement. It was possible to retire with 40% of the 
salary after 15 years of service102 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_02.htm p. 
4). There were new jobs offered in the rapidly expanding private sector103 (Mawby in 
K&d&r 2001 p. 25) and good opportunities to use information and contacts for 
business during the transition.
Although many officials who retired or resigned in 1990 could have rejoined the 
police forces after the vetting procedure was completed104 - it is estimated, for 
instance, that about 20% of former secret police officials were incorporated into the 
criminal police service105, the change of police personnel was significant and had a 
great impact on the institution, facilitating the reform process. The reduction of police
101 Interview with Cybulski.
102 In Poland, the right to retire is now acquired after 30 years of employment or at the age of 60 for 
women or 65 for men (interview with Cybulski).
103 Since February 1997, private bodyguard agencies must apply to the MSWiA for a license. This 
year, there were between 120,000 and 150,000 private agents operating in Poland. Until 23 Februaiy 
1998, when the Law on Protection o f Persons and Property of 22 August 1997 entered into force, there 
was also a public service entity called the Industrial Guard that guarded State-controlled enterprises, 
institutions and offices as well as research institutes of importance for the economy and defence. In 
1997, the Industrial Guard had 29,000 members. With this Law they lost the powers of public officials 
and became employees of bodyguard agencies. The same happened to the Post Office Guard which 
had 2,700 members in 1997 (Report, pl_02.htm, p.2).
104 Many dismissed officers appealed against their dismissal. There was also a case regarding vetting 
members of the police brought to the UN Human Rights Committee. A former official of the Security
Services, W. Kali, alleged a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 25) during the vetting procedure. In 1997, however, the Committee found (by a majority of 11 
to 3 votes) that the procedures provided for by Polish Law did not violate the Covenant. View of CCPR 
of 29th o f September 1997. Communication No. 552/19993. CCPR/C/60/D/552/1993 (Kremplweski in 
Kadar 2001 Footnote 15 pp. 216-217).
105 Interview with Lasocik.
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forces from 122,000 members in 1988 to 97,468 in 1992 (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee 2000 pl_02.htm p. 1, Footnote 1) also illustrates this institutional change.
However, since 1993, there has been a tendency toward expansion of the police, as 
shown by the increase in the budget (see Table 1). The Sejm, through the Budget 
Law, specifies the size of the police force. The budget of the police is allocated by the 
State as part of the general budget of the MSWiA. Police expansion has been a 
response to the strong perception of insecurity created, initially, by the uncertainty 
resulting from the political changeover106 and the emergence of armed conflict in the 
Balkans, but mainly from the perception of a rapid growth of criminality107. 
Regarding crime rates in Poland, on the one hand, there are grounds to argue that 
official statistics under the communist regime were manipulated for propaganda 
reasons; petty theft, for instance, was re-defined as a misdemeanour rather than a 
crime by the legislature. At the same time, the efficiency of each police officer was 
measured by crime and crime detection rates, as the lower the crime rate the higher 
the police efficiency seemed. On the other hand, during the transition period, not only 
did the police stop playing down crime rates but they also began to overstate it in 
order to press for more state spending in this area, which included their own salaries 
(Siemaszko 2000 pp. 15-16). Thus, the escalating crime rate also has been magnified 
by agencies responsible for law enforcement. Through what we can call “statistical 
pressures”, there has been a strong lobbying effort in the Sejm to increase the police
1 ORbudget as the following table on the police budget illustrates.
106 Koszeg (in K&ddr 2001 pp. 2-3) points out that “[a] major contribution to this climate of fear was 
made by the ending of the policy of artificially maintained general employment -  a characteristic 
feature o f Socialism -  as a result of which masses of people lost their jobs. The secure, albeit modest 
lifestyle to which the average citizen had been accustomed became fraught with uncertainty, while the 
state of the national economy was on more prominent display than ever before. With incredible speed 
social life became far more open and free: total control over society was abolished, constraints on 
travelling abroad were significantly eased, and formerly imperturbable state bodies disintegrated”.
107 Comparing the Polish rates to the EU average rates between 1997 and 2001, the crime recorded by 
the police had an average annual growth of 4.8% in Poland and -0.1% in Europe. For the same period, 
robbery rates grew an average o f 72% in Poland and 24% in the EU (Barclay and Tavares 2003 p. 3). 
An unintended consequence of the transition was also the increase of organized crime and corruption. 
The control of information and economic resources by the party leadership and secret service 
facilitated contact with criminal organizations. As Uildriks and Van Reenen (2003 p. 27) indicate: “[a] 
Polish Minister of the Interior noted that in Poland, mafia groups are directed by former Soviet 
intelligence and counter intelligence officials who failed verification checks in the 1990s. Their 
knowledge and abilities enabled them to ascend rapidly in the mafia hierarchy, striving to influence 
Polish political and economic circles as well as aiming for access to the various media outlets. Poland 
is not an exception to the rule -  the situation is believed to be similar in all post-communist societies”.
108 Interview with Lasocik.
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Table 1: Police Budget
Year Zlotych - PLN (million) US dollars -U S D  (million)*
2005 6,017 2,003
2004 5,869 1,953
2003 5,480 1,824
2002 5,292 1,763
2001 5,256 1,751
2000 4,739 1,579
1999 4,318 1,437
1998 3,722 1,239
1997 3,243 1,079
1996 2,668 888
1995 2,030 675
1994 1,552 517
1993 1,249 416
1992 901 300
1991 583 194
1990 402 134
Source: KGP, 2006. * Current currency (2006).
In June 1995, an integrated system o f recruitment and training was introduced at the 
four levels o f the police - basic, non-commissioned officers, aspirants, and officers. It 
was not a police initiative, but a political decision by the government109. Currently, 
there are five police academies and many regional training schools. About 8,500 
police graduate from all types o f training each year, and about 2,000 police attend 
various postgraduate courses. It is calculated that around 11% o f the police force are 
in training programmes each year (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_02.htm, 
p. 9). Some police training programmes were developed to deal with new issues 
regarding police work, professional ethics and human rights issues, but they were 
very limited.
Nevertheless, with the process o f expansion, there has been much criticism about the 
procedures for recruitment and preparatory service. During the 1990s the major 
concern o f the police was to fill the positions and increase numbers to cope with the 
increasing rate o f criminality. By 2006, the number of permanent police men and 
women was 103,309 (KGP 2006). The concern with the growth o f  the police force
109 Interview with Cybulski.
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resulted in the reduction of training time and decreased rigor of examinations in order 
to train the greatest number of candidates within a short time110 (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee 2000 pl_5.htm, pp. 1-10). The Police Law requires secondary education 
for recruitment (Article 25.1), but the Commander in Chief of the Police “may agree 
to admit to the service in the Police prevention squads a candidate with no secondary 
education if it was found in the course of the qualification procedure that this 
candidate has special disposition to serve in the Police” (Article 25.2)111.
Accountability System
The Soviet bloc militia systems possessed a highly developed system of control. It 
was a two-tier supervision system: one external, a political supervision by party 
representatives: and the other internal, by professional inspection bodies. In their 
daily work, militias had to fulfil quotas and detailed reports, most of them with 
manipulated and fabricated results (Uildrik and Van Reenen 2003 pp. 208-209). The 
extent to which this system controlled police behaviour and activities is doubtful, 
especially facing the rising level of police corruption during the 1980s; however, the 
culture of stringent controls left a legacy that facilitated the acceptance of external 
accountability systems by the police institution. This does not mean that the 
corporative spirit was absent or has been totally eliminated from the institution112; 
but in general, monitoring and control mechanisms have been developed and 
consolidated.
Chapter 3 of the Police Law, which deals with the range of powers of the police, 
states: “In the course of performance of their duties, police officers are obliged to 
respect human dignity and to observe and protect human rights” (Article 14.3). In 
relation to the right of the police to detain a person (Article 15.1), the Law says that it 
“should be performed in a manner reducing to the necessary minimum interference
110 At the Academy, a regular course ending with examination for Police officer takes three years. 
However, graduates from law school take a five-month course, and graduates from other disciplines 
take 10-month courses.
111 In 1991, of all police officers admitted, 24.1% had not finished high school; in 1992, the rate was 
20.6% (Police in Transition CD-ROM, Report pl_02.htm p. 1, Footnote 3).
1,2 There are cases, for instance, of police engaging in corruption activities when they are about to 
retire with the expectation that, even if they are discovered before retirement, solidarity within the 
institution would prevail (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_03.htm p. 11).
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with the personal rights of the detainee” (Article 15.6). The Law already stated 
disciplinary and criminal responsibilities of policemen (Articles 132-145), but it was 
the Penal Code of 1997 (Article 231) that specified the criminal responsibility of 
police officers who commit acts to the detriment of public and private interests. The 
Penal Code ( Article 247) states that anyone using violence against a lawfully 
detained suspect faces a penalty of three months to five years in prison, which is 
increased by one to ten years if the perpetrator acts with particular cruelty. Police 
officers suspected of criminal offences are always suspended from service activities 
during investigation (Articles 3 and 39.1 of the Police Law), and all the information 
on alleged offences committed by members of the police is examined by the 
prosecutor.
Articles 16 and 17 and the Ordinances of the Council of Ministers regulate the rights 
of policemen to use firearms. In all cases in which firearms are used, including 
warning shots, the police officer is obliged to provide immediate notification to the 
officer on duty at the nearest police unit. However, disciplinary proceedings tend to 
be kinder to police officers accused of unjustified use of firearms113.
There are two levels of inspection in the police; one at the regional police 
headquarters and another at the central police headquarters, the KGP. If authorised by 
the regional police chief, inspection teams may be also instituted in the largest local 
police stations. The regional inspectorate addresses complaints filed at the regional 
police headquarters and is responsible for carrying out the initial investigation. At the 
KGP, all the complaints are received by the Control Bureau and then the criminal 
allegations are referred to the Internal Affairs Bureau. The Control Bureau is also 
responsible for: (1) promotion of human rights at the Police, (2) observing human 
rights protection in Police activities, and (3) representing the Commander in Chief in 
national and international projects related to human rights (Journal of Laws of the 
General Headquarters of Police 2006 Article 23 and Annex 16). The Internal Affairs 
Bureau (usually referred to as BSW, the Polish acronym for Biuro Spraw 
Wewn?trznych) is specifically responsible for the detection and prosecution of crimes
113 The 29 June 1996 amendment to the Police Law has been criticized for extending police powers to 
use firearms. Firearms may be used in direct pursuit of a person who can be reasonably suspected of 
having committed a crime as specified in the law. This is a move backward in the matter of 
controlling the use of firearms (Interviews with Rzeplinski and Lasocik).
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committed by police officers and employees at the police institution. It also has the 
task o f  analysing the scale and reasons for crime threats in the police environment 
(Journal o f Laws 23 January 2006, Article 12 and Annex 5). In 2000, a toll-free 
telephone number for complaints against the police was created at the police 
institution.
Disciplinary proceedings for police officers are considered more severe than criminal 
ones, because, sometimes as the result o f prosecutor’s recommendations, they are 
more extensive and have a greater impact than criminal proceedings (Uildrik and Van 
Reenen 2003 pp. 186-211). However, there has been a significant drop in the number 
o f police punished and dismissed in cases o f disciplinary proceedings (see Table 2), 
much greater than the decrease in offences for the same period; a decrease o f 18.3% 
in the number o f disciplinary offences registered. In 1993, the number o f police 
punished was 4,734; more than three times the number in 2005, for a decrease o f  
72.3%. The number o f police punished with dismissal from service fell by 84.1%. 
This is attributed to changes in the policy o f enforcing disciplinary penalties 
(Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pi.-03.htm p. 10), due to the demilitarisation o f  
the police and the use o f alternative measures in disciplinary cases.
Table 2: Disciplinary Proceedings at the KGP
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of 
Offences 6,027 5,945 6,397 6,661 7,045 4,828 3,915 5,255 5,391 5,710 4,826 5,465 4,924
Offences with 
Punishment 4,850 4,753 4,661 4,891 4,757 2,547 2,244 2,838 2,884 2,556 1,796 1,682 1,331
% of Offences 
with Punishment 80.4 79.9 72.8 73.4 67.5 52.7 57.3 54.0 53.4 44.7 37.2 19.8 27.0
Including 
Punishment of 
Expulsion from 
Service
493 408 259 336 288 172 197 295 284 308 204 103 78
..............................
Number of Police 
Punished 4,734 4,613 4,584 4,667 4,507 2,525 2,206
. .......
2,765
..'£*
2,855 2,528
r“—*■—*—
1,778
..........
1,610 1,310
% of Police 
Punished in the 
Polish Police
4.8 4.8
L-.....  1....-....1
4.6 4.6 4.5 2.5 2.2 2.74 2.8 2.5 1.75 1.6 1.3
Source: KGP 2006.
In their comparative work on policing in post-communist societies, Uildrik and Van 
Reenen (2003 pp. 171-185) point out that Poland and Russia present the highest
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number o f  criminal and disciplinary proceedings against police officers among the 
former communist countries. However, less than 20 percent o f  cases in Poland 
concern allegations o f police ill-treatment. In recent years there has been a rise in the 
number o f cases related to “abusive behaviour” by the police (see Table 3). 
Nevertheless, the type and seriousness o f the abusive behaviour reported are not 
clear.
Table 3: Cases Investigated by the Internal Affairs Bureau
Type of Case 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Bribery 108 98 87 141 137 144
Abusive Behaviour 50 91 75 141 172 288
False Evidence 27 31 25 72 102 195
Illegal Seizure, Forgery 37 60 55 103 152 130
Disclosure of State Secrets and Official Documents 8 15 16 11 17 46
Others 43 65 81 102 142 212
Police Officers Charged 273 213 204 269 335 444
Source: KGP 2006.
In general, a high level o f complaints can indicate both public discontent with the 
police as well as the democratisation of the system and the population’s trust o f  it. 
Compared to Romania and Bulgaria, Uildrik and Van Reenen conclude that the high 
number o f  complaints against police officers at the KGP suggests that the public have 
confidence in the system.
Although less than 15 percent o f criminal proceedings initiated in Poland resulted in 
conviction and only very few policemen are sentenced to prison (see Table 4), in their 
analysis o f the criminal proceedings they also argue that “the Polish data makes a 
powerful case for contending that the notion o f impunity should not merely be seen in 
relation to the actual level o f criminal convictions, but also to the extent to which use 
is made o f the internal disciplinary system. The very fact so many Polish officers 
receive disciplinary punishments and are even dismissed, negates any suggestion o f  
impunity, whatever the number o f criminal convictions relative to the proportion o f  
serious violations” (Uildrik and Van Reenen 2003 pp. 186-209). The low level o f  
criminal convictions is not in itself indicative o f a prevailing attitude o f  impunity; it 
may reflect an absence o f  serious police violations at an institutional level.
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Table 4: Criminal Proceedings at the KGP
Year Cases with Criminal Criminal % of Cases with
Criminal Proceedings Proceedings with Conviction
Proceedings Completed Conviction
2005 568 221 78 13.9
2004 585* 280 81 13.8
2003 Change of 
Regulations
380 103
2002 770 296 84 10.9
2001 844 300 77 9.1
2000 609 282 70 11.4
1999 490 294 54 11.0
1998 582 419 95 16.3
1997 756 478 100 13.2
1996 691 404
...................................
81 11.7
1995 610 424 82 13.4
1994 660 478 64 9.6
1993 627 633 113 18.0
Source: KGP 2006.
In addition to criminal liability, convicted police officers can also be held civilly 
liable for restitution to the victim. The 1997 Polish Constitution states that "each 
person has the right to compensation for damages he or she has suffered through 
illegal action by the public authority" (Article 77.1), and the Civil Code o f 1964, 
which includes many amendments after 1989, stipulates (Article 417) that the State 
Treasury is responsible for paying damages for illegal acts committed by police 
officers in the performance o f their official duties. The Treasury may file claims 
against police officers and seek an indemnity or a refund o f  the money paid to the 
injured person. The Supreme Administrative Court has the power to process 
complaints against valid decisions issued by the police (e.g.: refusal o f gun permit, 
orderly performance o f police duties, etc.). In the Rehabilitation Act o f 1991, there 
were already grounds for claiming compensation from the State Treasury for damages 
and injuries suffered. According to Uildrik and Van Reenen (2003 pp. 168-176) 
“[t]he number o f compensation cases indicates that the requirement o f legal redress is 
taken seriously in the Polish legal system”. Between 1994 and 1997, the number o f  
general settlements in compensation cases handled by provincial courts varied from 
5,448 to 9,809. There are no detailed statistics regarding civil law liability applied to 
police officers, but human rights organisations have pointed out that a civil suit
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against the police institution is still difficult to win (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
2000 pl_03.htm p. 9). At the Ministry of Justice, convictions are divided into the 
categories of: health service staff (mainly physicians), employees of the education 
system, prisons and other institutions for the administration of justice; and employees 
of other public offices. Cases concerning policemen and soldiers are classified in this 
last category.
Complaints against the police can be also addressed to the Spokesperson for Victim’s 
Rights at the MSWiA or submitted to the prosecutor’s office. At the MSWiA, the 
organ responsible for overseeing police activities is the Control and Supervision 
Inspectorate. Concerning the Executive, it is also worth mentioning that the Prime 
Minister has supervisory power and responsibility over the police through the 
supervision of the MSWiA (Article 148.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland).
Until 1995, there was no parliamentary oversight for security forces. From that year 
forward, the functions of the Sejm Commission for Security Services have included 
the responsibility of examining complaints against police activities. At the Sejm, 
there are also the Administration and Internal Affairs Commission and the 
Administration of Justice and Human Rights Commission responsible for supervising 
enforcement of the Police Law and its resolutions pertaining to police work. 
However, Rzeplinski (2003 p. 109) has observed that legislators on the 
Administration and Internal Affairs Commission lobby to extend police power 
regarding crime control, and most legislators lack the professional capacity to provide 
parliamentary oversight of the police.
In addition to the work of the commissions, the Sejm can also supervise police 
activities through interpellations and parliamentary questions addressed to the Prime 
Minister, the MSWiA, other members of the Cabinet, or the President of the Supreme 
Chamber of Control, which has the power to monitor and investigate the police 
institution "from the viewpoint of legality, good management, expediency and 
reliability" (Article 203 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), especially 
related to financial, economic and administrative activities. The Supreme Chamber 
of Control constitutes an effective mechanism for inspection; however, most of its
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reports are secret. The Senate, through the Commission on Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law, also participates in the supervision of police work (Weber in Kdd&r 
2001 pp. 52-53).
One important institution for the promotion of human rights is the Polish 
parliamentary ombudsman, the Commissioner for Citizen’s Rights (Rzecznik Praw 
Obywatelskich). The first ombudsman’s office was established in 1988, and it is 
regulated by the Constitution (Articles 208-212) and the Law of July 15, 1987. The 
Commissioner was created by the communist regime in an attempt to seek domestic 
and international legitimacy through new institutions, such as the High 
Administrative Court (1980), the Tribunal of State (1982), and the Constitutional 
Court (1985). It was a concession to society by a weakening regime in the context of 
economic problems. The communist regime expected that the Commissioner would 
be easy to manipulate, and in this sense, as Ewa Letowska herself explains, it was not 
“accidental” that she was appointed as first Commissioner, a woman with no political 
affiliations or prior involvement in public activity114. However, as she points out 
“[c]ommunist politicians accepted the concept [of ombudsman] while having only a 
vague idea of what the office was and could be” (Letowska 1996 p. 2). The 
consequence was an inconvenient surprise for the regime. Since its creation, the 
Commissioner has presented a high level of authority on all matters without 
restrictions, including cases related to security affairs. As a properly functioning 
Commissioner is perceived as inconvenient by any kind of authority, much of the 
success of the Commissioner’s office in consolidating its power and independence 
has been attributed to the timing of its creation, during the weakening of the 
communist regime and before consolidation of a democratic government (Letowska 
1996). Within 10 years, the Commissioner’s requests were not respected by the 
administration in only 3% of its total cases, illustrating the respect gained by this 
institution (Kurczewski in Priban and Young 1999 p. 188).
The Commissioner’s office has a special team to examine individual complaints 
against police activity. They may examine all relevant documents related to the 
complaints, except those constituting state secrets. When facing obstacles at the
114 Interview with Letowska.
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police unit involved, the Commissioner approaches the KGP and MSWiA for 
cooperation. The rights of soldiers and of public service officials regarding service 
relationships, conditions of service115, and training of police officers are also the 
purview of the Commissioner (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2000 pl_03.htm pp. 1- 
2). The problem of discretionary disciplinary proceedings, both in regard to the 
decision to examine a complaint and presenting evidence, has been raised by the 
Commissioner’s work since discretion in disciplinary matters may contribute to 
offences or other violations of the law for ordinaiy citizens as well as members of 
police forces. However, the Commissioner may demand disciplinary measures or 
institute proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal and the High Administrative 
Court, and may file extraordinary appeals with the Supreme Court against any court’s 
final verdict.
Another enormous contribution of the Commissioner to the democratisation process 
in Poland has been developed through its educational function of promoting the rule 
of law in relation to the public and the political establishment, especially when 
making reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and the decisions 
formulated by the European Human Rights System (Letowska 1991). It has educated 
public officials and citizens about the language of human rights and permitted them to 
become familiar with regional mechanisms for human rights protection.
Oversight of police activities is also provided by NGOs, such as the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights116 and Amnesty International, and other organs of the 
Council of Europe and the EU. This occurs mainly through monitoring of the human 
rights situation as we have seen in Chapter One in the discussion about the European 
institutional context.
The 2001 Law on Access to Information also imposed on the MSWiA the obligation 
to create an Internet Public Information Newsletter. There is an effort to make the 
police institution more transparent and accountable. In this sense, the public now has
115 Including: wages, housing privileges, conditions of service, disability and retirement pensions.
116 The Helsinki Committee in Poland was founded in 1982 and worked in the underground until 1989. 
With the democratisation process it was able to emerge from its clandestine work and establish the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. The Foundation develops supervision, educational and 
research activities.
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access to general information related to the police, including some information about 
disciplinary and criminal proceedings. In fact, there are different cross-check 
mechanisms responsible for overseeing police activities.
Despite the prevalent difficulties in prosecuting police officers, the concern 
expressed by human rights organisations about the lenience of criminal sentences, 
and certain regression in the matter of using firearms, the fact is that human rights- 
oriented control mechanisms have been consolidated and are constantly activated in 
Poland; and most important, they have been able to limit distortions and abusive 
behaviour at the police institution.
Human Rights and the Polish Police
In the first periodic visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) to Poland in 1996, it 
affirmed that “numerous persons with considerable experience of the police stated 
that there had been a significant change for the better in recent years as regards the 
manner in which police officers treated persons in their custody”, and that “the 
majority of the persons met by the CPT's delegation who were, or had recently been, 
detained by the police indicated that they had been correctly treated, both at the time 
of their apprehension and during questioning” (CPT Strasbourg, 24 September 1998, 
visit from 30 June to 12 July 1996). Subsequent visits by the CPT to Poland, in 2002 
and 2004117, stated the same. Although the CPT delegation has heard some 
allegations of physical ill-treatment by the police, such as slaps, kicks, punches, 
blows with a truncheon and tight handcuffing for prolonged periods of time at the 
time of apprehension and punches, slaps, threats to use physical force and verbal 
abuse at the time of questioning, “[t]he evidence available about the level and nature 
of police human rights violations provides a rather positive picture at least where 
serious violations are concerned. There are no current indications or allegations of
117 c p t  Strasbourg, 2 March 2006, visit from 4 to 15 October 2004.
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police torture and this suggests the absence of systematic torture on an institutional 
level” (CPT/Inf2002 10 p. 7) " 8.
The greatest concern expressed by the CPT in its reports is related to police treatment 
of intoxicated people and the lack of respect to them. The CPT has also criticised 
Poland because its criminal law has not adopted the CPT definition of torture and 
there are no provisions regarding compensation of victims. There are, however, some 
criminal laws that permit officials to be prosecuted for torture or cruel and inhuman 
treatment119, and held civilly liable as any other public authority.
In its annual 2004 report, Amnesty International (AI) mentioned the report of the 
Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner on his 2002 visit to Poland120. The 
report notes the genuine willingness of Polish authorities to combat the problems
171identified and, at the same time, expresses concern about: (1) reports of ill- 
treatment and death while in police custody; (2) the impartiality of investigation of 
those cases; (3) domestic violence; and (4) racism and discrimination. The Helsinki 
Foundation, in its annual reports for the 2000s, has also expressed concern about 
continued reports of ill-treatment by the police, the lack of effective mechanisms to 
investigate those cases, and the extension of police power to use firearms. 
Nevertheless, the European Commission’s 2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress 
towards Accession states that “there is no evidence of systemic or systematic 
mistreatment in police custody” (European Commission 2002).
In fact, the vast majority of cases against Poland filed at the European Court of 
Human Rights -  in 2005 there were 4,744 cases -  are related to excessive court 
delays. Due to the pressure produced by the high number of cases at the Court, the
118 Ten officers in 1999 and 12 officers in 2000 were convicted for securing confessions “under 
duress” (CPT/Inf2002 10 p. 7). In 2000, isolated cases of infliction of electric shocks and blows to the 
soles o f the feet were reported to the CPT (CPT Strasbourg, 23 May 2002, visit from 8 to 19 May 
2000).
119 Interview with Platek.
120 Poland has not been the subject of specific reports presented by AI and Human Rights Watch 
(HRW).
121 The document “Security Services in a Constitutional Democracy - The Principles of Oversight and 
Accountability (1997)” elaborated by the Helsinki Foundation and the Centre for National Security 
Studies is broadly accepted by other human rights NGOs — the International Helsinki Federation, 
Amnesty International, Article 19 and the International Commission of Jurists -  and was presented as a 
special publication of the Polish Government (Rzeplinski 2003 p. 115).
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Polish government introduced a new law to facilitate the formulation of complaints 
by citizens against the excessive delay of court proceedings. In Poland, the number 
of court cases lasting for more than five years is estimated at 6,300; the average for 
court proceedings is six months in most of the country, 18 months for Warsaw and 
29 months for central Warsaw (Freedom House 2005 pp. 3 and 14).
It is important to observe that regional and international human rights mechanisms 
have played an important role in Poland from the beginning of the transition, 
providing concrete tools for Polish organs. The European Convention entered into 
force in Poland in 1993, and is considered the first positivation of human rights in the 
country122. Various external monitoring activities have helped to introduce and, to a 
certain extent, make the use of existing regional and international instruments routine.
Regional Cooperation
After 1989, Poland started receiving assistance from Western police institutions in 
order to reform its forces. The assistance, which included police training and the 
donation of police equipment, reached practically all areas of police work and was 
aimed at the implementation of Western models. The earliest and most significant 
assistance came from England, France, Germany and the U.S. Currently there is 
formal cooperation with foreign police forces, mostly in the areas of training and 
crime control, especially related to organised crime, the effects of migration 
movements, and terrorism (interview with Zygmunt).
The U.S. was the first country to provide assistance in police training to Poland after 
1989. In cooperation with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the 
1990-1996 period, 318 officers were trained in the U.S. and 196 in Poland 
(Hungarian Helsinki Foundation 2001). In 2002, the U.S. Department of State signed 
an agreement on law enforcement cooperation with the MSWiA. The total value of 
the assistance package was US$1,318,708, and it included the following projects to 
be developed in subsequent years: (1) Anti-Corruption Curriculum Development, (2)
122 Interview with Letowska.
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Combating International Organised Crime, (3) Courtroom Security, (4) Support to 
the Financial Intelligence Unit, and (5) Police Modernisation and Training (U.S. 
Department of State 2002).
Since 1990, Poland has had an agreement on police assistance with the British and 
French police. Between 1990 and 1996, 325 officers were trained in England and 528 
were trained by the British Police in Poland, while 286 policemen were trained in 
France and 1,194 were trained in Poland by French missions. France has been 
responsible for the highest number of policemen trained, it is the main type of 
assistance France provides since it does not give money for police; it only offers 
loans for buying equipment123. During the 1990s, Poland also signed agreements on 
police assistance with Germany and Austria. Germany has been responsible for most 
of the equipment obtained by the Polish Police under an agreement between both 
countries to deal with the effects of migration movements. Canada, the Netherlands 
and occasionally Japan and Israel are other countries from which Poland receives 
police training assistance (Hungarian Helsinki Foundation 2001).
Since 1996, there also have been training exchanges between Poland and Hungary 
under an agreement signed by both countries. In 1997, the International Centre for 
Specialised Police Training was established in Poland with the objective of 
conducting research on international crime in that part of Europe, training police 
officers, and drafting relevant laws. The Polish police force was responsible for most 
of the costs related to the Centre (Hungarian Helsinki Foundation 2001). The 
tendency now is for most of the police assistance provided by EU members to be 
channelled by the EU through different programmes and organs at its Third Pillar: 
Justice and Internal Affairs124.
All the support received by the Polish police results from agreements with other 
police institutions signed by the Polish government. Despite this, there are also 
complaints that not all programmes developed by the training assistance from 
Western partners are suitable for Polish needs. At the Office of the Police
123 Interview with Cordech.
124 Interview with Coderch.
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Commander in Chief, the Police International Cooperation Development Department 
is the division responsible for writing, developing and coordinating police bilateral 
and multilateral proposals for cooperation with police forces from other countries 
and with regional and international organisations. It is also responsible for 
disseminating standards of international cooperation at police organisational units 
(Journal of Laws, 23 January 2006 Annex 9).
In 2002, Poland signed the Europol Convention, and with its accession to the EU in 
2004, Poland became member of the Europol. First mentioned in the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), Europol became fully operational in 1999. Europol presents the 
advantage of promoting cooperation among police institutions, at least on specific 
issues, through a multilateral mechanism, diminishing a country’s concern of getting 
involved in police assistance and helping to avoid distortions in the public security 
agenda of one country by imposition of the interests of another country. At the same 
time, Europol is a peculiar institution that raises much concern regarding its nature. It 
cannot be considered a European Police since a European State as such does not 
exist. Human rights NGOs and the European Parliament have manifested 
apprehension regarding the development of Europol. Whether it will be used as a 
database centre or will work as an operational police force has yet to be defined. 
Europol has been developed without the establishment of organs for its supervision 
or any control mechanisms. There is the danger that it will become a “repressive 
federal system” without being subject to oversight by any democratic bodies 
(European Parliament report).
As a member of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Poland has the obligation to observe a number of 
documents, such as the Council of Europe Declaration on Police (1979), the 
European Code of Police Ethics (2001), and the OSCE Charter for European Security 
(1999). However, it is not clear whether Europol is subjected to regional mechanisms 
and which obligations it assumes.
Since 2004, Poland is also part of the EU’s Schengen agreement. This implies not 
only enforcing the outer borders of the EU, but also tightening international 
cooperation in fighting international crime and different forms of lawbreaking.
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Although the EU has not yet developed a clear human rights policy for its own 
members, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the regional standards developed by the 
Council of Europe are a strong reference for the EU itself and for EU members, all of 
them members of the Council of Europe as well.
Towards Human Rights and the Rule of Law
The advantage of police reform in Poland is that it was considered crucial in the 
beginning of the transition and started early in the process. The Polish Police Law 
(1990) promoted a rupture with the militarist traditions of the police and provided the 
legal conditions for further changes in the police institution.
The constant presence of police control in the daily life of the Polish people brought 
about the discussion about the legitimacy of the police. Police officers themselves 
were discontent with the party control and concerned about the image of the 
institution. Nevertheless, the reform was not a police initiative. It was a political 
decision by the government, and was successful because there was a network of 
NGOs and regional institutions that paid attention to legal reforms, the penitentiary 
system, and human rights issues. The work of those formal and informal institutions 
was important in making information about the human rights situation accessible, 
promoting an education on human rights, and strengthening interaction between 
regional institutions and emerging local entities.
Already in the 1970s, with the Helsinki accords, the human rights concept was the 
leading concept of civil society; it was not democracy or democratisation125. 
Dissidents believed that it was not possible to change the system, but to pressure for a 
more “civilised communism” and, at the same time, the former regime did not deny
17Athe discourse of human rights . The Helsinki process and the consolidated European 
Human Rights System were very important in supporting civil society. During the 
transition, regional and international human rights instruments became the normative
125 Interview with Lasocik and Platek.
126 Interview with Lasocik.
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standard applied, and since 1992, these have become binding norms (Kurczewski in 
Priban and Young 1999 p. 186).
The EU, and the intention of Poland to join it, has also played an important role in the 
consolidation of a democratic rule of law by making the Constitution more visible127. 
The struggle for a new constitution, as Priban and Young (1999 p. 6) argue, “must be 
understood in the context of the symbolic value of constitutions and their cultural and 
integrative functions”. In the Communist regime, the Constitution was an empty 
institution (Kurczewski in Priban and Young 1999 p. 186) that was kept for some 
years under the new regime. In 1992, a constitutional law, which became known as 
the Little Constitution, defined the relations between legislature and executive, but it 
was a temporary instrument that preceded the drafting of the new constitution (Priban 
and Young 1999 p. 7), which was finally put to a popular vote in 1997128. The process 
of writing a new constitution was long, with forward and backward actions; and as 
the first country from Eastern Europe to initiate the transition, many international 
observers were following the Polish process.
Police reform is a lengthy, continuous and sometimes non-linear process, as is the 
democratisation process itself, and the Polish case is not an exception. Police reform 
faced limitations from the resistance that still exists within the institution along with 
the increasing concern with public safety. With the transition came a general concern 
with property crime and vagrancy, and the rise of criminality was perceived by a 
significant part of the population as a result of the ‘excessive liberalism’ of state 
institutions. Some authors argue that the objectives of the police changed from 
primarily sustaining the political system to a social control that no longer serves only 
the party but the different social powers that emerged. The regression in socio­
economic rights followed by a rapid progress in consumer protection is also 
indicative of this (Koszeg in K£d£r 2001 pp. 2-3).
Without ignoring all the old and new concerns related to policing in Poland, it is not 
possible to deny the major steps taken in the direction of creating policing standards
127 Interview with Platek.
128 The 1997 Constitution only mentions the police in Article 103.2, where it states the prohibition 
against police officers, soldiers, prosecutors, judges and other civil servants holding a seat in the Sejm.
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associated with the democratic rule of law. Based on reports from different 
organisations responsible for supervising the human rights situation, we can affirm 
that, in Poland, there are still problems related to police brutality and institutional 
accountability, and some statistics about disciplinary and criminal proceedings may 
support these concerns, but the same reports also indicate the absence of evidence of 
systematic and gross human rights violations.
It is not possible to talk about a completely new police institution, but there was an 
enormous restructuring of the police institution. Poland has been able to change the 
legal status and organisational principle of the police, and this has resulted in a 
positive impact on the trust of the police by the population129. As Plywaczewski has 
argued: “The efficient protection of human rights during police interventions depends 
not only on the congruence of Polish law with international standards, but also on the 
ability of citizens to initiate control of police activities through the prosecutors and 
courts, as well as on the right to obtain compensation for loss or injury suffered. In all 
these aspects, the Polish legal system offers significant possibilities for redress, an 
ability supported by the institution of the Ombudsman”, (Plywaczewski in Das and 
Marenin 2000 p. 170). The possibility of real change in the police institution 
originated with the fact that the control mechanisms were developed from the very 
beginning. To a great extent this was possible because the democratisation process 
was framed within a regional environment which supported it.
129 Interview with Cybulski.
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Chapter 6 - Ecuador: Skipping Police Reform
Introduction
In Ecuador the discussion about the police forces did not follow the democratisation 
process. In fact, it has come very late in the political agenda. Only in very recent 
years is it possible to find some initiatives in this direction. The keynote during three 
decades of political democracy has been a complete lack of interest in the police 
institution by governments, political leaders and academics.
Following the analytical approach used in the case of the police in Poland, in this 
chapter I analyse the Ecuadorian police and the problem they pose to democracy 
through the same four major categories: (1) continuity from non-democratic regimes; 
(2) the lack of external control mechanisms; (3) the human rights situation; and (4) 
their interaction with regional politics.
The Police History: A Partisan and Military Affair
The current national police have their origins in the “Police of Order and Security” 
created by President Jos6 Maria Pl£cido Caamano (1883-1888) on 14 June 1884. It 
was only during this Second Republican Period in Ecuador (1884-1938) that the 
police force was defined as a state institution for the first time. From its inception it 
possessed a strongly partisan and openly politicised character. Under the Ministry of 
Government, it was immediately incorporated by the government into the fight 
against the liberals. Although thought of as a civilian force, the police were organised 
militarily and their members were called “soldiers of the police”. However, this 
militarised period lasted for only a few years. In 1892, the police structure was 
demilitarised by President Luis Cordero Crespo (1892-1895). The revamped structure 
would last for almost four decades, until it was converted into the current institutional 
structure.
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In 1923, through a new General Regulation (Reglamento General), the police had 
their name changed to “National Police” by President Jos6 Luis Tamayo (1920-1924), 
and in 1925, the national government created the first police academies in Quito and 
Guayaquil with the support of a French police mission. Nevertheless, the most 
important changes would be promoted in 1938 by President General Alberto Enriquez 
Gallo (1937-1938), who is considered the founder of the police as a public institution 
and the main person responsible for its professionalization. Through “Supreme 
Decree 219” signed by President Enriquez Gallo on 4 January 1938, the police had 
their name changed to “Police Forces” and gained a new military structure and 
hierarchy130. Again, on 8 July 1938, the name of the institution was replaced by the 
“Police Corps” (Cuerpo de Carabineros), and the Military School for Police was 
created. The police forces were similar in construction to the Chilean Carabineros, a 
police and military hybrid.
The further militarisation of the police was promoted by President Arroyo de Rio 
(1940-1944) in order to protect his government from political pressures from the 
military. With the loss of a significant part of Ecuadorian territory after the war 
against Peru and the signing of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro on 29 January 1942, 
tensions between the military and the government increased. In 1944, the presidency 
of Arroyo del Rio was overthrown by a military-popular insurrection -  “La Gloriosd’ 
-  and, on 6 June 1944, the “Police Corps” was once more transformed into the 
“National Civil Guard” in an attempt to diminish its military character or at least to 
disguise it.
The police force was introduced in the Ecuadorian Constitution for the first time in 
1946. The Constitution mentioned a civil police force because it was understood that 
the police had always been military. Since the 1940s, the name of the police has 
changed a few more times. On 31 October 1951, the National Congress converted it 
into the “National Police”; on 21 March 1973, President General Guillermo 
Rodriguez Lara changed it again to “National Civil Police”; and finally, on 28 
February 1975, that same president changed it back to “National Police.” Although 
the name changes were attempts to attribute a civilian character to the police, the
130 The first law related to the police personnel, in 1938, was entitled “Law of the Military Situation 
and Promotion of the Police Forces” (Ley de Situation Militar y  Ascensos de las Fuerzas de Politia).
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institution has kept the same military hierarchy, discipline, organisational structure, 
and doctrine established in 1938.
The military character of this hybrid institution has fed the eagerness of the military 
to control the police for decades. During the National Constitutional Assembly (1997- 
1998), installed after the fall of populist President Abdald Bucaram in 1997, there was 
much debate and controversy about the role of the public forces in the country. In this 
episode there was a confrontation between the police and the military at the National 
Assembly of 1998 (Garcia 2005). More than 17 years after changing regimes, there 
were still military attempts to convert the police into a fourth branch of the Armed 
Forces. Although these proposals presented by the military have not been considered, 
in the 1998 Political Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador the police are still 
defined as an auxiliary force of the Armed Forces for the defence of national 
sovereignty.131 Under a state of emergency decree, which is not exceptional in the 
Ecuadorian socio-political instability context of recent years, the police become 
subordinate to the Armed Forces. In a broad and controversial interpretation of 
Article 180 of the 1998 Constitution, which states the possibility of a decree of 
emergency in situations of “serious internal commotion”, 132 there have been cases in 
which a declaration of a state of emergency was justified by a high crime rate. During 
the government of President Gustavo Noboa (2000-2003), the city of Guayaquil was 
under a state of emergency for months by virtue of this allegation.
The 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution (Article 183) gives a very general definition of the 
role of the police. However, the 1999 Organic Law of the National Police133 attributes 
a variety of functions to the institution, in the following order: (a) preservation of
131 1998 Constitution, Title VII about the Executive Function, Chapter 5, Article 183 states:
“The public force will be constituted by the Armed Forces and the National Police. Their mission, 
organization, preparation, application, and control will be regulated by law.
The fundamental mission of the National Police will be to guarantee public security and order. It will 
constitute an auxiliary force of the Armed Forces for the defense of national sovereignty. It will be 
under the supervision, evaluation, and control of the National Council of Police, whose organization 
and function will be regulated by law.
The law will determine the collaboration that the public force will give to the socio-economic 
development of the country, without affecting the exercise of its specific functions.”
132 The other anticipated situations for state of emergency are “imminent external aggression,” 
“international war”, and “natural catastrophe”. It is the responsibility of the President to declare a state 
of emergency and determine whether it applies to the entire national territoiy or to specific parts of it 
and to determine the extent of its effects - that is, which rights it suspends (1998 Ecuadorian 
Constitution, Chapter 4).
133 Law 109, Title I, Article 4.
171
peace, order, and public security; prevention and repression of crime; (b) participation 
in crime investigation; (c) custody of law breakers; (d) prevention, repression, and 
investigation related to drug trafficking and drug use; (e) cooperation with the justice 
administration; (f) external security, and in case of emergency also internal security, 
of the detention centres; (g) planning, execution, and control of activities related to 
traffic and transport; (h) control of migrant movements and alien residency in the 
countiy; (i) cooperation in the protection of the ecosystem; (j) collaboration in the 
social and economic development of the country; (k) guaranteeing citizens’ 
individual rights and protecting private property.
It is interesting to observe that the function of the police related to the drug trafficking 
and use is specifically defined in the law. It is even listed before the protection of 
individual rights which, in fact, is listed last among the eleven specific attributions. 
This illustrates the orientation of the police toward crime repression rather than rights 
protection. These functions are not necessarily exclusive, but the emphasis placed on 
one or the other may point to different approaches to policing. Among the police 
functions listed, it is also interesting to see the reference to police collaboration in the 
socio-economic development of the countiy. The National Division of Public 
Security (Direction Nacional de Seguridad Publica) was established to advise the 
police operational units and the central government on decisions regarding political 
and socio-economic problems regarding the factors that alter public order and 
threaten the state’s internal security. This power has to do with the militarisation of 
the institution in a country where the military have a multifunctional character134 and, 
still in the 1998 Constitution, are the guarantors of the constitutional order135. During 
the dictatorship, the police were practically subordinate to the military, especially 
regarding secret and intelligence services. With the democratisation process, the 
police have recovered their arena for action but have kept the same military 
orientation based on the Brazilian National Security Doctrine.
134 Arms control is the responsibility of the army, and civil aviation is controlled by the Air Force, just 
to mention two examples of activities attributed to the military. The military also participate in a wide 
range of businesses: they own ammunition and uniform factories and participate in steel, 
metalworking, chemical, cement, and ceramics industries (Fitch 1998 pp. 106-133). They also own a 
Marriot Hotel in Quito.
135 1998 Constitution Article 183: “The Armed Forces have the fundamental mission of conserving 
national sovereignty, defending the integrity and independence of the state, and guaranteeing its 
juridical order”.
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The National Security Law left by the military as they stepped out of the government 
in 1979136 expresses the National Security Doctrine. The construction of a public 
security force based on the idea of combating an “internal enemy” is embedded in the 
police institution and in its approach to criminality. The “enemy” has changed since 
democratisation started, from communists and “subversive” groups to drug-traffickers 
and common criminals; however, the police approach to security has not been 
modified. In fact, until the beginning of the 1990s the police command was held by a 
military officer and the professors of the Police Academy were military. In 2009, the 
National Security Law was finally repealed by the Public and State Security Law; 
however it is too soon to evaluate any impact on policing.
The mixture of the concepts of defence and internal security has left many legacies in 
the police institution, including its secrecy. Despite the promulgation of the Law on 
Transparency and Access to Information in 2004, it is still very hard to get 
information from the police institution. For this reason, to a great extent this chapter 
is based on interviews. One police report (National Police 2005) lists 40 themes that 
must be restricted, all of them justified as internal security issues. Among them are 
specific cases and issues such as indigenous movements and organisations, labour 
and student unions, various social movements, political parties, corruption, strikes 
and protests, the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, and human rights.
The police institution reflects a functional and organisational centralism. The police 
are organised in large, enclosed headquarters containing many police personnel under 
a military model. This organisational character is consistent with the police mission to 
protect the state and maintain public order in a very politically unstable countiy. 
Following the same corporate mentality of militaiy institutions, police officers are 
also isolated from society in their daily life. They have access to a commercial outlet 
(iComisariato de la Policla National) where all types of products are sold at lower 
prices than those found in the open market, and they also have their own social club 
and hospital.
136 National Security Law No. 275 was published in the Official Register (RO 892) one day before the 
inauguration of the first democratically elected president, Jaime Roldds (1979-1981), on 10 August 
1979.
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The police hierarchy is pyramidal (see Table 5) with a great distance between the 
troops (closes andpolicia) at the bottom and the officers at the top, and with seniority 
rather than merit as the main criterion for promotion.
Table 5: Police Population by Rank
Rank Number
General Inspector (General Inspector) 2
District General (General de Districto) 9
Colonel (Coronet) 126
Major {Mayor) 242
Captain (Capitdn) 320
Lieutenant (Tenente) 523
Sub-Lieutenant (Subteniente) 1013
Major Sub-Lieutenant {SubtenienteMayor) 16
First Sub-Officer (Suboficial Primero) 525
Second Sub-Officer (SuboficialSegundo) 849
First Sergeant (Sargento Primero) 2065
Second Sergeant {Sargento Segundo) 2378
First Corporal {Cabo Primero) 3840
Second Corporal {Cabo Segundo) 5630
Police {Policia) 15015
Total 32654
Source: General Command of the National Police, 2005.
The titles of the police officers are military, and the disciplinary code (Reglamento de 
Disciplina de la Policia National121), approved in 1998, still expresses military 
values.138 The code defines the police institution as a disciplinary hierarchical system 
(Article 2); consequently, orders must be carried out without objection or contestation 
(Article 4). Subordination and disciplinary respect must be observed even when a 
policeman is not on duty (Article 6). The code classifies disciplinary misconduct into 
three categories: first class, slight infractions (Article 60); second class, serious 
misconduct (Article 62); and third class, criminal misconduct (Article 64). The 
sanctions for any of these categories may include dismissal, arrest, reprimand, 
extension of the time the person has to serve, and carrying out certain additional 
work.139 First class misconduct includes the failure to salute or respond to a superior’s 
salute (Article 6), washing clothes during unauthorised hours or drying them in 
inappropriate places (Article 17), and failure to salute the national flag (Article 33). 
This military organisation and disciplinary code deny police officers the rights 
afforded to any civil servant; police officers are not allowed to have unions and are
137 Agreement 1070, R.O. 35-28.IX-98.
138 The police also have a Code of Professional Ethics (1992).
139 Sanctions are defined by the Disciplinary Tribunals (1998 Organic Law of the National Police, Law 
109, Article 81).
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under a Draconian code of ethics. In this sense, we find that third class infractions 
include the promotion of or participation in collective demands, as well as protests 
against superiors or against the established internal regime (Article 17.)140
In the National Police General Inspection Office (Inspectoria General de la Policia 
National),'41 which is responsible for the supervision, control, and oversight of the 
disciplinaiy, administrative, financial, and technical-scientific activities of the police, 
there is no systematised data about disciplinary measures or infractions committed by 
members of the police.142 Lieutenant Colonel Pazmifio, who analysed the data for 
2002 (Pazmifio 2003), found a total of 4,449 cases of disciplinary offences or 
infractions and about 200 types of entries in the register, ranging from washing or 
drying clothes in headquarters outside the authorised time to physical aggression and 
rape. The lack of systematisation of this information and the lack of precision and 
rigor in registering complaints indicate a silent intention to keep the institution hidden 
from public scrutiny and control. Of a total of 238 cases specifically identified as 
violations of the Penal Code of the National Police (1960), there were about 80 
different types of listings, and in 80 cases the type of offence is not clearly specified 
(Pazmifio 2003 pp. 50-76).
The most serious legacy from the non-democratic regime and the essence of the 
military character of the Ecuadorian police is the existence of a special forum for 
judging members of the police forces, the National Court of Police Justice (NCPJ). 
Article 187 of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution establishes that members of the 
public force are subject to a special forum for the judgment of offences committed in 
the exercise of their professional work. In cases of common offences, they will be 
subject to the common justice system. However, this Constitution is ambiguous
140 It is also noteworthy that one of the services developed by the National Public Security Office is to 
provide political records for citizens who want to join the police forces; this document is valid for six 
months. The mere concept of political records is alien to a democracy.
141 In addition to the mechanisms established by the 1992 Code of Professional Ethics and the 1998 
Disciplinary Code of the National Police, there is the Police General Inspection Office. It operates 
through the internal affairs units of the various districts and provinces. Specifically for the control of 
financial and administrative activities, this Office has an Internal Inspection Unit (Auditoria Interna) 
and for technical-scientific activities, there is the “Planning Division” (Direccion de Planificacion) 
(1998 Organic Law of the National Police, Law 109, Article 32).
142 It would be necessary to review the archives of the previous years, month by month, and identify 
them from among all complaints filed with the institution. In addition to the lack of access to this 
information, it would be impossible to process all accusations from previous years for the purposes of 
this study.
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regarding which forum has jurisdiction in cases of common offences committed by 
police when exercising their professional work. At the same time, the 1960 Penal 
Code of the Police categorises common offences such as homicide, torture, and 
sexual misconduct that obviously cannot be considered as part of their professional 
functions. Regarding Article 187 of the 1998 Constitution, the Constitutional 
Tribunal ruled that common offences committed by members of the Public Forces 
must be judged by ordinary courts,143 and Transitory Disposition No. 26 of the 1998 
Constitution establishes that the judges who work under the Executive Branch, 
explicitly military and police judges, will be transferred to the Judicial Branch. In this 
sense, in 2001 the National Judicature Council {Cornejo Nacional de la Judicatura) 
presented a bill144 to Congress that would implement this integration. Nevertheless, 
the political instability of the country, the politicisation of the Judiciary, and its lack 
of institutionalisation145 have impeded this reform and left the decision of which 
forum is responsible for judging cases involving police officers to the discretion of 
judges. Usually these cases are sent to the special courts because the judges in the 
ordinary courts do not want to assume them. There are two main reasons for this: 
first, judges are overloaded with too many cases, and secondly, they are not interested 
in getting involved with complicated cases regarding a sensitive institution such as 
the police.
Administratively, the NCPJ is placed under the Ministry of Government, Police and 
Worship {Ministerio de Gobierno, Policia y  Cultos), which means that the police 
judicial system is subordinate to the Executive Branch. In addition to the lack of 
independence of this judicial function and the discriminatory privileging of police 
officers before the law, the court lacks impartiality. It consists mainly of members of 
the police institution in active service, and in the superior levels of the appeals courts,
143 In a conflict of jurisdiction between the military justice system and the ordinary court in a case of 
embezzlement involving high officials of the National Navy, the Constitutional Tribunal emphasized 
that Article 187 of the 1998 Constitution only authorizes a special jurisdiction for members of police 
forces in cases of alleged infractions committed in the exercise of their professional work. The crime 
of embezzlement, ruled the Court, is not of a strictly military nature, and, obviously, embezzlement is 
not part of their professional work. Sentence No. 002-2202-CC, issued on 19 February 2003 and 
published in the Official Register on 26 February 2003, pp. 21-28 (Cited in Amnesty International 
2004).
144 Bill of Legal Reforms for the Jurisdictional Unit (Proyecto de Reformas Legates para la Unidad 
Jurisdiccional), Official Note No. 545-SCNJ 2001.
145 One of the factors that motivated the street protests in Quito that led to the fall of President Lucio 
Gutierrez in April 2005 was the dismissal of the Supreme Court of Justice on 8 December 2004. It is 
illustrative of the problems Ecuador has faced in strengthening the rule of law.
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by officials in inactive service; in both cases all officials are subordinate to the 
hierarchy and discipline of the police institution.146
Between 1985 and 1995, the NCPJ initiated 4,568 cases. Of this total, in 1995, only 
five cases had conviction sentences; 46 had provisional sentences and 1885 cases 
were shelved.147 In addition to the very low number of conviction sentences, a 
comparison with the number of accusations received by the Ecumenical Human 
Rights Commission (CEDHU is its Spanish acronym) suggests that very few of the 
total number of cases of human rights violations reached the court since most of the 
cases initiated were not related to criminal offences. Unfortunately, the record does 
not differentiate among types of crime; the conviction sentence can relate to crimes of 
homicide as well as desertion. For the same period, CEDHU received 3,421 
accusations of serious human rights violations (see Table 6).
Table 6: Accusations of Human Rights Violations Received by CEDHU (1985-1995)
Type o f Violation Number o f Accusations
Homicide 241
Torture 630
Physical Aggression 1127
Arbitrary Arrest 1423
Total 3421
Source: CEDHU Database 1997.
The vast majority of the cases received by CEDHU were allegedly perpetrated by the 
police (see Tables 7 and 8).
Table 7: Accusations of Torture Received by CEDHU.
Accusations 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Perpetrated 
by Police
41 64 62 38 47 37 32 41 56 28 20
Total 50 88 84 46 61 56 39 54 67 50 34
Perpetrated 
by Police 
(%)
82% 73% 74% 83% 77% 66% 82% 76% 84% 56% 59%
Source: CEDHU Database 1997.
Table 8: Accusations of Physical Aggression Received by CEDHU.
Accusations 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Perpetrated 
by Police
19 60 55 77 83 101 69 59 67 40 43
Total 50 92 89 124 110 171 93 78 115 94 76
146 Organic law of the Judicial Function of the National Police mentioned in Article 67 of the Organic 
Law of the National Police.
147 CEDHU had access to this data because it was provided in 1995 to a national legislator, Pedro Lino 
S&nchez, who was the President of the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the 
National Congress.
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Perpetrated 38% 65% 62% 62% 75% 59% 74% 76% 58% 43% 57%
by Police
(%)
Source: CEDHU Database 1997.
The situation has not changed in recent years. In 2004, there were 1,127 cases 
initiated at the NCPJ; 711 cases were resolved with only 27 conviction sentences. The 
information sent to Congress does not differentiate among the types of crime or 
offences that received condemnation sentences, but even if the 27 convictions were 
related to the most serious accusations, such as crimes against life, this would 
represent less than about 21% of the cases initiated at the NCPJ (see Table 9), and 
that is not the case. It is estimated that the average length of a trial from beginning to 
end is now one year.148
Table 9: The Most Common Types of Cases Initiated at the NCPJ in 2004
Type o f Case Number o f Cases % of Total Cases
Desertion 205 17.5
Offences against the Existence and Security of the National 
Police
183 15.6
Crimes against Life 127 10.8
Offences against the Police Oath 118 10.0
Abuse of Faculties 94 8.0
Robbery 82 7.0
Insubordination 54 4.6
Abandonment of Service 51 4.3
Extortion 51 4.3
Total 965 82.8
Source: Based on information provided by the NCPJ, on 30 March 2006.
In 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights prepared a report on the 
human rights situation in Ecuador (CIDH 1997). The report observed problems 
related to the existence of special military and police courts of justice, and it 
recommended that only the cases involving offences of a military or police nature 
should be brought to these special courts. The NCPJ was also the topic of the 
Amnesty International Reports on Ecuador in 2003 and 2004.
Policing and Human Rights: Breaking the Law
During the 1980s it was the issue of subversive groups that dominated police work. 
The enduring legacy of dictatorships permitted the second directly elected president
148 Information provided by Cesar Duque (Interview: 16 February 2006).
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of this democratic period, Le6n Febres Cordero, leader of the Social Christian Party 
(PSC - Partido Social Cristiano), who represented the conservative right oligarchy of 
Guayaquil City, to establish a very repressive government (1984-1988).
He created a centralised repressive apparatus based on the military and on the police 
special operations group, GOE {Grupo de Operaciones Especiales), and on the 
intervention and rescue group, GIR {Grupo de Intervention y  Rescate). A special 
force was also created at the Criminal Investigation Service149 {Servicio de 
Investigation Criminal) that was popularly dubbed the “Criminal Service of 
Investigation” {Servicio Criminal de Investigation). This special force was formed by 
unidentified members of other units of the police that came together when it was 
considered necessary (Arguello 1997 p. 95). It was a clandestine group inside the 
police organised to combat “subversives,” such Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC), and to 
prevent the infiltration of the “Shining Path” {Sendero Luminoso) from Peru and the 
M19 from Colombia into Ecuadorian territory. The person responsible for designing 
this structure, both within the police force and the militaiy, was an Israeli security 
expert, Ran Gassit, who was hired to plan the security strategy of the government.
Under accusations of human rights violations, including executions,150 forced 
disappearances, kidnapping, and torture, in September 1987, Minister of Government 
Luis Robles Plaza faced a political trial at the National Congress, where he was found 
responsible for those violations. The Special Inspection and Political Control 
Commission {Comision Especial de Fiscalizacion y  Control Politico) and the Special 
Human Rights Commission of National Congress brought together accusatoiy 
testimony and evidence of human rights violations by the police and military 
(Enriquez Bermeo 1988). This “electoral democracy” headed by Febres Cordero was 
more repressive than the years of military dictatorship. All the leaders of the leftist
149 In 1995, it became the Judicial Police, defined as an auxiliary body of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office {Ministerio Publico), and was established as an autonomous body for the first time. The officers 
of the Judicial Police are hierarchically, disciplinarily, administratively and operationally dependent on 
the National Police, but the control and judicial direction of investigations correspond to the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. Their activities have been regulated by the “Criminal Procedural Code” (Codigo 
de Procedimiento Penal, Law No 000. RO/Sup360, 13 January 2000).
150 Usually, the executions were made to simulate a confrontation between the police and the victims. 
In Ecuador these situations were called “ley de fu g d \  a practice justifying the murder of a prisoner by 
claiming that he was trying to escape.
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armed group AVC,151 which had first emerged in 1983 as a group of university 
students along with some rural and urban workers, were killed; six of them with signs 
of torture.152 There are many emblematic cases of repression and human rights 
violations involving members of the Armed Forces and the police during this 
period.153
Since the 1990s drug trafficking has dominated internal security concerns. With the 
structure and doctrine from the past still unchanged, human rights violations 
committed by members of the police have not diminished. However, with the lack of 
a political target for repression, police violence and abuse of power have become 
invisible. This invisibility is aggravated by the lack of statistics about human rights 
violations for the country. For this reason, the work of CEDHU is often used as a 
reference for this research. It is the only institution with reliable and continuous work 
in monitoring human rights in the country since 1978, when it was created. The 
reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty 
International are also based on the numbers provided by CEDHU. In fact, CEDHU 
stopped publishing its statistics in its monthly journal - Derechos del Pueblo - 
because they were wrongly manipulated as if they represented the total number of 
human rights violations in the country.
For the period of 1991-2000, CEDHU alone received 2,729 accusations involving 
state agents. There were 5,016 victims of arbitrary arrest, 3,246 of physical 
aggression, 727 of torture, and 304 of homicide (see Table 4 in the Annex). Of the 
235 accusations received in 2000, at least 149 were allegedly committed by the 
police, involving 445 victims.
151 On 19 January 1989, during the Presidency of Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992), AVC members handed 
over their arms and signed an agreement with the government, in which they made a commitment to 
enter civilian life.
152 Information provided by Sister Elsie Monje (Personal interview: 11 August 2005).
153 Just to mention the two most notorious cases: (1) The case of the Restrepo brothers. On 8 January 
1988, brothers Carlos Santiago and Pedro Andres Restrepo, both under 18 years old, were detained by 
the National Police, and later disappeared while under the custody of the police. The case was brought 
to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in 2000 and the Ecuadorian State assumed 
responsibility through a Friendly Solution settlement. (2) The case of teacher Consuelo Benavides. 
Benavides was kidnapped on 4 December 1985, tortured, and executed by members of the National 
Navy. This case was brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. On 19 June 1998 the 
Court issued a decision requiring the Ecuadorian State to compensate her family and investigate the 
case to punish those responsible.
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Table 10: Accusations of Gross Human Rights Violations Received by CEDHU in 2000
Aggressor Victims of 
Homicide
Victims of 
Torture
Victims of 
Physical Aggression
Victims o f
Arbitrary
Detention
Total
Police 21 26 131 267 445
Military 8 9 25 84 126
Other 4 15 9 332 360
Total 33 50 165 683 931
Source: CEDHU Database 2001.
The figures presented by CEDHU are just a small sample of the denouncements it 
receives; most of them are from Quito, where CEDHU is based. Although it is not 
representative of the total universe of cases in the country, it is significant as an 
indication that the violation of human rights by state agents, not only by police 
officers, is routinised. In 2004, CEDHU registered 482 victims of human rights 
violations perpetrated by the police. The continuity of the police institution is possible 
to a great extent because effective oversight mechanisms do not exist.
In the Ministry of Government there is a Directorate of Human Rights, which is 
supposed to collect information about human rights from all the governmental 
agencies. This unit is responsible to the Political Coordination Office of the 
Undersecretary of Government at the Ministry and has no autonomy. In addition to 
the manipulation to which the information is subjected, there is also a serious 
problem regarding the systematisation of the data. There is a total lack of knowledge 
and understanding of the concept of human rights among the officials. This division 
usually engenders all kind of complaints, registered with public agencies, ranging 
from misplacing objects to mistreating public citizens who request information about 
human rights. For this reason, the Directorate of Human Rights has stopped collecting 
information as long as there is no appropriate training for personnel to qualify them 
for this work.154
In 1996, the Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoria del Pueblo) was created and the first 
ombudsman, Julio Cesar Trujillo, was appointed; however, it was only in 1998, with 
the second ombudsman, Milton Alava, that the office started to operate and receive 
reports of rights violations. This office has a department specifically dedicated to the 
public forces, but in its first years of existence it gave more attention to consumers’
154 Information provided by Laura Orellana (personal interview: 17 August 2005).
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rights. In 2000, ironically, Alava was dismissed by the National Congress on 
corruption charges. Claudio Mueckay took over as interim ombudsman until 2005, 
when he was finally elected by Congress. However, his election was contested by 
human rights organisations, due to Mueckay’s connections with the PSC and also to 
some accusations of corruption during Alava’s tenure in the ombudsman’s office. 
Because of these accusations, a judge declared the post vacant, using an instrument of 
“protection” {amparo). This decision has been appealed by Congress, but with the 
process of establishing the new Supreme Court, the decision was delayed. As a 
result, the Ombudsman’s Office was, for months, in the hands of the “interim of the 
interim”. The National Congress has a Human Rights Commission; however, no 
government body, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary, has been able to 
develop mechanisms to exercise its function of supervising and monitoring the police 
institution as required by any democratic regime.
In the various texts of laws and regulating documents of the police institution, it is 
possible to discern an effort to incorporate “respect for human rights” into police 
discourse. Article 39 of the 1992 Professional Ethics Code of the National Police, for 
instance, explicitly mentions that critical or extraordinary circumstances, such as a 
state of war, a state of emergency, a threat to national security, internal political 
instability, or any other public emergency, does not justify torture or other cruel and 
degrading treatment. However, as the accusations of human rights violations and the 
lack of control mechanisms make evident, human rights discourse is not anchored in 
concrete measures or practices. The human rights discourse has been followed by 
limited initiatives by some commanding officers to change police education. During 
the last decade, human rights courses have been introduced into the curriculum of the 
police academy, and changes have occurred in the education of police personnel, but 
it is still predominantly militarised.155
Since the 1990s, there has been an agreement with the Latin American Association of 
Human Rights (ALDHU is its Spanish acronym) for the training of some police 
officers to become human rights instructors at the police academy; it is the same 
agreement ALDHU has with the military. For the police officers who graduated
155 Information provided by Professor Carlos Hirose (personal interview: 9 August 2005).
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before the introduction of human rights courses in the educational curriculum, the 
police institution signed an agreement in 2004 with the Ecuadorian Red Cross to 
provide a one week course on human rights. Additionally, the police have reached an 
agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
light of the increasing number of Colombian refugees in Ecuadorian territory. These 
courses are not very well integrated into the police programmes of study; they are 
presented as complementary courses rather than core subjects for police education 
and are organised as short seminars. The ALDHU offers only 10 hours of training and 
the Red Cross offers 16 hours. In fact, there is no evaluation of these courses. A sad 
anecdote regarding the case of the “Eleven of Putumayo” (INREDH 1997) illustrates 
the limited impact these courses have had among the police and the military. In 1994, 
in a joint action, the military and the police arrested 39 small farmers under the 
accusation of being “farm guerrillas” {guerrilleros de finca), that is, farmers who take 
part in activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) when the 
guerrilla force finds it necessary. Eleven of them were kept in the custody of the 
military and were tortured by them before being handed over to the police. In their 
defence against allegations of torture, the military responded that they could not have 
tortured the farmers because they had taken the ALDHU course.156 Similar 
allegations are in the police discourse. Human rights courses have been used as a 
violations-ffee certificate by the military and police. Without reforming the structure 
of the police institution and its doctrine, human rights courses, even if well designed, 
will not be able to change police practices and the authoritarian subculture. On the 
contrary, a discourse without content compromises it and invigorates the 
invisibilisation of human rights violations.
Although formally incorporated in the discourse of the police institution, human 
rights represent ideas and values that are still alien to the Ecuadorian police. When 
interviewing members of the police force, one notices their effort to demonstrate this 
new discourse; however, with the exception of a small group of officials directly 
involved in a dialogue with civil society about reforming the police, it is also clear 
that there is a misunderstanding or superficial comprehension of human rights. It is 
curious to see how human rights receive a “personified” treatment. In the speech of
156 Anecdote told by Sister Elsie Monje (personal interview: 11 August 2005).
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police it is common to hear expressions like “When the case happened, the human 
rights came...,” “The human rights complained about the action...,” or “The human 
rights never show up when a policeman is killed.” These expressions, apart from their 
content, call attention to the construction of the speech. It seems the police are talking 
about a person and not about organisations or movements that defend rights and 
principles. In fact, this treatment of human rights ideas or movements is also common 
in the Ecuadorian media, demonstrating that little about human rights is understood or 
supported in the larger society as well.
Two other changes have occurred recently in the education of Ecuadorian police 
officers: one has been the experience of studying at universities with ordinary non­
police students, and the other is the experience of studying at police academies 
outside of Ecuador, in countries where the police institutions have already started 
their processes of reform. Since the 1990s, some initiatives have permitted officers to 
attend university. To this end, the National Police have signed agreements with 
various universities in Ecuador, predominantly in the areas of engineering and law 
(agreement with the Universidad Tecnica Particular de Loja), information 
technology and physical education (agreement with the Escuela Superior Politecnica 
- ESP), and technical police issues (agreement with the Instituto Tecnoldgico 
Superior). All of these agreements are incentives for members of the police force to 
study at regular universities; however, they derived from technical and instrumental 
concerns of the institution. A novel aspect of this process was an agreement signed 
with the San Francisco de Quito University (USFQ), which created, in 2005, the 
School for Police Sciences. This agreement has an explicit focus on providing a 
humanistic education to the cadets of the Superior Police School. Nevertheless, it has 
generated some controversy inside the police institution for various reasons. The 
USFQ is a very expensive and, therefore a very elitist university. With this 
agreement, students of the Superior Police School are charged a special reduced fee, 
but still it is not accessible to all cadets. It has created the feeling among some police 
officers that the programme is a privilege for the few who can afford to study and 
improve their curriculum vitae, while most members of the police are working hard 
on the streets.157 Others criticise the programme for not responding to the needs of the
157 Interviews with Professor Hirose (9 August 2005) and Captain L6pez (3 August 2005).
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police institution. The first group of cadets to study at this university received, among 
other classes, courses in culinary culture and pottery. Nevertheless, the main criticism 
that should be made is that this attempt to introduce a humanistic vision into the 
education of police is accessible to only a portion of the students at the Superior 
Police School, and these students are not really integrating with non-police students at 
the university since they attend classes separately from other programmes.
In the same vein, there is a concern that the existing proposal to create a technical-
scientific university for educating the police would run counter to the effort of
promoting familiarity between police and citizens and a more humanistic education.
At the same time, if this university is opened to the public in general, and not just to
1police officers, as is the intention for the future, it is not difficult to imagine who its 
students would be: surely they will be people involved with private policing. It would 
contribute to the privatisation of policing by educating any person in technical police 
issues.
The experience with the greatest impact in terms of education and potential for 
institutional change has come from stepping out of the National Police and acquiring 
familiarity with police institutions elsewhere that have begun a process of reform. All 
the questions regarding police reform, as discussed in the previous chapter, that are 
now arising in Ecuador have been debated since the 1980s in Spain, and since the 
1990s in various Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Colombia. The development of this debate and the outcomes derived from this 
process have varied from country to country, but in all of them the debate has 
generated a critical movement that pushes for change and for strengthening the 
normative framework of society for regulating and controlling its public force. Some 
of the officials most involved with the proposal for reforming the Ecuadorian police 
force have studied in Chile, where there has been an extensive debate on the police 
and some reforms.159 Between 1993 and 1998, of the 100 foreign police officers 
studying in Chile, 30 were Ecuadorian.160 However, this opportunity depended on
158 Intention expressed by Colonel Guzmdn, responsible for organizing the university.
159 In 1998, the Chilean government launched the “Comprehensive Plan for Citizen Security” {Plan 
Comprehensivo para la Seguridad Ciudadana).
160 Interviews with Colonel Ruedas (11 July 2005) and Captain Cevallos (19 July 2005).
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personal initiative; there was no institutionalised programme, and it is not the 
predominant type of international cooperation in which police usually participate.
Closed but Not Isolated
Since the 1920s, we can find some kind of international assistance to the Ecuadorian 
police. French, Chilean and Italian missions contributed to the creation of the first 
police schools and initial training programmes. However, the police Division for 
International Affairs was created as late as 1998. This division is responsible for 
keeping records of officials going abroad, but their records date back only to 2002. 
Apart from that, it is difficult to know exactly what this division does, since all 
information about international cooperation and course training abroad is still 
centralised under the General Command (Comandancia General) and most of the 
data are kept secret.161 There are two types of international assistance: training 
programmes, and financial and equipment aid. With democratisation this assistance 
has increased and become more complex.
Most police personnel studying abroad take short courses related to technical issues 
in criminalistics, especially related to drug trafficking. Through those programmes 
many officials have gone to the U.S., Spain, France, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, 
Argentina, Brazil, Panama, and in fewer numbers, to various other countries. 
According to the information provided by the police institution, there are cooperative 
programmes at the National Directorate of Migration (Direction National de 
Migration), the National Directorate of Health of the Planning Department
161 All requests for information must be sent directly to the General Command, which is responsible 
for directing the request to the corresponding police divisions. Without the written authorization of the 
General Command, no division is allowed to provide information. After following this process, the 
only information about international cooperation or assistance provided by the police was a list of the 
permissions given to police officers to go abroad in recent years; this includes travel for health 
treatment and for personal reasons. There was not a word about formalized assistance and cooperation 
for specific areas of the institution. Facing this situation, I tried to get this information through the 
National Congress. Congress member Enrique Ayala, from the Socialist Party and the President of the 
Sim6n Bolivar Andean University, requested the information from the police. After months, the police 
provided partial information. Again, in order to support the impression that they are following the Law 
of Transparency and Access to Information and providing the information requested, they prepared a 
long list of all the equipment donated by the German government, a reference to the assistance 
received by the U.S. but without amounts or details, and some information related to migration and 
HIV programmes. By cross-referencing information with various embassies in Quito, it is evident that 
the police did not want to provide this information even to the National Congress.
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(Direction National de Salud del Departamento de Planificaciori), and the National 
Anti-Narcotics Directorate {Direccion Nacional Anitnarcdticos). Officials at the 
National Directorate of Migration receive training on issues related to Colombian 
refugees from the UNHCR, and on issues related to passport security, visas, and 
detection of false documents by the governments of the U.S., the United Kingdom, 
Spain, France, Mexico and Guatemala. At the National Directorate of Health, there is 
an AIDS prevention project that receives technical and financial support from the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The goal of the project, launched in 2005, 
is to train 80% of the members of the police force in two years. At the National Anti- 
Narcotics Directorate the police have registered the donation of equipment by the 
German government and training programmes promoted by the U.S., which I will 
discuss later. Although they have provided much information, the police have failed 
to supply a complete report, since the cooperation and assistance actually received are 
not limited to the information disclosed, as the following examples indicate.
Since 1998, there has been an agreement between the Ecuadorian Minister of 
Government and Police and the Spanish Minister of the Interior, basically for 
training. According to information provided by the Spanish Embassy, Spain spends 
between US$700,000 and US$800,000 in Ecuador per year for training in the areas of 
drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, irregular migration, and issues related to 
documentation. Training programmes for Ecuadorian police officers are developed in 
Ecuador and Spain as well as in Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia. These 
programmes have trained police personnel in the areas of environment (about 700 
personnel), community policing (about 600), drug trafficking (about 400), 
criminalistics (about 100), and other issues such as transit (about 200). At the 
moment, the biggest project involves community policing, in which between 100 and 
150 police personnel have been trained each year.162
France, through an agreement signed with the police in 1982 and renewed in 1994 
and 2006, and an agreement signed with the Public Prosecutor in 1998 and also 
renewed in 2006, is the leading country in training efforts; it is the country that trains 
the highest number of Ecuadorian police personnel. Due to the entry into force of the
162 Interview with Julidn Marin y Rios (29 May 2006).
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New Criminal Procedures Code (2000), the main training programme has been in the 
area of the judicial police. It started to work with prosecutors in an attempt to base 
justice more on an accusatory model than on the inquisitorial system.163 An 
advancement in the 1998 Constitution was the definition of the work of the judicial 
police under the Judiciary. Although Public Force is a special chapter of this 
Constitution, the Criminal Investigation Police, that is the Judicial Police, are defined 
in the chapter regarding the Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, the process of 
applying the new code has not been easy, especially in coordinating the work of the 
prosecutor and member of the police. France also provides training in the areas of: 
maintenance of public order, technical and scientific police, and support to 
intervention groups such as GIR. Recently, France started working on operational 
cooperation in the areas of drug trafficking, irregular migration, and forgery of 
documents. Until 1995, French trainers were directly located in the police schools; 
now they are at the French Embassy and conduct short courses lasting one to three 
weeks.164
Most courses promoted by the U.S. and the U.K. are short courses related to 
intelligence and anti-narcotics with a certain amount of coordination between these 
specialties. The U.S. also pays for courses for Ecuadorian police officers in other 
Andean Region countries -  Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. In many cases, the U.S. 
promotes the joint training of the military and police, and yet, most of the training 
programmes are given by the military; many are trained at the Western Hemisphere 
Institute for Security Cooperation (Institute* de Cooperation para la Seguridad de las 
Americas), the former School of the Americas (Escuela de las Americas). U.S. 
expenditures for police training in Ecuador ranges between US$700,000 and US$1.0 
million per year, and involves different U.S. bureaucratic agencies and programmes. 
Since 2002, the U.S. has also been involved in the training of judicial police through 
a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programme with the 
Department of Justice, the ICITAP (International Criminal Investigation Training 
Assistance Programme) at the State Department, and the Narcotics Affairs Section
163 In the inquisitorial system, it was necessary to prove the existence of a crime and to identify the 
perpetrators and accomplices during the summary process in order to establish the judicial process. In 
the accusatory system, the summary process is not meant to prove anything, only to investigate.
164 Interview with Jean Pierre Coderch (5 May 2006).
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(NAS) at the U.S. Embassy in Quito.165 Ecuador is also one of seven countries in 
Latin America where the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has special 
investigative units (SIU). The DEA screens police officers prior to receiving training 
in the U.S.; upon their return to Ecuador, these units work on their own or in 
coordination with the DEA (Edwards 2003 p. 8).
On the one hand, because of the rotation system within which police operate, donors 
complain that they give specialised training to officers who stay for a couple of years 
in one division only to be transferred soon to another division. Countries complain 
that they spend a lot of money, yet the advantage provided by their training 
programmes is wasted. For this reason, the U.S. and French programmes started to 
make training assistance conditional on a certain amount of stability in specific work 
assignments. On the other hand, rotation may spread the impact of the training 
programme to the whole institution. The priorities and the approaches on specific 
issues will be reproduced by police officers who have received training, while other 
officials may wish to work on the issues prioritised by other countries in order to have 
the chance to travel abroad. Before the agreements with universities, the training 
programmes represented the only alternatives for studying in academic venues other 
than the police institution.166 This may create the perception among police personnel 
of a hierarchy of activities developed by the institution.
Despite the contribution that training programmes may offer to specific areas, their 
potential impact on the institutional subculture in terms of the central issues of this 
research, as already mentioned, has been produced by the opportunity to study abroad 
in countries that have experienced democratic police reform or where there is an 
ongoing debate that allows police personnel to grow familiar with those issues. The 
opportunity to study lengthy courses in a regular education system allows police 
officers to live together with common citizens and, at the same time, to become 
familiar with the police reforms in particular countries. In this case, the significant 
impact on the institution is not so much to extend it to greater numbers of police 
officers, but for the trained officers to collaborate in forming a critical group within
165 Interview with Ken Keller (16 March 2006).
166 Interview with Captain Cevallos (19 July 2005).
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the institution. Short and technical courses, even if at democratic police institutions, 
are not able to produce the same impact.
The second group of international assistance relates to aid and equipment. Usually 
countries avoid directly aiding police institutions and concentrate their assistance on 
training programmes and the donation of equipment; however, this is not the case 
with the U.S., by far the leading and most important contributor.
In the 2006 fiscal year, U.S. aid in cooperation with Ecuador amounted to 
US$61,590.00 in total (see Table 6 in the Annex). From this amount, US$11,000.00 
is given through the State Department to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, 
trafficking in persons (coyoterismo), and other international crimes.167 According to 
the U.S. Embassy, every year for the last five years, the U.S. has given US$1.0 
million to projects on judicial reform, US$6.0 million to the Armed Forces, and about 
US$8.0 million directly to the police, mainly to the Anti-Narcotics Office (DNA is its 
Spanish acronym), responsible for all activities related to the prevention, 
investigation, and suppression of drug trafficking. Looking at the U.S. projects in 
more detail, we find many correlated projects that increase the figures of the U.S. 
assistance to the police in combating drug trafficking (see Table 11 and Tables 7 and 
8 in the Annex for the years 2005 and 2004).
Table 11: Projects Developed under Agreement between the U.S. and Ecuadorian Governments for
2006
Project
Number
Project Title Personnel Operational
Support
Equipment
and
Supplies
Other
Expenses
Total
01181214
Police
Operations
625,000 500,000 7,000,000 188,000 8,313,000
01181215 Police
Infrastructure
100,000 - 3,465,000 - 3,565,000
01181206 Counter-
Narcotics
Training
100,000 - - 900,000 1,000,000
01181207 Chemical 
Control/ Money 
Laundering
0 0 0 150,000 150,000
01181208 Prevention 0 0 0 150,000 150,000
01181309 Military Projects - 700,000 5,300,000 - 6,000,000
167 All the information was provided by NAS, at the U.S. Embassy in Quito.
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01185210 Investigation
Support
100,000 50,000 300,000 50,000 500,000
01185211 DEA Andean 
Initiative
- - 40,000 - 40,000
01185212 Fluvial Patrol 
Project
- - - 0
01181004 Migration 
Control Project
- - - 15,000 15,000
01181510 Cocoa Project - - 200,000 200,000
Summary Total of Projects 925,000 1,205,000 16,105,000 1,653,000 19,933,000
Source: NAS, U.S. Embassy in Quito, 2006.
U.S. assistance to the Ecuadorian police poses many questions about the definition 
and development of security priorities and policies in the country, since it has an 
enormous impact on the institution, particularly on the DNA which is dependent on 
U.S. aid for its operation. The DNA, according to information provided by the U.S. 
Embassy, has an annual budget for operating activities of only US$700,000,168 The 
largest part of the budget that the police force receives from the state goes to pay 
personnel and other fixed expenditures (see Table 12 and Table 9 in the Annex).
Table 12: Expenditure of Internal Affairs related to Security (2006)
Issue Budget (US Dollars) %
Personnel Expenses 331,632,200 63.4
Service and Consumer Goods 118,844,789 22.7
Financial Expenses 1,847,727 0.3
Other Expenses 4,193,613 0.8
Current Transfers and Donations 11,895,267 2.2
Anticipated Reallocation 8,400,000 1.6
Public Works 19,758,857 3.7
Other Investment Expenses - -
Transfers and Donation for Investment - -
Durable Goods 21,697,882 4.1
Payment of Public Debt 4,666,000 0.8
Total 522,936,315 100.0
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006.
Yet, within the DNA, the Special Anti-Narcotics Mobile Group (GEMA, the Spanish 
acronym for Grupo Especial Movil Antinarcdticos) was created by a Bilateral 
Agreement (Acuerdo Bilateral No. 93-2) between the Ecuadorian and U.S. 
governments on 31 August 1993. It was further defined in a Letter of Understanding 
{Carta de Entendimiento) signed by both governments through their respective
168 Interview with Ken Keller (16 March 2006).
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organs, the National Investigation Division of the National Police and NAS on 17 
April 1995.169
Since President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) declared that illicit drugs are a threat to 
U.S. national security, and later with the Andean Initiative launched by President 
George Bush (1989-1993), the U.S. approach to the drug problem has been one of 
repressive policing that involves the military and police of Latin American countries, 
especially in the Andean Region that is the main drug producer for the U.S. market. 
The U.S. drug control model based on the repression of drug supply has had a 
tremendous impact on the Ecuadorian security apparatus and the justice system in 
general. Although Ecuador has never been a significant producer and has not 
presented serious social problems due to an internal market for illegal narcotics and 
drug consumption, it has developed harsh anti-drug legislation170 that largely affects 
the smallest and most vulnerable offenders (Edwards 2003 pp. 1-2). One of the 
consequences of the penetration of the U.S. agenda and its approach to security is the 
increasing number of inmates in Ecuador; more than 75% of the female inmates are 
in jail due to drug-related crimes (see Table 10 in the Annex). Foreign aid and 
training programmes have concentrated on the drug trafficking issue, while the 
perception of insecurity among the population is related to the increase in common 
criminality (see Table 13).
Table 13: Criminality in Ecuador
Type o f Crime 1975 (%) 1995 (%)
Against Property 23.4 64.3*
Against Persons 0.4 15.6
Drug Offences 13.5 8.5
Other 62.7 11.6
*1994
Source: Colectivo de Abogados, “Por los Derechos de las Personas” Ecuador 1995 pp. 7-8 (in 
Edwards 2003).
169 Under this division in 1988, the Canine Training Centre {Centro de Adestramiento Canino) was 
created with support from the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the governments of 
Germany, England, and the U.S., and Ecuadorian private firms. The creation of this centre was 
justified by the increasing international criminality related to drug trafficking (Official Note No. 437- 
DNA, 10 March 2005 and Official Note No. 595-CAC- DNA of 11 March 2005 cited in the Annual 
Report on the Transparency Law).
170 The Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Law No. 108, which entered into force in 
1991. Anti-drug legislation makes no distinction among drug users, first-time offenders, “mules” in 
possession of small amounts, and high-level drug traffickers. They are all subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence of twelve years.
192
In 1986, Ecuador and the U.S. agreed on joint actions against drug trafficking. In 
addition to the joint training between the police and military promoted by the U.S., 
the Chief of the Southern Command has direct contact with police and military 
officers, and the police intelligence service is infiltrated with a security doctrine 
coming from the U.S.,171 which promotes the “militarisation” of the police institution 
as well as the “policisation” of the Armed Forces. Direct foreign assistance to the 
police institution without any type of coordination and control by the state,172 
aggravated by the strong autonomy of the institution and its lack of transparency, 
compromise the capacity of the state to develop its own agenda on public security and 
create serious distortions in public policies related to security.
Looking for Change: Shifting or Adaptation?
In the case of Ecuador, the lack of concern about the police institution until very 
recently is remarkable. The increasing crime rate that produced a debate regarding 
citizen security, in the beginning mainly at the local government level, concentrated 
on the recovery of public spaces and ignored the police institution. What is interesting 
is that the discussion about police reform has been started, to certain extent, by the 
initiative of the police institution itself through the development, in 2004, of the 
“2004-2014 Strategic Plan for Modernisation and Comprehensive Transformation of 
the Ecuadorian National Police” (Plan Estrategico de Modernization y  
Transformation Integral de la Policia National Ecuatoriana, 2004-2014) in order to 
reform the 1998 Organic Law on the Police. This plan defines the mission, vision, 
policies, objectives, and strategies of the police. Police officers working on the plan 
have identified the following priorities:
1- Implementation of a comprehensive plan for citizen security in the cities, 
where the police have started working closely with mayors through the 
creation of community police.
171 Interview with Colonel Ruedas (11 July 2005).
172 In 2000, President Gustavo Noboa created the Ecuadorian Institute for International Cooperation 
(INECI is its Spanish acronym), Executive Decree No. 611, as an organ of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; it is theoretically responsible for coordinating, administering and supervising foreign 
cooperation and assistance; however, it has no records regarding police assistance.
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2- Decentralisation of locations for to serve the public.
3- Establishment of an accountability system and the development of value 
interiorisation programmes.
4- Reorientation of the education programme and establishment of criteria for 
the promotion of officer candidates.
5- Updating of the police doctrine.
6- Work on the reform of the Organic Law on the Police to be sent to Congress; 
study of the reform of the Law on Personnel and its statutes; reform of the 
Penal Code of the National Police and other laws and institutional statutes that 
are not in accordance with the country’s code.
7- Increase in the level of satisfaction of police officers; reduction of working 
hours.
The plan was a result of several workshops with different sectors of civil society 
organised in different cities throughout the country over a period of eight months. It is 
difficult to say to what extent this plan can lead to a reform of the police institution. 
Clearly, there is personal leadership by a group of officers more familiar with police 
reforms in other countries and more critical to the institution.173 General Carlos 
Calahorrano has argued that “the current challenges to security are criminality, police 
misconduct, and the irresponsible decisions of political and civil leaders.”174 
Although still very limited, this initiative represents an important step in reforming 
the police since it helps to break down the institution’s resistance to open and 
democratic debate.
However, there are also other motivations for “reforming” which raise questions 
about the true extent of this initiative. The main question is how much of this is 
related to the self-preservation of the institution. In recent years, there has been an 
attempt by all sectors of the police to change their image, but thus far it has been 
more a change of image than a genuine change. The police started making an 
assessment of the institution and its functions as a reaction to recent trends: first, the 
rise in crime rates and the increasing insecurity felt by the population; secondly, the
173 Interview with Colonel Ruedas (11 July 2005).
174 Speech at the seminar “Democracy, Security and Defense,” PUCE-Ecuador, Escuela de Estado 
Mayor, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), Quito, 30 May 2005.
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negative image of the institution due to its poor record in solving cases and mounting 
accusations of corruption; and thirdly, the competition imposed by the increase in 
private policing.
As a result, the “Security Zone Plan” s s c d i^ i/ \  was
implemented to introduce the concept of community police into the institution; 
however, it concerns only a small part of the police institution. In 2005, 4,337 of 
36,907 of members of the police were community police175; thus it does not mean a 
significant change for the whole police institution, which has noticeably expanded in 
the last few years (see Table 13) as an immediate response to the perception of 
increased insecurity.
Table 13: Police Personnel.
Year Number of Police Personnel
2001 22,008
2002 26,008
2003 33,303
2004 36,907
2005 36,907
2006 36,907
Source: “Cuadro de Recursos Humanos por sectores, 2001-2006”, Observatorio de Politico Fiscal
The police argument for fostering this proximity to the population is that the police, 
because of their monopoly over the use of force, have treated their “clients” with 
disdain. For this reason, the perception of the police institution is negative, and the 
proliferation of private police forces is now challenging this monopoly. This 
diagnosis may be headed in the right direction; however, the community police, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, are not the answer to all the policing issues, and in the 
police discourse is still missing the notion of citizens and their rights rather than 
“clients”.
Another motivation for the police to pursue certain changes in order to ensure police 
functions and autonomy is the historical competition with the Armed Forces. The 
police institution in Ecuador, as already discussed, has been used by governments to 
counterbalance the power of the military on many occasions. At the same time, the 
military have always had a special prestige, mainly because of the national identity 
built on the territorial conflict with Peru. Ecuadorian history also has many elements
175 General Command of the Police.
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of a nationalism that glorifies the military and that is responsible for its strong 
presence in society and for a vast range of activities in various sectors. With 1998 
Organic Law still based on the National Security Doctrine, there has still been much 
confusion over the functions and powers of the police and the armed forces.
In 2007, Rafael Correa176 took office as president of Ecuador and created a 
commission for the modernisation of the police. The commission presented three 
documents regarding urgent actions to improve police activities, one document with 
recommendations for the constitutional reform and one document to be used as basis 
for the reform on training and management of personnel. In March of 2008, the 
National Plan for Citizen Security (“Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana”) was 
launched. So far, the only significant changes have been those introduced in the new 
Constitution, especially Articles 158, 159, 160, 163 and 188177. These articles define
176 In 2006, Rafael Correa founded the “Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance” Alliance (Patria 
Altiva y  Soberana or PAIS, its Spanish acronym) and ran for the presidency. He defined himself as 
humanist, a leftist Christian and a proponent of socialism for the 21st century. The PAIS Alliance did 
not run any Congressional candidates as Correa based his campaign on the convocation of a 
constitutional assembly. He took office in 2007 and, in 2008, a referendum ratified the new 
constitution drafted by the Constitutional Assembly that had been elected in 2007. Rafael Correa was 
re-elected in 2009.
177 Article 158.- The Armed Forces and the National Police are institutions for the protection of the 
rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens. The fundamental mission of the Armed Forces is the 
defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The internal protection and maintenance of public order are the exclusive functions of the State and are 
the responsibility of the National Police.
Those serving in the Armed Forces and the National Police will be trained under the tenets of 
democracy and human rights, and will respect the dignity and the rights of individuals without any 
discrimination and in strict adherence to the legal order.
Article 159.- The Armed Forces and the National Police will be obedient and non-deliberative, and 
will fulfill their mission in strict subjection to the civil power and to the Constitution.
The authorities of the Armed Forces and the National Police will be responsible for the orders that they 
issue. Obedience to orders from superiors does not exempt those that execute them from responsibility. 
Article 160.- (...)
The members of the Armed Forces and the National Police will be judged by organs of the Judicial 
Branch; in the case of crimes committed within their specific mission, they will be judged by special 
military and police courts, under that same Judicial Branch. Disciplinary infractions will be judged by 
the appropriate bodies as duly established by law.
Article 163.- The National Police is a state institution and is civilian, armed, technically qualified, 
disciplined, professional and highly specialised in nature, with a hierarchical structure. Its mission is to 
ensure citizen security and public order, and to protect the safety and free exercise of the rights of 
persons within the national territory.
The training of the members of the National Police will be based on human rights, specialised 
investigation, prevention, crime control and prevention, and the use o f dissuasion and conciliation 
methods as alternatives to the use of force.
The National Police will coordinate its functions with the different decentralised autonomous levels of 
government in order to carry out its duties.
Article 188.- In applying the principle of jurisdictional unity, the members of the Armed Forces and 
the National Police will be judged by the ordinaiy justice system. Infractions of a disciplinary or 
administrative nature will be subject to their own procedural standards.
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the Armed Forces and the National Police and their functions based on democratic 
and human rights principles, finally eliminating the authoritarian elements that had 
persisted for three decades after the beginning of the democratisation process.
Due to the political instability in Ecuador since 1997, there was discussion, mostly 
among police officers, of creating a ministry of public order and citizen security, 
independent of the Ministry of Government. This proposal had already appeared in 
the 1997-1998 National Constitutional Assembly (AMR 28/010/2003/s p. 7). On the 
one hand, an independent ministry could make the police less vulnerable to political 
issues. On the other hand, it could increase the already great autonomy of the police 
institution. The decision of the presidency in 2009 was to create an Under Secretary 
of Internal Security in the Ministry of Government. It seems superimposed on the 
already-existing Under Secretary of Police and Under Secretary of Citizen Security. It 
is this new under secretary that will be responsible for the announced intention to 
reform the police institution and promote a professionalisation process. The creation 
of this under secretary merits further discussion on the concept of security and the 
concerns orienting these changes; however, that is work for another research 
endeavour, and all the changes promoted since the last Constitutional Assembly do 
not change the arguments presented here.
Although, very recently there have been important changes in the legal status of the
17Rpolice institution , the organisational principles of the police structure are still 
intact. None of the initiatives have effectively pointed to the structural reform of the 
police institution. It resists as a hermetic institution, closed to public scrutiny and 
control. The lack of reliable control mechanisms and the absence of integration with a 
regional network for the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law 
are evident in the Ecuadorian case; in other words, the lack of accountability and a 
problematic regional environment still represent serious weaknesses for further 
democratisation.
The law will regulate the jurisdiction of cases concerning the hierarchy and administrative 
responsibility (2008 Ecuadorian Constitution).
178 Currently there is a National Police Bill presented for debate in the National Assembly of Ecuador, 
but is has not yet been discussed.
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Conclusion
“In sum, policing is a complicated job, a set of 
government organisations and programs, a 
measure and symbol of human rights and 
universal values and an exercise of power and 
politics -  all simultaneously.” 179
Democratisation, as democracy itself, is an open process that encompasses different 
actors and dimensions. Despite the extensive literature on democratisation, it is only 
recently that police forces have been addressed as integral part of the state and not 
only as an instrumental element. The police, with their discretionary capacity and 
specific organisational culture, are also a relevant actor in any attempt to democratise 
state and society.
It is inconceivable to have a democratisation process without encompassing the police 
forces. They should become part of the process; otherwise police practices will 
reinforce authoritarian legacies. In Latin America, after decades, democracy has not 
been able to create democratic and human rights policing. In the case of Ecuador, 
human rights are still a fagade in the discourse of the police, and police reform was 
never an issue in the democratic transition, even in the context of writing a new 
Constitution. It is only in the last few years that it has been introduced into the 
political debate.
It is pertinent to discuss why in some countries it has taken so many years for police 
reform to be introduced into the democratic political agenda while in other countries, 
as in the case of Poland, police forces were involved from the veiy beginning of the 
transition. The explanatory models that have predominated in the debate are not 
sufficient to explain how countries that began to democratise under similar
179 Marenin in Das and Marenin 2000 p. 318.
198
conditions, mostly with regard to political and civil rights, ended up with different 
types of control over similar militarised and centralised police forces.
Transition and modernisation theories have enormously contributed to the debate 
about police reform; however, both explanations miss the regional dimension of the 
problems and processes involving police forces. There is an increasing regionalisation 
and internationalisation of issues imposed on policing, and a diversification of 
influences to which the state and police may be subjected when defining their policies 
and activities. Both explanations disregard the diversity of regional actors and the 
impact that regional politics may have on the police forces.
Comparatively, Poland is the successful case regarding police reform. It was able to 
reshape the institutional doctrine and control the abusive behaviour of the members of 
the police through a reform that came early in the democratisation process. Already in 
1990, the Police Law promoted the demilitarisation of the police and established the 
legal framework for further changes.
The success of the police reform was largely based on the establishment of a network 
among domestic and regional NGOs, and regional institutions concerned with legal 
reforms and human rights issues. Regional human rights mechanisms played an 
important role during the democratisation process in Poland, providing tools for 
Polish bodies and helping to routinise domestic and external human rights 
monitoring.
In the process of preparing for accessing the EU, Poland made an effort to harmonise 
its laws and institutions, including human rights and policing, with those of the EU 
member states. The EU played an important role in the consolidation of a democratic 
rule of law by making the legal state more visible. The offer of permanent 
membership, and the access to an expanding variety of economic and social 
opportunities was a powerful diplomatic instrument. However, the effectiveness of 
human rights protection and the promotion of the rule of law rely on a more complex 
regional network. The simultaneity of the development of the EHRS and of the 
European regional integration process was key in differentiating the European 
institutional development from other regions. On the one hand, EU conditionality
199
imposed during the accession process has been crucial for promoting human rights 
and democracy in the candidate countries. On the other hand, the process of supra­
national institutionalisation itself has been favoured by the Council of Europe’s 
political dynamic; the Council has promoted shared perceptions of interests and 
identities that constitute an important support for regional integration.
It is neither the Council of Europe nor the EU alone that is able to promote and 
protect human rights. The real impact on human rights protection depends on the 
political dynamic of the network established by and around those organisations. Thus, 
the dense institutional environment in Europe has been responsible for creating a 
“regional structure of consent”, and an extensive and effective regional network for 
control.
The institutional context of the Americas is not comparable to the regional law 
enforcement framework developed in Europe. The Inter-American Human Rights 
System does not constitute an element of regional identity and is still more a Latin 
American system than an Inter-American one; as not all the countries in the 
hemisphere have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. It establishes 
different obligations and mechanisms for party and non-party states.
The Inter-American Human Rights System continues to play a paramount role in the 
defence of those rights and, indirectly, of democracy in the hemisphere. Evaluating 
the IAHRS on its own terms, there have been significant advances in the last decade; 
however, in comparison to its European counterpart, the IAHRS still presents many 
problems and faces serious resistance to further development. It is far from allowing 
individual access to the IAHR Court and moving to one permanent and single court.
The absence of the U.S. in the system also creates a paradox in the OAS context. 
Symbolically, and financially, the non-adherence of the U.S. to the American 
Convention represents a serious disregard for the IAHRS. Moreover, the most 
powerful and richest country in the Americas, which attributes to itself the leading 
role in defending human rights, is not subordinate to the same human rights standards 
that other countries are expected to follow. At the same time, the OAS is not 
perceived as a reliable forum due to the predominance of the asymmetric power of
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the U.S. and its position of distrust regarding international judicial regimes. The 
consequence has been an incapacity to develop an authoritative interpretation of 
democratic standards (Levitt 2006) and erratic and uneven actions in the region.
This negative perception of the OAS has greatly contributed to the proliferation of 
alternative regional institutions. Thus far, the multiplication of organisations with 
autonomous agendas in the region has not helped them to strengthen each other or to 
create a powerful and efficient network; on the contrary, the superposition of many 
institutional frameworks has usually undermined power and created competing 
political actors. More recently, the different regional interlocutors -  such as 
MERCOSUR, CAN and the Rio Group -  have begun processes of mutual recognition 
and are moving towards what seems to be a convergent direction. It is not clear what 
approach or pace the OAS will assume with all these regional interlocutors in moving 
toward convergence in the European model, or indeed whether they will converge at 
all. Meanwhile, the hemisphere requires a regional political process that supports 
broad integration and is capable of building a “regional structure of consent” and an 
effective network that is able to promote democracy and human rights.
The lack of long-term perspective based on regional integration, and the prevalence 
of bilateral relations have created a regional context that is less favourable to the 
development and incorporation of regional parameters for democratic policing. The 
case of Ecuador is illustrative of the political dynamic established in the region and 
the detrimental impact it may have on domestic policing.
The U.S. is the number one donor in police assistance to Ecuador, however, despite 
this, it is not subordinate to the same human rights standards that the Ecuadorian state 
is expected to follow and it is rarely held accountable for its assistance policies. U.S. 
foreign policy, and specifically police assistance, has become more decentralised 
among many agencies. The multiplication of source institutions has resulted in 
assistance policies that are less accountable to Congress or other domestic oversight 
mechanisms. All the same, U.S. unilateralism and its ambivalence in relation to 
human rights systems make its less accountable to external oversight mechanisms and 
less visible in other countries (Huggins 1998; Bayley 2006).
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The lack of accountability of U.S. police assistance together with the lack of 
accountability of the Ecuadorian police forces, both domestically and at the regional 
level, have resulted in a perverse influence on public security in Ecuador. U.S. direct 
assistance to police forces, without control by any other body, has: (1) followed 
priorities established in the donor’s public security agenda and this is aggravated by 
the recipient’s lack of an agenda; (2) reinforced the autonomy of the police; (3) 
undermined efforts to make the police forces more accountable; and (4) created a 
distortion within the police institution in relation to the “status” of the work they 
developed -  better equipped units and the offer of more training courses abroad make 
the control of drug trafficking very attractive to police officers, in contrast to crime 
prevention for instance.
Although Moravcsik (2001 p. 347) argues that the primary impact of U.S. 
unilateralism is restricted to U.S. citizens “who might otherwise be able to plead a 
broader range of rights before U.S. courts”, and that “little currently available 
evidence supports the claim of human rights activists that the U.S. ambivalence 
undermines U.S. foreign policy, U.S. human rights policy, or the global enforcement 
of human rights”, in the case of police assistance, the direction of U.S. foreign policy 
has contributed to the undermining of democratic and human rights-oriented policies 
in Ecuador. The unfavourable regional context aggravates the domestic difficulty of 
defining a strategy for reform and puts more emphasis on the quality of individual 
leadership to promote police reform.
In contrast, police assistance in Poland has been framed by: (1) a public security 
policy established according to the country’s priorities; (2) different domestic and 
regional mechanisms controlling police activities; and (3) regional democratic and 
human rights standards incorporated into the country’s political dynamic.
In this sense, the efforts by the Council of Europe to develop rule of law and human 
rights standards for policing, from the establishment of the Declaration on the Police 
in 1979 to the adoption of the European Code of Police Ethics in 2001, has been a 
unique and paramount work in Europe.
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At the same time, European countries have combined regional mechanisms and 
policies related to their internal security affairs; it has been possible because there is 
not a single and asymmetric power influencing security issues in the region. Although 
the main cooperation programmes among the EU members and the ECE countries 
have been in areas of regional security matters, focusing on combating organised 
crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration, and despite the predominance of 
bilateral relations with the ECE countries, the tendency has been to channel police 
assistance through the EU’s mechanisms.
The ECE countries have experienced an “Europeanisation” process that moved them 
into a “European public space” supported by consolidated regional institutions. On 
the one hand, the EU accession process and the European identity, based on human 
rights values, have made democratic policing relevant for obtaining legitimacy at the 
regional level. On the other hand, the EU enlargement process itself increases the 
concern with democracy and human rights; as the new members are countries with 
less consolidated institutions, the original members are concerned with the protection 
of their own regional institutions. The European democracies provide more 
guarantees for human rights and more obstacles to the limitation of their scope. There 
are also a number of counter-balancing actors working in the region.
Regional Impact on Policing
The tension between a narrow and a broad agenda of rule of law assistance 
programmes has generated a false duality between efficiency and accountability of 
institutions. In the judicial system, this tension can be translated into prioritising 
criminal justice assistance based on the order enforcement approach or programmes 
promoting judicial accessibility based on the law enforcement approach. The police 
are also enmeshed in this duality between improving police operational capabilities 
and efficiency, or promoting human rights and democratic accountability of their 
activities. It is in this context that policing issues emerged in the international and 
regional assistance debate, revealing that policing may not be an exclusively domestic 
affair.
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Most bilateral programmes related to police have converged in pursuing order 
enforcement rather than law enforcement. Strengthening citizenship and 
accountability in other countries would hardly be the priority of the bilateral donor 
country; in many cases, assistance programmes may be used as instruments of 
different economic and political rationale that has little or nothing to do with human 
rights and law enforcement. In terms of police assistance, the order enforcement 
approach may perpetuate the abuse of power and corruption by controlling people 
instead of strengthening people’s mechanisms for controlling the police.
Intentionally or unintentionally, regional politics have an impact on policing; they 
may positively overcome the limitations found in domestic politics and support 
democratic reforms or they may create additional obstacles. The consequences may 
be the increasing incapacity of new democracies to control their repressive forces and 
institutional changes that do not follow the priorities of the country itself.
Thus, the regional impact on police forces can be analysed through three channels of 
interaction: (1) the norms created by regional standards; (2) the oversight mechanisms 
operating in the regional community; and (3) the international cooperation or 
assistance ongoing in each region. This requires an integral vision of the police as a 
singular actor with a particular organisational culture and special attributions within 
the state apparatus.
Regional norms are important referential support for police reformers. There is 
already a consensus regarding democratic and human rights policing and the 
development of international and, to a different extent, regional standards; what is 
missing in many cases is their observance and application.
Control mechanisms and public scrutiny are fundamental in any policing 
circumstances. It is the existence of cross-mechanisms of control that can overcome 
the limitations of each instrument and may bridge the gap between the formal systems 
of accountability and the unwritten norms produced by the police culture. It is the 
complementary nature of internal and external instruments, domestic and regional, 
that will guarantee an appropriate control system and help to consolidate democratic 
and human rights policing.
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Police assistance is not a matter of technical and operational strategies; it is part of a 
more complex regional political dynamic with regional and domestic consequences 
for recipient countries. For this reason, governments must resume their 
responsibilities regarding public security policies in order to limit police discretionary 
power and to restrict influence from actors with different motivations and interests in 
security issues.
In sum, foreign assistance to police forces must be framed by: (1) the recipient 
country’s public security agenda; (2) democratic and human rights international 
standards; and (3) oversight mechanisms.
Police reform is part of the democratisation process; however, as police forces are a 
singular part of the state administration, this reform does not present the same timing 
as the transformation of the political system. Police reform is one of a series of 
reforms in the ongoing and open process of democratisation and, as such, should be 
analysed through the different dimensions it implies. The relations between civil 
society and government, between national and regional or international actors are 
largely responsible for the path taken by the police institution during democratisation. 
It is necessary to look at those interactions in order to understand why there are 
differences among countries that follow the same initial transitional path.
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Methodological Appendix
The broad scope of interests of this research -  the regional impact on the rule of law 
and human rights in new democracies - and the sensitivity of the chosen case studies 
-  the police forces - signified particular difficulties for its development. After 
defining the theoretical framework presented in the introductory chapter, I had to 
adopt specific strategies for each part of the research process.
In order to discuss the regional institutionalisation process in Europe and the 
Americas, I used available official institutional information and relied on the 
extensive literature produced about them. Regarding the case studies, I additionally 
opted for in-depth interviews. There are many reasons for this decision. First, in- 
depth interviews make it possible to have diverse perspectives on normative and 
political aspects of police reform. Secondly, they provide an opportunity to learn 
about unwritten rules and interactions that orient police forces. Thirdly, when 
transparency is not part of the political culture, it may help to obtain data that is 
officially unavailable; in some cases, statistical data does not exist at all; in other 
cases, it is not obtainable.
In the case of Ecuador, the lack of statistics available was a serious obstacle for the 
research. There was no statistical data for many crucial issues, such as human rights 
violations perpetrated by police forces and foreign assistance received by the police 
institution. In the process of obtaining information from the Ecuadorian police it was 
also interesting to observe the bureaucratic response they provided. All requests for 
information must be written and addressed to the General Headquarters of the Police; 
for all requests I presented I never received “no” as answer, I always received long 
written answers full of useless information. The same strategy was applied for the 
requests for interviews with high-ranking officers of the police institution. Again, 
they never said no, and usually they sent an assistant to talk to me and supposedly 
help me to make the appointment; this assistant always very kindly answered my calls 
but he was never able to reach his “superior” or confirm his agenda due to different 
excuses. Another similar strategy was to redirect me to police sectors that are not part 
of the real core of the police organisation and operations.
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In Poland, one of the outcomes of the police reform was the increase of transparency 
and public monitoring of the police activities. There is systematised and available 
statistical data. The biggest obstacle for this research was the language. Although 
Polish membership in the EU has helped to make translated information more 
available, not all the information can be found or easily found in English. In any case, 
simply the way requests for information or interviews were answered inspired more 
professionalism; all the requests were quickly and objectively answered.
The list of interviewees presented at the end of this methodological appendix is 
organised by date. The chronological order the interviews took place did not represent 
their relevance for the research as the arrangement for the meetings depended much 
on the availability of each interviewee. Following I present the interviewees by the 
importance of their contribution to this work and the process developed to identify 
and contact them. The differences between the strategies and criteria for the selection 
of interviewees in Poland and Ecuador were based on the different processes that took 
place in each case study. In order to define the first interviewees I started with 
searching if there was academic work on the police in each country. Prior to my 
fieldwork, I also conducted interviews in London with academics and human rights 
NGOs that have developed work on questions related to my research; however, I list 
only the people I personally interviewed in Poland -  during my visits in 2004 and 
2005 -  and in Ecuador -  where I had the advantage of a long stay from 2004 to 2007. 
I do not include the contacts by e-mail180 or prior contact or follow up 
communications with the people I personally interviewed.
On the intervieews
In the case of Poland there was a significant work on the police organised by the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee on Human Rights that resulted in the CD-ROM 
Police in Transition, 2000. The chapter on the Polish Police was written by Andrzej 
Rzeplinski, Professor at the University of Warsaw. Rzeplinski is also a member of the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and actively participated in the debate on the
180 Such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch -  Europe; Interights; Transparency 
International Polska; the Police Human Rights Programme at the Council of Europe.
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police reform in Poland. His interview was the first I conducted in the country and 
was especially important because of his broad view on the topic as academic and also 
as human rights activist. Rzeplinski helped me to identity other important 
interviewees; through him I was able to contact Slawomir Cybulski and Eva 
Letowska, two clue interviewees for this research. Cybulski is a retired police officer 
and researcher on police issues at the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Besides 
his continuing work on the police debate, Cybulski was one of the reformers of the 
police training during the police reform and gave me a relevant internal view of the 
whole reform process. Eva Letowska is a Judge at the Constitutional Tribunal and 
Professor at the Institute of Legal Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and was 
the first Ombudsman in Poland. Letowska played an outstanding role during the 
democratisation process, especially through the incorporation and promotion of the 
European human rights standards in the Polish legal system and the political debate. 
Letowska provided a valuable material and comments about her experience.
At the Academy environment I also contacted Barbara Kunicka, Professor at the 
Institute of Legal Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences who, besides providing 
an important overview of the changes in the Polish legal framework, introduced me to 
Zigbniew Lasocik and Monika Platek. Lasocik is a Professor at the School of Applied 
Social Sciences and Resocialisation of the University of Warsaw and has worked on 
violence and rule of law issues in Poland; we had a very rich discussion on the Polish 
democratisation process and he gave me a relevant overview on the police reform 
within this context. Platek is a Professor at the Polish Association for Legal Studies 
and has developed work on the rule of law issues. Platek helped me with a good 
presentation of the current situation of the Polish legal framework in connection with 
the topics of this research.
At the same time I contacted the regional and national institutions related to the 
democratisation process in Poland and the police reform. I interviewed Denis Petit 
from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at the 
Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Albin Dearing 
responsible for the European Union’s programs developed by the Poland and 
Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE). Both 
interviewees contributed with a regional overview of the democratisation process in
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Poland mainly by the historical role of their respective institutions in the country. 
From the perspective of regional and international actors I also found important to 
contact the U.S. Embassy in Poland. Patrick Lahey who was responsible for the 
Cultural Affairs Office received me. Lahey had also served at the U.S. Embassy in 
Ecuador and gave me a good comparison about the U.S. activities in each country; he 
also helped me to identify other institutions with relevant work in Poland such as the 
Stefan Batory Foundation that was established by the American financier George 
Soros. At the Foundation I interviewed Jakub Boratynski, currently at the Directorate 
General of Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission but in that 
occasion a researcher on the rule of law issues. His interview contributed for the 
understanding of the debate on the rule of law in Poland.
At the National level I interviewed Andrzej Siemaszko, Director of the Institute of 
Justice of the Ministry of Justice, who provided a valuable statistical data about the 
police; and Bodgan Bujak, President of the Administration and Home Affairs 
Commission at the Sejm, and the Representative Bozena Kizinska. Their interviews 
contributed to explain how the Legislative commissions work and the place human 
rights and the rule of law issues have in the political debate. Although much criticism 
can be made on the commission’s work, there is a formal commission that dedicates 
time and work on human rights and police issues.
At the police institution I interviewed the officers Robert Sudenis, Josef 
Tomaszewski, Tadeusz Zygmunt, Leszek Szreder and Dariusz Drzal. They all 
provided important information about the current institutional and operational 
situation of the police, their perception about the institution, criminality and human 
rights issues. Their most important contribution, however, was the possibility they 
gave me to observe, through their own behaviour, a clear evidence of the level of 
professionalisation, transparency and accessibility of the police institution in Poland.
In the case of Ecuador there was no relevant academic work on the police when I 
started my research. My first interviewee in the country was Bertha Garcia, Professor 
at the Catholic Pontifical University of Ecuador (PUCE), who had developed 
extensive work on the military and was one of the first scholars to give attention to 
the police in Ecuador. Garcia together with a group of officers had recently organised
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a debate about the police reform and through her I was able to contact those officers 
compromised with the idea of reform and open to discuss the police issues. In this 
sense, two clue interviewees were Colonel Juan Carlos Ruedas and Captain Ricardo 
Cevallos. Both provided relevant material for this research and helped me to identify 
different people and groups within the police institution.
A veiy important interview was the one I had with the Sister Elsie Monje, Executive 
Director of the Ecumenical Human Rights Commission (CEDHU). CEDHU has 
worked for decades in monitoring and promoting human rights in Ecuador. Monje 
provided a detailed material on police violence and a very interesting overview on the 
human rights situation and its historical development in Ecuador. At CEDHU I also 
interviewed Cdsar Duque, a lawyer and researcher on human rights who provided 
complementary material for this research.
Also crucial were the contacts at the U.S. Embassy in Quito, where I interviewed Ken 
Keller, from the Narcotics Affairs Section of the Embassy (NAS); Brian Doherty, 
Director of NAS in Ecuador; and Carlos Arrobo, Ecuadorian researcher who was 
developing a project on the judicial system under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy. 
All the interviews were very helpful to understand the activities developed by 
different U.S. institutions in the country, and especially relevant was the detailed 
information and material provided by Ken Keller about the U.S. police assistance to 
Ecuador. In order to complement the information about the U.S assistance related to 
the rule of law, I also interviewed Patricia Esquetini who was responsible for the 
projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) at the 
Esquel Foundation, a non-profit civil society organisation aiming to promote 
democracy and development in the country.
With the development of my research I found out that France and Spain were the two 
countries that followed the U.S. regarding police assistance in Ecuador. For this 
reason I contacted their embassies in Quito and interviewed Jean Pierre Coderch, 
Police Attach^ at the French Embassy, and Juli&n Marin y Rios, Counseller of Home 
Affairs at the Spanish Embassy. Both interviewees provided relevant information 
about the police assistance from their respective countries to the Ecuadorian National 
Police.
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In my intent to get official information from the Ecuadorian National Police and to 
verify if there was any data on the institution and their activities I also contacted 
Colonel Camacho, Colonel Guzm&n, and Colonel Vinueza, respectively responsible 
for the Pedagogical, Planning and International Affairs divisions, and Colonel 
Machado, Under-Secretary of the Police at the Ministry of Government. I tried in 
vein to contact higher officers at the police; my requests for appointment were never 
denied, neither attended. The main contribution of these interviews as well as the 
entire process of trying to make an appointment with the police commanders or get 
any information from the police was the evidence of secrecy, closeness and hierarchy 
of the police institution in Ecuador.
At the police institution I also contacted Jacqueline Chacdn, a Psychologist who 
works at the Police Academy, and Carlos Hirose, a Pedagogue who works at the 
Pedagogical Division. Both develop activities regarding pedagogical issues and were 
very open in providing the material they had available. I also interviewed Captain 
L6pez who contacted me when I was conducting research at the Pedagogical 
Division; this interview was interesting to reveal the concerns coming from the troops 
in relation to the educational program at the police.
At the governmental level I also contacted Fernando Acosta, who was the Under­
secretary of Government and Police; Laura Orellana, who was in charge of the 
Human Rights Unit of the Ministry; and Soledad Cdrdoba from the Ecuadorian 
Institute of International Cooperation (INECI). In all cases, their interviews mainly 
contributed to give more evidence of the lack of systematic information and human 
rights culture in the Ecuadorian institutions.
I also interviewed Osvaldo Jarrin, General of the Armed Forces. Jarrin had been Joint 
Chief of Staff and later became Minister of Defence. When I interviewed him he was 
developing research on security issues at FLACSO and provided helpful insights 
about the relationship between the police and the Armed Forces.
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List of interviews
Poland
1- Denis Petit (OSCE, 28 June 2004)
Head of the Unit Legislative of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR), at OSCE.2- Albin Dearing (PHARE, 29 June 2004)
Responsible for the PHARE projects in Poland.
3- Andrzej Rzeplinski (University of Warsaw, 1 July 2004)
Professor of Criminal and Constitutional Law and member of the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights.
4- Patrick Lahey (U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, 30 June 2004)
Cultural Affairs Office. The original contact I had at the Embassy was abroad during 
my stay in Warsaw.
5- Jakub Boratynski (Stefan Batoiy Foundation, 8 July 2004)
Head of the Unit to Fight against Organised Crime at the Directorate General of 
Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission. Previously, Boratynski 
was the Programme Director of the Stefan Batory Foundation, an independent private 
Polish foundation established by the American financier George Soros in 1988.
6- Barbara Kunicka (Polish Academy of Sciences, 5 May 2005)
Professor at the Institute of Legal Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
7- Andrzej Siemaszko (Institute of Justice, 5 May 2005)
Director of the Institute of Justice at the Ministry of Justice.
8- Bogdan Bujak (Sejm, 6 May 2005)
President of the Administration and Home Affairs Commission at the Sejm. 
Representative Bozena Kizinska, from the same Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), 
also participated in the interview that occurred with the assistance of an interpreter.
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9- Eva Letowska (Justice Constitutional Tribunal, 9 May 2005)
Judge at the Justice Constitutional Tribunal and Professor at the Institute of Legal 
Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
10- Slawomir Cybulski (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 9 May 2005)
Lawyer and researcher on police issues at the Helsinki Foundation. Cybulski was also 
a police officer until his retirement in 1995, and participated in the Police reform 
training.
11- Zigbniew Lasocik (Warsaw University, 9 May 2005)
Professor in the School of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialisation.
12- Robert Sudenis (National Police Headquarters, 10 May 2005)
Commissary and Councillor at the Department of Studies and Analysis of the Police 
Strategy Office. Interview conducted with interpreter.
13- Josef Tomaszewski (National Police Headquarters, 10 May 2005)
Junior Inspector and Deputy Director of the Police Strategy Office. Interview 
conducted with interpreter.
14- Tadeusz Zygmunt (National Police Headquarters, 10 May 2005)
Deputy Director of the Bureau of International Police Cooperation. Interview 
conducted with interpreter.
15- Leszek Szreder (National Police Headquarters, 10 May 2005)
General Inspector of the European and International Cooperation Department. 
Interview conducted with interpreter.
16- Monika Platek (Polish Association for Legal Education, 10 May 2005)
Professor and researcher at the Polish Association for Legal Studies.
17- Dariusz Drzal, (National Police Headquarters, 11 May 2005)
Deputy Head of the European and International Cooperation Department.
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Ecuador
1- Bertha Garcia (Catholic Pontifical University of Ecuador - PUCE, 6 July 2005) 
Professor at the School of Human Sciences.
2- Juan Carlos Ruedas (Escuela del Estado Mayor, 11 July 2005)
Police Colonel and one of the police leadership that has promoted the debate on 
police reform.
3- Osvaldo Jarrin (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO-Ecuador, 12 
July 2005)
General of the Armed Forces and Joint Chief of Staff in 2003. Jarrin was developing 
research on security issues at FLACSO, and in 2005 he also became Minister of 
Defence.
4- Renato Cevallos (Judicial Police, 19 July 2005)
Police Captain and one of the police leadership that has promoted the debate on 
police reform.
5- Jacqueline Chacdn {Escuela de Estado Mayor, 22 July 2005)
Psychologist working at the police academy.
6- Colonel Camacho (Pedagogical Division of the Police, 28 July 2005)
Police Colonel. Colonel Camacho was working in the Pedagogical Division.
7- Francisco Guzman (Police General Headquarters, 4 August 2005 and 30 August 
2005)
Police Colonel. Colonel Guzmdn was working in the Planning Division.
8- Carlos Hirose, (Pedagogical Division of the Police, 9 August 2005)
Pedagogue. Hirose was working on the curriculum and training courses in the Police 
Pedagogical Division.
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9- Captain L6pez (Pedagogical Police Division, 9 August 2005)
Police Captain. When Captain L6pez learned that I was doing research about the 
police and that I was interested in the police agreement with universities for special 
courses for police members, he came to talk with me and to complain about these 
programmes, saying they were for an elite within the institution.
10- Elsie Monje (Ecumenical Human Rights Commission - CEDHU, 11 August 
2005)
Executive Director of CEDHU.
11- Fernando Acosta (Ministry of Government, Police and Worship, 17 August 2005) 
Under Secretary of Government and Police.
12- Colonel Machado (Ministry of Government, Police and Worship, 17 August 2005 
Colonel and Under Secretary of Police.
13- Laura Orellana (Ministry of Government, Police and Worship, 17 August 2005) 
Responsible for the Human Rights Unit of the Ministry.
14- Carlos Arrobo (U.S. Embassy in Quito, 30 August 2005and 1 September 2005) 
Research on judicial system. Arrobo was working in a project developed under the 
auspices of the U.S. Embassy.
15- Brian Doherty (U.S. Embassy in Quito, 30 August 2005)
Director of the Narcotics Affairs Section -  NAS of the U.S. Embassy in Quito.
16- Colonel Vinueza (Police General Headquarters, 30 August 2005)
Police Colonel. Colonel Vinueza was responsible for the International Affairs 
Department of the Police.
17- C6sar Duque (CEDHU, 16 February 2006)
Lawyer and researcher at CEDHU.
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18- Ken Keller (U.S. Embassy, 16 March 2006)
Keller worked at NAS.
19- Patricia Esquetini (Esquel Foundation, 21 March 2006)
Researcher at Esquel, a private non-profit civil society organisation aiming to 
promote democracy and development. Esquetini was developing some projects 
sponsored by USAID in Ecuador.
20- Jean Pierre Coderch (Embassy of France in Quito, 05 May 2006)
Police Attache at the Embassy.
21- Julian Marin y Rios (Embassy of Spain in Quito, 29 May 2006)
Counsellor of Home Affairs at the Embassy.
22- Soledad C6rdoba (Ecuadorian Institute of International Cooperation - INECI, 24 
August 2005)
Responsible for the cooperation issues between Ecuador and European countries and 
organisations.
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ANNEX
Table 1 -  Countries’ ratings for political rights and civil liberties, and freedom status
BOLIVIA ECUADOR PERU HUNGARY POLAND
Period covered PR CL FS PR CL FS PR CL FS PR CL FS PR CL FS
1977 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF
1978 5 3 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 PF
1979 3 3 PF 2 4 F 5 4 PF 6 5 PF 6 5 PF
1980 7 5 NF 2 2 F 2 3 F 6 5 PF 6 4 PF
Jan.81-Aug.82 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 3 F 6 5 PF 6 5 PF
Aug.82-Nov.83 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 3 F 6 5 PF 6 5 PF
Nov.83-Nov.84 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 3 F 6 5 PF 6 5 PF
Nov.84-Nov.85 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 5 PF 6 5 PF
Nov.85-Nov.86 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 5 PF 6 5 PF
Nov.86-Nov.87 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 5 5 PF
Nov.87-Nov.88 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 5 5 PF
Nov.88-Dec.89 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 4 F 4 3 PF 4 3 PF
1990 2 3 F 2 2 F 3 4 PF 2 2 F 2 2 F
1991 2 3 F 2 3 F 3 5 PF 2 2 F 2 2 F
1992 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 5 PF 2 2 F 2 2 F
1993 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 5 PF 1 2 F 2 2 F
1994 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 1 2 F 2 2 F
1995 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
1996 2 3 F 2 4 PF 4 3 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
1997 1 3 F 3 3 PF 5 4 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
1998 1 3 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
1999 1 3 F 2 3 F 5 4 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
2000 1 3 F 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 1 2 F 1 2 F
2001 1 3 F 3 3 PF 2 3 F 1 2 F 1 2 F
2002 2 3 F 3 3 PF 2 3 F 1 2 F 1 2 F
2003 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 2 3 F 1 2 F 1 2 F
2003-2004 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 2 3 F 1 1 F 1 1 F
PR = Political Rights; CL = Civil Liberties; FS = Freedom Status; F = free; PF = Partially free; NF = 
Non-free. A country is considered “free” when it has an average rating for political rights and civil 
liberties of between 1 and 2.5; “partially free” when the average rating is between 3 and 5.5; and “non- 
free” when it is between 5.5 and 7. Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Comparative 
Rankings: 1973 to 2005.
This survey is valuable for a primary approach to each region; however, in the case of Ecuador, it is 
striking that the repressive government of Le6n Febres Cordero (1984-1988), responsible for human 
rights violations, is not reflected in the country’s scores. The insensitivity to the repression of this 
period may be explained by the low number of victims compared to past authoritarian regimes in the 
region, and the general invisibility of human rights violations in the country.
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Table 2 - Human development index (HDI)
Country HDI value HDI
Rank
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2003
Norway 0.859 0.877 0.888 0.901 0.925 0.942 0.963 1
Hungary 0.777 0.793 0.805 0.804 0.809 0.835 0.862 35
Poland •• •• •• 0.792 0.808 0.833 0.858 37
Peru 0.643 0.674 0.707 0.734 0.762 0.762 79
Ecuador 0.630 0.674 0.698 0.715 0.730 •• 0.759 82
Bolivia 0.549 0.580 0.604 0.636 0.672 0.687 0.687 113
Sierra
Leone
0.275 0.298 173
Source: UNDP, Human Development Indicators 2002 .
181 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.
Table 3- Signatures and status of ratifications of the American Convention on Human Rights until 
2006
SIGNATORY
COUNTRIES
DATE OF DEPOSIT OF 
RATIFICATION
DATE OF 
ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE COURT
Antigua y Barbuda
Argentina 5 Sep. 1984 5 Sep. 1984
Bahamas
Barbados 27 Nov. 1982 4 Jun. 2000
Belize
Bolivia 19 Jul. 1979 27 Jul. 1993
Brazil 25 Sep. 1992 10 Dec. 1998
Canada
Chile* 21 Aug. 1990 21 Aug. 1990
Colombia* 31 Jul. 1973 21 Jun. 1985
Costa Rica* 8 Apr. 1970 2 Jul. 1980
Dominica 11 Jun. 1993
Dominican Republic 19 Apr. 1978 25 Mar. 1999
Ecuador* 28 Dec. 1977 13 Aug. 1984
El Salvador 23 Jun. 1978 6 Jun. 1995
Grenada 18 Jul. 1978
Guatemala 25 May 1978 9 Mar. 1987
Guyana
Haiti 27 Sep. 1977 20 Mar. 1998
Honduras 8 Sep. 1977 9 Sep. 1981
Jamaica* 7 Aug. 1978
Mexico 3 Apr. 1982 16 Dec. 1998
Nicaragua 25 Sep. 1979 12 Feb.1991
Panama 22 Jun. 1978 3 May 1990
Paraguay 24 Aug. 1989 26 Mar. 1993
Peru* 28 Jul. 1978 21 Jan. 1981
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vicent and Grenadines
Suriname 12 Nov. 1987 12 Nov. 1987
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Trinidad y Tobago 28 May 1991 28 May 1991
United States
Uruguay* 19 Apr. 1985 19 Apr. 1985
Venezuela* 9 Aug. 1977 24 Jun. 1981
* States that have accepted the competence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights to receive 
and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State Party has violated the 
human rights set forth in the American Convention: Argentina (September 5, 1984); Chile (August 21, 
1990); Colombia (June 21, 1985); Costa Rica (July 2, 1980); Ecuador (August 13, 1984); Jamaica 
(August 7, 1978); Nicaragua (February 6, 2006); Peru (January 21, 1981); Uruguay (April 19, 1985) 
and Venezuela (August 9, 1977).
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Table 4: Accusations o f gross human rights violations received by CEDHU
Year Homicide Torture Physical
Aggression
Arbitrary
Detention
Detainees
Disappeared
C V C V C V C V C V
1985 9 11 50 50 0 55 66 66 - -
1986 19 19 88 88 92 92 115 115 - -
1987 36 36 84 84 89 89 177 177 - -
1988 19 19 46 46 124 124 142 142 - -
1989 21 21 61 64 110 110 137 439 - -
1990 20 20 56 57 175 177 225 236 - -
1991 22 23 39 46 93 132 95 166 - -
1992 28 35 54 83 92 450 80 189 - -
1993 30 43 67 119 127 250 134 436 - -
1994 21 21 51 107 95 501 126 399 - -
1995 16 16 34 53 80 144 126 253 - -
1996 26 34 43 67 105 376 166 414 - -
1997 22 35 47 70 129 211 190 613 - -
1998 11 17 21 45 75 138 87 323 - -
1999 31 47 33 87 87 882 137 1559 - -
2000 18 33 19 50 67 162 131 664 - 10
2001 - 62 - 31 - 857 - 542 - 1
2002 - 28 - 79 - 323 - 240 - 2
2003 - 10 - 25 - 551 - 83 - 3
2004 - 21 - 17 - 368 - 252 - 3
Total 371 551 841 1268 1643 5992 2210 7308 - 19
C = Complaints; V = Victims 
Source: CEDHU, 2005.
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Table 5: Cases initiated by the NCPJ in 2004
Type o f offence Number o f cases
Offences against individual freedom 16
Offences against home violation 3
Offences related to statements of unions or relatives 1
Offence against police personnel 2
Offences against the existence and security of the NP 183
Offences against subordination 54
Illegal absence 20
Abandonment of service 51
Desertion 205
Abuse of police power 94
Offences against “police faith” (delitos contra la fe  policial) 118
Offences against the administration of justice 9
Offences against the administration of justice 15
Fraud, mismanagement, and other abuses in the administration of 
the institution
127
Crimes against life 40
Injuries 4
Rape 6
Abduction 61
Theft (hurto) 21
Robbery 51
Extortion 8
Embezzlement and other previous frauds 38
Total 1,127
Source: NCPJ, on 30 March 2006.
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Table 6: U.S. Assistance to Ecuador (2006)
U.S. Bodies Issue Amount
(US$)
USAID Social and Economic Development - Northern Border 
and Southern Border
14,390,000
Department of State Security: Counter-narcotics
Security: Trafficking of People, Money Laundering 
and Other International Crimes
8,000,000
3,000,000
Department of Labour Child Labour 11,000,000
Department of Agriculture Agriculture 10,000,000
Military Group Humanitarian Aid 5,300,000
USAID Environmental Protection 4,500,000
USAID Democracy and Governance (Reforms to the Judiciary) 3,250,000
Department of State Education 1,000,000
Total: 61,590,000
Source: U.S. Embassy in Quito; FY 2006.
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Table 7 - Projects developed under agreement between the US and the Ecuadorian governments for
2005
Project
Number
Project Title Personnel Operational
Support
Equipment
and
Supplies
Other
Expenses
Total
01181214 Police
Operations
450,000 1,000,000 2,242,000 200,000 3,892,000
01181215 Police
Infrastructure
80,000 - - 1,880,000 1,960,000
01181206 Counter-
Narcotics
Training
90,000 145,000 710,000 945,000
01181207 Chemical 
Control / 
Money 
Laundering
0 0 200,000 70,000 270,000
01181208 Prevention 0 0 0 75,000 75,000
01181309 Military
Projects
500,000 2,300,000 200,000 3,000,000
01183913 Migration
Control
Project
140,000 50,000 10,000 200,000
01185210 Investigation
Support
- 440,000 100,000 60,000 600,000
01185211 DEA Andean 
Initiative
- 25,000 15,000 0 40,000
Summary Total of 
Projects
620,000 2,105,000 5,052,000 3,205,000 10,982,000
Source: NAS, U.S. Embassy in Quito, 2006.
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Table 8 - Projects developed under agreement between the US and the Ecuadorian governments for
2004
Project
Number
Project Title Personnel Operation 
al Support
Equipment
and
Supplies
Other
Expenses
Total
0118-1214 Police
Operations
294,000 810,000 2,221,000 1,000,000 4,325,000
0118-1215 Police
Infrastructure
18,000 0 2,682,000 0 2,700,000
0118-1206 Counter-
Narcotics
Training
75,000 785,000 140,000 0 1,000,000
0118-1207 Chemical 
Control / Money 
Laundering
0 0 0 150,000 150,000
0118-1808 Prevention 0 0 0 125,000 125,000
0118-1309 Military Projects 0 150,000 5,800,000 50,000 6,000,000
0118-5210 Investigation
Support
100,000 29,000 300,000 124,000 553,000
0118-5211 DEA Andean 
Initiative
0 0 16,000 258,990 274,000
0118-5212 Fluvial 
Patrol Project
0 12,000 388,000 0 400,000
0118-3913 Migration 
Project Control
0 0 200,000 25,000 225,000
0118-9202 Investigation
Support
0 0 0 100,000 100,000
Summary Total of Projects 620,000 2,105,000 5,052,000 3,205,000 10,982,000
Source: NAS, U.S. Embassy in Quito, 2006.
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Table 9 - Ecuadorian Security Budget (2006)
Sector Institution Initial Budget 
(In millions of dollars)
Judicial Sector Supreme Court 140,38
Military Court of Justice 0,89
Police Court of Justice 2,05
Total 143,31
Internal Affairs Ministry of Government and Police 24,27
Sector National Police 410,72
National Security Directorate 0,86
Social Rehabilitation National Council 31,35
Traffic National Council 38,12
National Migration Directorate 3,00
Total 508,32
Defence Ministry of Defence 621,1%
Sector National Security Council 4,48
Total 632,26
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006.
227
Table 10 - Female inmates by type o f offence (2005)
Type o f offence Inmates in Quito (%) Inmates in Guayaquil (%)
Against people 5 5
Against property 5 10
Related to drugs 75 77
Others 15 8
Total 100 100
Source: FLACSO, Survey at Social Rehabilitation Centres, 2005.
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Cabinet of Police 
Commander in Chief
Social Communication 
Bureau
Personel and Training 
Bureau
First Deputy Chief
Prevention and Traffic 
Bureau
V J
Central Operational Board
Legal Bureau
Control Bureau
Protection of Classified 
Information Bureau
Internal Affair Bureau
Internal Audit Unit
National Center for 
Criminal Information
Chief Commander of 
Polish Police
Deputy Chief 
Commander
Central Investigation
Criminal Bureau
Criminal Intelligence
Central Forensic
 Police Logistic Bureau
Deputy Chief
Information and 
Comunication
Finance Bureau
International Affairs 
Bureau
Public Ministry j.
Council of Generals Superior CouncilDistrict Courts
Central Intelligence Division
Chief Commander s 
Cabinet
National Social Welfare 
Division
Police Under 
Secretary
Ministry of Government 
and Police National Police Council
Council of police and
National Court of Police
General Secretary
Joint Chief of Staff
General Inspectorate
Personnel General Division
National Communication 
Division
Personnel Joint Chief of 
Staff
Urban and Rural National 
Service Division
Financial Division
General Logistics Division
Community Action 
Department
Department of 
International Afairs National Legal Division
National Narcotics Division
Police General Chief 
Commander
General Operations Division
Planning Division
National Education Division
National Criminal and 
Investigation Police Division
Environment Protection 
Department
National Migration Division
National Health Division
National Transit and Transport 
Division
Secretary of the General 
Chief Commander
National Public Security 
Division
Department of 
Communications, 
Strategy and Control
General Division for Civil 
Affairs and Community
National Special Division 
for Children and Juvenile 
Affairs
General Inspectorate
Internal Audit
Legal Office
First District 
Command
District Joint 
Chief o f Staff
1
Pichincha CP-1 
Command
Carchi CP-10 
Command
1
ImababuniCP-12
Command
Esmeraldas CP-14 
Command
| i
Napo CP-20 
Command
Sucumbions CP- 
21 Command
Francisco Orellana 
CP-22 Command
Rescue and Especial
Emergency Squad Investigations
District Joint Chief 
o f Staff
Pastaza CP-15 
Command
Cotopaxi CP-13 
Command
Second Distrcit 
Command
Chimborazo CP-5 
Command
Bolivar CP-1 1 
Command
Special Mounted Unit
Operations Squad
Police Social 
Security
Guayas CP-2 
Command
Manabi CP-4 
Command
Zamora Chinchipe 
CP-18 Command
Galapagos CP-19 
Command
Azuay CP-6 
Command
Loja CP-7 
Command
El Oro CP-3
Command
Third District 
Command
District Joint 
Chief o f Staff
Fourth distrcit 
Command
District Joint 
Chief o f Staff
Morona Santiago 
CP-17 Command
CaflarCP-15
Command
Los Rios CP-8 
Command
Kidnapping 
Investigation Unit
Environmet 
Protection Unit
Community 
Action Unit
 ------
National Police
Chronology of the US military and clandestine operations in Latin America and Caribbean 
countries since the post World War II:
1954
1958
1959
1961
1962
1963 
Ibarra.
1964 
1964
Guatemala CIA overthrows the government of President Jacob Arbenz
Guzman.
Panama Clashes between US forces in Canal Zone and local citizens.
Haiti Marines land.
Cuba CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion.
Cuba Nuclear threat and naval blockade.
Ecuador CIA backs military overthrow of President Jose Maria Velasco
Panama Clashes between US forces in Canal Zone and local citizens.
Brazil CIA-backed military coup overthrows the government of JoSo
Goulart and General Castello Branco takes power.
1965 Dominican Rep. 23,000 troops land.
1966-67 Guatemala Extensive counter-insurgency operation.
1973 Chile CIA-backed military coup outs government of President Salvador
Allende. General Augusto Pinochet comes to power.
1981-1992
1981-1990 
in harbors.
1983
1983-1989
1986
1989
El Salvador 
Nicaragua
Grenada
Honduras
Bolivia
Colombia, 
Bolivia, 
and Peru
1989-1990 Panama
government of President Noriega.
1991 Haiti
1994-1996 Haiti
Aristide to office.
2004 Haiti
Bertrand Aristide.
CIA and special forces begin a long counterinsurgency campaing. 
CIA directs exile “Contra” operations. US air units drop sea mines
Military forces invade Grenada.
Large program of military assistance at conflict in Nicaragua. 
Special Forces units engage in counter-insurgency 
Andean Initiative on war on drugs.
27,000 troops as well as naval and air power used to overthrow
CIA-backed military coup outs President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
Troops depose military rulers restore President Jean Bertrand
Marines land. CIA-backed forces overthrow President Jean
Source: Based on Global Policy Forum, US Military and Clandestine Operations in Foreign Countries, 
1798-Present, December 2005.
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